Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement

I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script.

I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API.

My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement:

Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement?

Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque.

If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate?

Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter?

A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.