I am designing a fail-closed filesystem ACL verifier and would appreciate clarification of the supported public API contract.
The observed environment is macOS 27.0, build 26A428, on Apple silicon. Disk Utility identifies the Data volume mounted at /System/Volumes/Data as APFS (Encrypted). Finder shows Xcode 27.2, and Xcode displays a built-in macOS 27.2 component. The exact SDK build and the SDK to be used for validation remain unconfirmed.
I am considering acl_get_fd_np with ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED and acl_get_entry. Could someone clarify:
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How can a caller distinguish an absent ACL, a valid zero-entry ACL, and failed or unavailable ACL retrieval on an existing object? Under what documented conditions, if any, does a NULL result with ENOENT establish that an ACL is absent?
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How can a caller recognise valid enumeration completion without confusing it with invalid ACL state or another EINVAL failure?
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Is there a supported descriptor-bound public API or documented sequence for making these distinctions? How should omitted security attributes and truncated attribute buffers be interpreted?
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Which of these guarantees depend on the macOS build, SDK version, or filesystem?
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What guarantees apply to object identity and concurrent changes between reading ACL evidence and a later operation?
I intend to classify ambiguous evidence as indeterminate and do not intend to modify ACLs on assessed objects.
Thank you.