macOS is the operating system for Mac.

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API to get the system pointer’s actual rendered size (respecting Accessibility → Pointer size)?
I'm positioning a tooltip-style panel relative to the mouse pointer and need to avoid overlapping the pointer glyph itself. This works fine at the default pointer size, but breaks once the user sets System Settings → Accessibility → Pointer → Pointer size to something larger than Normal — the pointer is visibly bigger on screen, but my offset doesn't grow to match, so the tooltip overlaps it. The only cursor-size-related value I've found any API expose is the ratio behind that same setting, read via: /usr/bin/defaults read com.apple.universalaccess mouseDriverCursorSizeThis returns a scale factor (1.0 = Normal, larger toward Large), not a size in points. I'm using it to scale a fixed offset, but that only approximates the real on-screen footprint of the pointer glyph — it doesn't tell me the glyph's actual rendered bounding box, so the tooltip still clips the pointer at larger sizes. Question: Is there a supported API — AppKit, Accessibility, or otherwise — that returns the system pointer's actual rendered size (bounding box, in points) reflecting the user's Pointer size setting? Or is there a different recommended approach for positioning UI relative to the live pointer without overlapping it, that doesn't depend on knowing that size directly? Minimal repro (AppKit, Swift Package Manager, no storyboard/xib — ~150 lines): enum CursorPrefs { static func readPointerScale() -> Double { let process = Process() process.executableURL = URL(fileURLWithPath: "/usr/bin/defaults") process.arguments = ["read", "com.apple.universalaccess", "mouseDriverCursorSize"] let outputPipe = Pipe() process.standardOutput = outputPipe process.standardError = Pipe() try? process.run() process.waitUntilExit() let data = outputPipe.fileHandleForReading.readDataToEndOfFile() let output = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8)?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? "" guard let scale = Double(output), scale >= 1.0 else { return 1.0 } return scale } } // A tracking-area view shows a tooltip-style NSPanel near NSEvent.mouseLocation, // offset by a fixed amount scaled by the value above. At Pointer size = Large, // the tooltip still overlaps the (visibly bigger) pointer glyph, because the // value is a ratio, not the glyph's rendered size in points.Steps to reproduce: Run the demo app (swift run, or open Package.swift in Xcode and Run). Open System Settings → Accessibility → Pointer → Pointer size and set it to Large. Quit and relaunch the demo (it reads the setting once at launch). Move the mouse over the gray box in the window. The floating tooltip tracks the pointer but still overlaps the now-larger pointer glyph. Environment: macOS 14.7.8 (23H730, Xcode 16.2 (16C5032a), Swift 5.9, arm64 (Apple Silicon). Happy to attach the full repro project as a zip if useful — it's a single main.swift plus an SPM manifest, no external dependencies.
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productbuild and Keychain Access concern
productbuild cmd: productbuild --component /Applications/Very\ Large\ Number\ Calculator.app /Applications --sign "3rd Party Mac Developer Installer: Alain_B " /Applications/Very\ Large\ Number\ Calculator.pkg Give this error: Cannot write product to "/Applications/Very Large Number Calculator.pkg". (Could not find appropriate signing identity for “3rd Party Mac Developer Installer: Alain_B ”.) But Keychain Access show "3rd Party Mac Developer Installer" is in Certificates: 3rd Party Mac Developer Application: 10 digits (64......J5) certificate login Nov 10, 2027 at 8:02:04 AM Alain_B private key login 3rd Party Mac Developer Installer: Alain_B (64......J5) certificate login Apr 19, 2027 at 8:32:51AM Apple Development: Alain_B (35......P5) certificate login Oct 19, 2027 at 9:29:59 AM Apple Development: Alain_B (Alain_B ) private key login Apple Distribution: Alain_B (64MZBY64J5) certificate login Oct 26, 2027 at 9:36:16 AM Alain_B private key login Apple Root CA certificate login Feb 9, 2035 at 4:40:36 PM Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification Authority certificate login Feb 19, 2030 at 7:00:00 PM Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification Authority certificate login Mar 18, 2036 at 8:00:00 PM Developer ID Certification Authority certificate login Feb 1, 2027 at 5:12:15 PM Developer ID Certification Authority certificate login Sep 16, 2031 at 8:00:00 PM What can I do ? Thank you.
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Can macOS sandbox-exec confine writes to a directory that doesn’t exist yet?
I’m evaluating an offline command-line tool launched from Terminal on macOS. The parent process creates an enclosing directory, then launches the tool through /usr/bin/sandbox-exec -p with an inline profile. The tool must create its own output directory, which is absent at launch. Can a macOS sandbox profile reliably enforce all of the following for that invocation? Allow reads of the tool’s interpreter, dependencies and input files. Deny network access and creation of child processes by the sandboxed tool. Allow the tool to create /path/to/work/proof/producer001 and write beneath it, while denying writes outside that directory, including writes through symlinks or other path aliases. The proposed profile denies file-write* globally and allows it only under a subpath rule for the output directory. Does that exception cover creation of the directory itself when only its parent exists? Does deny process-fork cover all child-process creation paths, including posix_spawn? Is there a supported way to inspect or validate the effective policy for an exact command and working directory before invoking it? If sandbox-exec is unsuitable for this use, is there a supported macOS mechanism for applying these restrictions to a command-line tool launched from Terminal? A documentation reference would be helpful.
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iOS 27b3 SDK: iOS App on Mac crashes on UISearchBar focus
Our app crashes when compiled with the iOS 27 beta 3 SDK and run as an iOS app on Mac, on both macOS 26 and macOS 27, as soon as a UISearchBar receives focus. The crash is due to this exception: *** Assertion failure in BOOL _screenBasedFocusUnsupported(void)(), UIScreen.m:3.725 Accessing the focus system through UIScreen is no longer supported. ( 0 CoreFoundation 0x000000018bea31c0 __exceptionPreprocess + 176 1 libobjc.A.dylib 0x000000018b91e91c objc_exception_throw + 88 2 Foundation 0x000000018e092644 -[NSMutableDictionary(NSMutableDictionary) initWithContentsOfFile:] + 0 3 UIKitCore 0x00000001c5dae8ec _screenBasedFocusUnsupported + 272 4 UIKitCore 0x00000001c5dae960 -[UIScreen _preferredFocusedWindow] + 24 5 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4ea3a60 -[UIScreen _mainSceneReferenceBounds] + 200 6 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4ea3914 -[UIScreen _mainSceneBoundsForInterfaceOrientation:] + 40 7 UIKitCore 0x00000001c5708134 +[UINavigationBar defaultSizeForOrientation:] + 76 8 UIKitCore 0x00000001c6222c88 -[_UISearchPresentationController _layoutPresentationWithSize:transitionCoordinator:] + 704 9 UIKitCore 0x00000001c622296c -[_UISearchPresentationController containerViewWillLayoutSubviews] + 84 10 UIKitCore 0x00000001c549304c block_destroy_helper.13 + 25112 11 UIKitCore 0x00000001c549344c block_destroy_helper.13 + 26136 12 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4ea26a8 -[UIView(CALayerDelegate) layoutSublayersOfLayer:] + 1648 13 QuartzCore 0x0000000196103dbc _ZN2CA5Layer15perform_update_EPS0_P7CALayerjNS_17LayerUpdateReasonEPNS_11TransactionE + 460 14 QuartzCore 0x000000019610390c _ZN2CA5Layer17update_if_needed_EPNS_11TransactionENS_17LayerUpdateReasonE + 692 15 QuartzCore 0x0000000196035d2c _ZN2CA7Context18commit_transactionEPNS_11TransactionEdPd + 608 16 QuartzCore 0x0000000195e69520 _ZN2CA11Transaction6commitEv + 652 17 AppKit 0x0000000190fe116c __37+[NSDisplayCycle currentDisplayCycle]_block_invoke.7 + 44 18 CoreFoundation 0x000000018be34ad0 __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_A_BLOCK__ + 28 19 CoreFoundation 0x000000018be34a10 __CFRunLoopDoBlocks + 396 20 CoreFoundation 0x000000018be33e54 __CFRunLoopRun + 2356 21 CoreFoundation 0x000000018bf06234 _CFRunLoopRunSpecificWithOptions + 532 22 HIToolbox 0x0000000198c1f560 RunCurrentEventLoopInMode + 320 23 HIToolbox 0x0000000198c228bc ReceiveNextEventCommon + 488 24 HIToolbox 0x0000000198dac14c _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInMode + 48 25 AppKit 0x00000001909163d0 _DPSBlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInMode + 228 26 AppKit 0x000000019026a084 _DPSNextEvent + 576 27 AppKit 0x0000000190dff96c -[NSApplication(NSEventRouting) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] + 688 28 AppKit 0x0000000190dff678 -[NSApplication(NSEventRouting) nextEventMatchingMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] + 72 29 AppKit 0x000000019025d13c -[NSApplication run] + 368 30 AppKit 0x00000001902357b0 NSApplicationMain + 880 31 AppKit 0x000000019047c958 +[NSWindow _savedFrameFromString:] + 0 32 UIKitMacHelper 0x00000001aa2651bc UINSApplicationMain + 972 33 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4e1aed4 UIApplicationMain + 144 34 UIKitCore 0x00000001c548bda0 block_destroy_helper.31 + 8880 35 DigitalConcertHall.debug.dylib 0x0000000106e41bd8 $sSo21UIApplicationDelegateP5UIKitE4mainyyFZ + 128 36 DigitalConcertHall.debug.dylib 0x0000000106e41b4c $s18DigitalConcertHall11AppDelegateC5$mainyyFZ + 32 37 DigitalConcertHall.debug.dylib 0x0000000106e4afc0 __debug_main_executable_dylib_entry_point + 28 38 dyld 0x000000018b9ac4e4 start + 6992 ) I could not test with the iOS 27 beta 4 SDK due to this blocking issue: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/839012 However, when I tried to set up a simple sample project, I could not reproduce the issue. Does anybody know what might be causing this? I filed feedback FB24201508
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Credential Provider Extension should allow BE=0, BS=0 for device-bound passkeys
In these threads, it was clarified that Credential Provider Extensions must set both Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags to 1 in authenticator data: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/745605 https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/787629 However, I'm developing a passkey manager that intentionally stores credentials only on the local device. My implementation uses: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for keychain items kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave for private keys No iCloud sync or backup These credentials are, by definition, single-device credentials. According to the WebAuthn specification, they should be represented with BE=0, BS=0. Currently, I'm forced to set BE=1, BS=1 to make the extension work, which misrepresents the actual backup status to relying parties. This is problematic because: Servers using BE/BS flags for security policies will incorrectly classify these as synced passkeys Users who specifically want device-bound credentials for higher security cannot get accurate flag representation Request: Please allow Credential Provider Extensions to return credentials with BE=0, BS=0 for legitimate device-bound passkey implementations. Environment: macOS 26.2 (25C56), Xcode 26.2 (17C52)
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Battery chart time labels shifted hours ahead on macOS 27 (endOfDay wrong in BatteryUI.plist)
the "last 24 hours" battery level and screen on usage charts in system settings > battery have the hour labels shifted way ahead of real time. the bars are in the right order, the axis is just wrong. at 17:13 it was showing stuff up to like 23:00. at 10:05 a few days later it was about 12 hours ahead. the "last charged to 100%" time above the chart is correct tho. my clock and time zone are fine (asia/manila, set automatically, synced). the battery data itself is right too, i checked the power log and the plug in and unplug times match what actually happened. i dug into it and found the problem in `/private/var/db/powerlog/Library/BatteryLife/Debug/BatteryUI.plist`, which is what the battery pane gets from PerfPowerServices. `endOfDay` comes back as the next hour instead of midnight: PLBatteryUIQueryTime 2026-10-24 17:13:25 (local) endOfHour 2026-10-24 18:00:00 <- correct endOfDay 2026-10-24 18:00:00 <- should be 2026-10-25 00:00:00 so the chart puts 00:00 at 18:00 yesterday and everything ends up 6 hours off. it looks like the chart always labels its right edge as 24:00, so the further you are from midnight the worse it gets. restarting PerfPowerServices (`sudo killall PerfPowerServices`) doesn't fix it, the new process sends the same values right away. macos 27.0.1 (26A434). this was fine on macos 26. looks like the same bug as https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/852392
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CloudKit sync fails in macOS TestFlight build – sandbox denies com.apple.cloudd
I have a macOS SwiftUI app using SwiftData with CloudKit synchronization. Bundle ID: com.mjsapps.PhrasePin CloudKit container: iCloud.com.mjsapps.PhrasePin CloudKit synchronization works when running the app from Xcode using the Development environment. However, synchronization does not work in the TestFlight / Production build. The Production schema has been deployed successfully. The TestFlight build has the expected entitlements, including: com.apple.developer.icloud-container-environment = Production com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers = iCloud.com.mjsapps.PhrasePin com.apple.developer.icloud-services = CloudKit com.apple.security.app-sandbox = true com.apple.security.network.client = true The TestFlight build is signed as: Authority=TestFlight Beta Distribution Identifier=com.mjsapps.PhrasePin TeamIdentifier=8D6TX86CQK CloudKit/Core Data logging shows that the app is trying to use: container=iCloud.com.mjsapps.PhrasePin:Production but synchronization fails with: CKErrorDomain Code=6 Error connecting to CloudKit daemon NSCocoaErrorDomain Code=4099 The macOS sandbox log shows: Sandbox: PhrasePin(...) deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd As a result, no com.apple.coredata.cloudkit.zone is created in the Production private database and no SwiftData records are synchronized. The problem has been reproduced on: macOS Sequoia 15.7.7 macOS Sequoia 15.7.9 The same app works with CloudKit in Development when run from Xcode. I have already submitted a Feedback Assistant report, but have not received a response. Has anyone seen this behavior with SwiftData + CloudKit in a sandboxed macOS TestFlight build? Is there an additional entitlement or provisioning requirement needed for access to com.apple.cloudd in Production?
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macos 27 - unexpected/new errno from BSD socket connect() when pending connections exceed backlog
Please consider the trivial C program attached to this thread. The code creates a socket() and listen()s for connections, but (intentionally) doesn't accept() the connections. The listen() is done using a small backlog (of 1). This test then does several connect() attempts and expects that the connect() attempts will accumulate in the pending queue and once the queue exceeds the backlog limit, then as specified in man listen: The backlog parameter defines the maximum length for the queue of pending connections. If a connection request arrives with the queue full, the client may receive an error with an indication of ECONNREFUSED. then the connect() attempt will receive a ECONNREFUSED. However, in macos 27, such a connect() attempt leads to ECONNRESET (Connection reset by peer) instead of ECONNREFUSED. Is this expected? Experiments show that prior versions of macos were returning a ETIMEDOUT for such connect() attempts. If this new error is expected from connect() when the backlog limit has exceeded, should it be specified in the man listen documentation? Rename the attached main.c.txt to main.c. Compiling the attached program on macos 27, using clang main.c and then running ./a.out results in: ----------------------- MacOS version: 27.0.1 Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 27.0.0: Tue Aug 11 21:02:16 PDT 2026; root:xnu-13432.1.9~1/RELEASE_ARM64_T8112 ----------------------- started server at at 127.0.0.1:52753 with a backlog of 1 connect() attempt 1 - connected connect() attempt 2 - connected connect() attempt 3 - connected connect() attempt 4 - connected connect() attempt 5 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 connect() attempt 6 - connected connect() attempt 7 - connected connect() attempt 8 - connected connect() attempt 9 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 connect() attempt 10 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 connect() attempt 11 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 On a related note, it's unclear why several of the connect() attempts succeeded instead of just 1 of them succeeding. On prior versions of macos, the output of the same program is: ----------------------- MacOS version: 26.7.1 Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 25.6.0: Tue Aug 18 17:49:13 PDT 2026; root:xnu-12377.161.15.700.19~2/RELEASE_ARM64_T6000 ----------------------- started server at at 127.0.0.1:52451 with a backlog of 1 connect() attempt 1 - connected connect() attempt 2 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 3 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 4 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 5 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 6 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 7 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 8 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 9 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 10 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 11 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out and this output is much more understandable and deterministic. main.c.txt
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Supported App Sandbox metadata access through an inherited file descriptor, without reopening the object
We are evaluating a macOS design before implementation. This is a platform-support question, not a report of an observed runtime failure. No actual controller executable, helper executable or deployment configuration has been selected or qualified. Our objective is to let a small, fixed-purpose helper examine an already-open object’s identity and access control list (ACL) metadata while preserving the original object reference and ownership. Proposed configuration A trusted controller would launch one native C helper using an explicit executable target and posix_spawn. The controller would need to qualify for the documented nonsandboxed-parent case, without a conflicting inherited sandbox. We do not assume that an absent entitlement alone establishes this. The helper would be the main executable of its own signed application bundle, using its own ordinary App Sandbox rather than inheriting the controller’s sandbox. Its proposed additional filesystem permission would be com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-only, containing exactly two fixed directory entries beneath a user’s development workspace, outside the helper’s container. The literal private paths are omitted. The controller would already own a read-only file descriptor for one regular file or directory within those trees. It would retain its original reference and pass a known duplicate referring to the same open object to the helper. The helper would perform one metadata observation. The proposed operations are fstat for object identity and fgetattrlist requesting ATTR_CMN_RETURNED_ATTRS and ATTR_CMN_EXTENDED_SECURITY, with FSOPT_REPORT_FULLSIZE and without FSOPT_PACK_INVAL_ATTRS. Required boundaries The helper must use only the inherited descriptor for the subject observation. The design does not permit: Reopening or resolving the subject through a pathname, bookmark or URL. Substituting a copied file or another object reference. Reading file contents, enumerating directories, changing permissions, or modifying shared descriptor flags or file offsets. Expanding the exception to an ancestor, home directory or broader workspace. Disabling an existing sandbox or using private interfaces to bypass restrictions. Parent-side traversal and identity checks remain separate responsibilities. Strict ancestor directories are not additional helper ACL subjects. We understand that a read-only directory exception and ordinary sandbox/container capabilities may permit more than the helper’s intended metadata operations. Metadata-only behaviour would be a reviewed-code obligation; we are not asking App Sandbox to enforce an exact metadata-only operation filter. Questions Supported launch and activation: Under what documented parent-context, signing, bundle, container and launch conditions can this helper establish its own ordinary App Sandbox? What supported mechanism or guarantee establishes that the sandbox is effective before the subject metadata operation? Required metadata permissions: Does the proposed read-only exception support fstat and the specified extended-security fgetattrlist request through an inherited read-only descriptor, for both regular files and directories? Please distinguish descriptor survival from permission to perform these operations, including any additional access-control conditions. Scope, identity and lifetime: What documented behaviour applies to descendant coverage, aliases, hard links, renames or namespace changes after the descriptor was opened? Please distinguish the lifetime of the inherited object reference from the lifetime of the static directory permission. Our design would refuse uncertainty rather than reopen, rebind or widen access. Evidence and support boundary: Which public documentation, interfaces or authoritative guarantees support this exact composition, and which parts require separate empirical qualification? Please identify applicable macOS versions and restrictions. Distinguish platform support from any distribution or App Store review requirements. If these requirements cannot be combined through supported interfaces, please identify the incompatible requirement. An approach requiring broader access, pathname reopening, a replacement object or a different handoff architecture would be a design change requiring separate review, not a solution within the stated constraints. Permission failures, unsupported requests and incomplete metadata would remain unavailable results. They would not be interpreted as proof that an ACL is absent. Complete ACL-absence interpretation and native resource bounds remain separate qualification questions. Apple material already reviewed Resolving App Sandbox Inheritance Problems App Sandbox Temporary Exception Entitlements Accessing files from the macOS App Sandbox
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Control fan speed on MacPro 3.1 (early 2008)
I have a MacPro 3.1 (early 2008) that has Linux installed on it (Debian 13). One of the fans runs at top speed of 2500 rpm because some sensor in the board can't report the temperature to the OS. The Motherboard model is Mac-F42C88C8. Searched the internet to see if I could find any information on how to identify the sensor or the SMC information about it. I would like to know if there is any information that anyone knows about this and where could I start trying to make a driver to control the fan by getting the value in the sensor. I can see in the program coolercontrol in Linux the Fan that is at high speed is named 'IO' Thanks Regards
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Sandboxed app can't delete AppleDouble (._) files of quarantined files on exFAT, even with user-selected access.
My Mac App Store utility removes Mac metadata files (._* AppleDouble files and .DS_Store) from external drives formatted exFAT or FAT32. The app is sandboxed with com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write and com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope. The user grants access to the volume through NSOpenPanel. Deleting a ._ file works, except when its companion file carries com.apple.quarantine (for example, a file downloaded with Safari and copied to the drive with Finder). Then: let partner = volume + "/Nirvana.zip" // has com.apple.quarantine let appleDouble = volume + "/._Nirvana.zip" removexattr(partner, "com.apple.quarantine", XATTR_NOFOLLOW) // -1, errno 1 (EPERM) unlink(appleDouble) // -1, errno 1 (EPERM)The same unlink succeeds from Terminal (not sandboxed, without Full Disk Access). On exFAT the extended attributes live in the ._ file, so I assume the sandbox refuses because deleting it would remove the quarantine attribute. Tried, with no change: Full Disk Access granted to the app. Adding com.apple.security.files.user-selected.executable (verified in the built app with codesign -d --entitlements -). On a real drive (a music library), about 71% of the ._ files belong to quarantined files, so this is most of what users want removed. Is there a supported way for a sandboxed app to remove these files: an entitlement, an API, or an explicit user action? If not, can you confirm it's intended behavior, so I can explain it accurately to users? macOS 27.2, Xcode 27.2, Apple silicon. Focused sample project available (one source file). DTS case 23240704.
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Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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Is NavigationSplitView on macOS 27 broken?
On macOS 27 Beta 2, a simple NavigationSplitView example exhibits bizarre behaviour when the window is resized. The sidebar seemingly expands and collapses at random as the window is resized. The symptoms can be exacerbated with toolbar items. The sidebar appears to behave correctly when an inspector view is not present. Copy paste the code below into a new Xcode 27 project and run on macOS 27 and then resize the window: File -> New -> Project... -> App import SwiftUI @main struct MyApp: App { var body: some Scene { WindowGroup { ContentView() } } } struct ContentView: View { var body: some View { NavigationSplitView { Text("Sidebar") } detail: { Text("Content") } .inspector(isPresented: .constant(true)) { Text("Inspector") } } } Adding .frame or .inspectorColumnWidth to any of the Text views does not appear to fix the issues. macOS: 27.0 Beta (26A5368g) Xcode: 27.0 beta 2 (27A5209h)
Topic: UI Frameworks SubTopic: SwiftUI Tags:
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Kernel tag check fault after wake on Mac17 hardware, Google Chrome Helper, macOS 26.5–27.0.1 — related to r.172793638?
We're seeing a recurring kernel panic across six Mac17-family Macs (Mac17,2 / Mac17,4 / Mac17,8; T8142 and T6050) in a managed fleet. 34 panic logs collected 30 Sept – 9 Oct, all with the same signature: panic(cpu N caller ...): Kernel tag check fault (expected tagged address: 0x...028), esr 0x96000011 Faulting address is always at offset 0x28 of the object Same crash PC per build: kernel text exec base + 0x48da38 on 27.0/27.0.1, + 0x46a784 on 26.7, + 0x466ee0 on 26.5 Panicked task is "Google Chrome Helper" in all 34 cases, thread Chrome_ChildIOThread (Chrome's IPC/network I/O thread) Always 3–60 s after wake from sleep, usually a dark wake with the lid closed (overnight or after a 3–18 min sleep) No third-party kexts loaded; "Post-boot loaded kexts" lists only Apple drivers Affected builds: 26.5 (25F71), 26.7 (25G229), 27.0 (26A428), 27.0.1 (26A434). Not a regression from one update: a machine still on 26.5 panics identically. Only Mac17-family hardware is affected. Older Apple silicon Macs with the same software stack are fine. Present on every affected machine: Chrome PWAs (Gmail/Chat/Meet) running in the background, keeping Chrome's network service alive across sleep. On one machine Microsoft Edge is the primary browser and never panics; only Chrome Helper does. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint with its network filter (content filter) extension, MDM-managed. This looks related to thread 821372, where DTS described a kernel networking panic on M5-family hardware with a Network Extension present (r.172793638 / FB22401652), fixed in 26.5b2. We appear to be seeing a tag-check-fault variant on 26.5 release and later. Questions: Is this a known issue, and is it the same root cause as r.172793638? Is there a build where it's fixed? Any recommended mitigation beyond preventing sleep and quitting Chrome? Feedback Assistant: FB25128015 with panic logs and sysdiagnose. Happy to collect more data or test a build. Backtrace from a 27.0.1 panic (kernel text exec base 0xfffffe003aa54000), panic PC first: lr: 0xfffffe003aee1a38 lr: 0xfffffe003aeec580 lr: 0xfffffe003b12cf34 lr: 0xfffffe003b12dc50 lr: 0xfffffe003b07b1f8 lr: 0xfffffe003b07c758 lr: 0xfffffe003b237ff4 lr: 0xfffffe003ac787f0 lr: 0xfffffe003aa576ac lr: 0x000000018747a57c (userspace)
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RLIMIT_AS across posix_spawn and exec on Apple silicon: documented guarantees?
What supported behaviour, if any, may applications rely on for inherited RLIMIT_AS when launching a process on macOS on Apple silicon using posix_spawn and subsequent exec transitions? An older published XNU header defines RLIMIT_AS: XNU resource.h (immutable revision) I am looking for the documented support and virtual-address-space accounting scope, including exclusions. For a finite limit already set in the launching process, does any documented guarantee cover the new process from its first executable or dynamic-loader mapping and across later exec transitions, or does the limit take effect at a later stage? If the limit cannot be applied, does launch abort before any target user code executes, what failure is reported, and can mappings occur before that failure? An explicit statement that this guarantee is not provided would also be helpful. My question concerns virtual address space, rather than resident memory or a language runtime's heap. A successful setter or getrlimit readback by itself does not answer when the limit takes effect. If an answer relies on published XNU code, what public release/build record would be needed to relate an immutable source revision to a released macOS build on Apple silicon, and what limits apply to that correspondence? I am asking about the supported public interface and publicly available documentation/source, without requesting private implementation details. A link to an existing answer or the documented boundary would be appreciated.
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Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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macOS Spaces transitions silently discard input during the final animation tail
I've reported a longstanding macOS Spaces input-reliability issue to Apple: typing and scrolling are ignored during the slow final tail of a Space-switching animation, even when the destination looks ready. It happens with multi-finger trackpad swipes across my Macs and interrupts my work countless times a day, including when switching to Screen Sharing. To reproduce, leave a focused text editor on one Space, swipe away and back, and start typing as the destination settles but before the transition fully finishes. Compare with typing after completion. Repeat with a scrollable window. Reduce Motion changes the slide to a fade but doesn't solve the interaction delay for me. The desired fix is to accept input on the destination once the switch is committed, while preserving the spatial animation. Has anyone found a supported way for destination apps to receive input during this interval, or confirmed the same behavior on their current macOS version? Related reports: https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/434555/ https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/475139/ Apple Feedback ID: FB25534557.
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Is it safe to strip with All Symbols for a content filter?
We would like to minimise the amount of code exposed in the product we have developed and an obvious option is to configure our build setting to use the All Symbols for Strip Style. Some investigation with an AI tool reports there are possible problems doing so. ContentFilter: non-global → all — risky. The NetworkExtension and XPC subsystems load your bundle and look up classes by name through the ObjC runtime, which uses __objc_classlist and friends (not the Mach-O symbol table), so in principle all works. In practice it occasionally breaks bundle loading in edge cases. If you try this, test specifically that systemextensionsctl activates the bundle and the filter actually traps packets. Is it safe to use All Symbols with a content filter or do we need to accept Non-Global symbols? Thanks, Dave
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PDF Widget Annotations Disappear After Saving in PDFKit (including with Preview)
The Problem When a user toggles radio buttons or checkboxes in a PDF using Preview, the widgets disappear following subsequent interactions after the file is saved and reopened. This renders the form fields unusable. Steps to Reproduce the Problem Open a PDF with radio buttons or checkboxes in Preview. Toggle a radio button or checkbox. Save and close the file. Re-open the PDF in Preview. Toggle the same button again. The button (and any others with the same field name) will disappear. Expected Results Toggling a radio button or checkbox should update the field value without causing the button (or related buttons) to disappear. This behavior is consistent with previous versions of PDFKit. What is Happening In Preview, interacting with radio buttons and checkboxes correctly updates their appearance as expected. Saving the PDF, however, causes the appearance dictionary to reference a new N entry that is a single appearance stream unassociated with any state. The annotation's AS entry is not updated. The original N entry remains but is no longer referenced. Subsequent interactions fail to update the visual presentation because the appearance stream is missing. Impact on User Experience Radio buttons and checkboxes may disappear and become unusable when toggled. PDF documents become irreparably altered after a button is toggled and the file is saved. PDF file size significantly increases when the file is saved. Users may believe they have successfully completed a form, only for the data to become inaccessible or invisible to recipients. Forms may need to be completely restarted or recreated from scratch if the original becomes unusable. The corrupted PDF structure might cause the file to render incorrectly or crash in third-party PDF viewers. Affected Apps/OSs Tested with Preview 11.0 (1147), as well as other apps that use PDFKit, on macOS Golden Gate 27.0 (26A428). This problem also affects PDFKit on iOS 27.0 and iPadOS 27.0. Feedback/bug report: FB24866826 Related Sample Output Original PDF File Checkbox widget annotation (6 0 obj), its appearance dictionary (17 0 obj), and normal appearance dictionary (18 0 obj). Button is not checked. 6 0 obj << /Border [ 0 0 0 ] /Rect [ 90 390 110 410 ] /T (button1) /F 4 /Subtype /Widget /DA (/.AppleSystemUIFont 13 Tf 0 g) /MK 16 0 R /C [ 0 ] /AP 17 0 R /V /Off /M (D:20260919225320Z00'00') /AS /Off /FT /Btn /Type /Annot /Ff 0 >> endobj 17 0 obj << /N 18 0 R >> endobj 18 0 obj << /Yes 20 0 R /Off 22 0 R >> endobj PDF File after Save Checkbox widget annotation object (6 0 obj), its new appearance dictionary object (8 0 obj), a new normal appearance stream object (20 0 obj), and the original appearance stream dictionary (now 21 0 obj). File saved after user checked button. 6 0 obj << /Ff 0 /Type /Annot /AS /Off /AP 8 0 R /MK 9 0 R /C [ 0 ] /FT /Btn /M (D:20260919225320Z00'00') /DA (/.AppleSystemUIFont 13 Tf 0 g) /Subtype /Widget /F 4 /Border [ 0 0 0 ] /Rect [ 90 390 110 410 ] /T (button1) /V (Yes) >> endobj 8 0 obj << /N 20 0 R >> endobj 20 0 obj << /Filter /FlateDecode /Resources << /ColorSpace << /CS1 [ /ICCBased 29 0 R ] /CS2 [ /ICCBased 30 0 R ] >> >> /BBox [ 0 0 20 20 ] /Type /XObject /Subtype /Form /Length 123 >> stream x UéA ¬0 Ô}≈|†≈nà¢úÛÇ* —SA =}Ïr(»ñµ≤w◊€YËà’|ÙÎŒç'óRï∂#SäÏÌü∞¢S‰Ì§ôRÌX }–É•åY Éçˆ BŒ H " *â´8™ˆZø6z⁄ÿ ”ú6ɀ੠"∫t˘‹;'¬ endstream endobj 21 0 obj << /Off 22 0 R /Yes 23 0 R >> endobj Note: No object references 21 0 obj in the PDF.
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PDF Widget Annotations appear Pixelated/Rasterized
The Problem On opening a PDF document in the Preview app, PDF widget annotations appear pixelated/rasterized. This problem exists with button, text, and choice widget subtypes. The pixelation becomes more apparent when zoomed in. Expected Results PDF widgets should appear sharp and smooth, without pixelation. In previous versions of the Preview app, widgets appear vector-based as expected. Impact on User Experience PDF widgets appear pixelated and inconsistent with text content in the same PDF document. Widgets do not look like elements of an interactive form but, instead, resemble low-quality embedded images. Affected Apps/OSs: Preview 11.0 (1147), as well as other apps that use PDFKit, on macOS Golden Gate 27.0 (26A428). A similar problem appears to affect PDFKit on iOS 27.0 and iPadOS 27.0 as well. Feedback/bug report: FB24843022
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API to get the system pointer’s actual rendered size (respecting Accessibility → Pointer size)?
I'm positioning a tooltip-style panel relative to the mouse pointer and need to avoid overlapping the pointer glyph itself. This works fine at the default pointer size, but breaks once the user sets System Settings → Accessibility → Pointer → Pointer size to something larger than Normal — the pointer is visibly bigger on screen, but my offset doesn't grow to match, so the tooltip overlaps it. The only cursor-size-related value I've found any API expose is the ratio behind that same setting, read via: /usr/bin/defaults read com.apple.universalaccess mouseDriverCursorSizeThis returns a scale factor (1.0 = Normal, larger toward Large), not a size in points. I'm using it to scale a fixed offset, but that only approximates the real on-screen footprint of the pointer glyph — it doesn't tell me the glyph's actual rendered bounding box, so the tooltip still clips the pointer at larger sizes. Question: Is there a supported API — AppKit, Accessibility, or otherwise — that returns the system pointer's actual rendered size (bounding box, in points) reflecting the user's Pointer size setting? Or is there a different recommended approach for positioning UI relative to the live pointer without overlapping it, that doesn't depend on knowing that size directly? Minimal repro (AppKit, Swift Package Manager, no storyboard/xib — ~150 lines): enum CursorPrefs { static func readPointerScale() -> Double { let process = Process() process.executableURL = URL(fileURLWithPath: "/usr/bin/defaults") process.arguments = ["read", "com.apple.universalaccess", "mouseDriverCursorSize"] let outputPipe = Pipe() process.standardOutput = outputPipe process.standardError = Pipe() try? process.run() process.waitUntilExit() let data = outputPipe.fileHandleForReading.readDataToEndOfFile() let output = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8)?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) ?? "" guard let scale = Double(output), scale >= 1.0 else { return 1.0 } return scale } } // A tracking-area view shows a tooltip-style NSPanel near NSEvent.mouseLocation, // offset by a fixed amount scaled by the value above. At Pointer size = Large, // the tooltip still overlaps the (visibly bigger) pointer glyph, because the // value is a ratio, not the glyph's rendered size in points.Steps to reproduce: Run the demo app (swift run, or open Package.swift in Xcode and Run). Open System Settings → Accessibility → Pointer → Pointer size and set it to Large. Quit and relaunch the demo (it reads the setting once at launch). Move the mouse over the gray box in the window. The floating tooltip tracks the pointer but still overlaps the now-larger pointer glyph. Environment: macOS 14.7.8 (23H730, Xcode 16.2 (16C5032a), Swift 5.9, arm64 (Apple Silicon). Happy to attach the full repro project as a zip if useful — it's a single main.swift plus an SPM manifest, no external dependencies.
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4h
productbuild and Keychain Access concern
productbuild cmd: productbuild --component /Applications/Very\ Large\ Number\ Calculator.app /Applications --sign "3rd Party Mac Developer Installer: Alain_B " /Applications/Very\ Large\ Number\ Calculator.pkg Give this error: Cannot write product to "/Applications/Very Large Number Calculator.pkg". (Could not find appropriate signing identity for “3rd Party Mac Developer Installer: Alain_B ”.) But Keychain Access show "3rd Party Mac Developer Installer" is in Certificates: 3rd Party Mac Developer Application: 10 digits (64......J5) certificate login Nov 10, 2027 at 8:02:04 AM Alain_B private key login 3rd Party Mac Developer Installer: Alain_B (64......J5) certificate login Apr 19, 2027 at 8:32:51AM Apple Development: Alain_B (35......P5) certificate login Oct 19, 2027 at 9:29:59 AM Apple Development: Alain_B (Alain_B ) private key login Apple Distribution: Alain_B (64MZBY64J5) certificate login Oct 26, 2027 at 9:36:16 AM Alain_B private key login Apple Root CA certificate login Feb 9, 2035 at 4:40:36 PM Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification Authority certificate login Feb 19, 2030 at 7:00:00 PM Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification Authority certificate login Mar 18, 2036 at 8:00:00 PM Developer ID Certification Authority certificate login Feb 1, 2027 at 5:12:15 PM Developer ID Certification Authority certificate login Sep 16, 2031 at 8:00:00 PM What can I do ? Thank you.
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54
Activity
13h
Can macOS sandbox-exec confine writes to a directory that doesn’t exist yet?
I’m evaluating an offline command-line tool launched from Terminal on macOS. The parent process creates an enclosing directory, then launches the tool through /usr/bin/sandbox-exec -p with an inline profile. The tool must create its own output directory, which is absent at launch. Can a macOS sandbox profile reliably enforce all of the following for that invocation? Allow reads of the tool’s interpreter, dependencies and input files. Deny network access and creation of child processes by the sandboxed tool. Allow the tool to create /path/to/work/proof/producer001 and write beneath it, while denying writes outside that directory, including writes through symlinks or other path aliases. The proposed profile denies file-write* globally and allows it only under a subpath rule for the output directory. Does that exception cover creation of the directory itself when only its parent exists? Does deny process-fork cover all child-process creation paths, including posix_spawn? Is there a supported way to inspect or validate the effective policy for an exact command and working directory before invoking it? If sandbox-exec is unsuitable for this use, is there a supported macOS mechanism for applying these restrictions to a command-line tool launched from Terminal? A documentation reference would be helpful.
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94
Activity
15h
iOS 27b3 SDK: iOS App on Mac crashes on UISearchBar focus
Our app crashes when compiled with the iOS 27 beta 3 SDK and run as an iOS app on Mac, on both macOS 26 and macOS 27, as soon as a UISearchBar receives focus. The crash is due to this exception: *** Assertion failure in BOOL _screenBasedFocusUnsupported(void)(), UIScreen.m:3.725 Accessing the focus system through UIScreen is no longer supported. ( 0 CoreFoundation 0x000000018bea31c0 __exceptionPreprocess + 176 1 libobjc.A.dylib 0x000000018b91e91c objc_exception_throw + 88 2 Foundation 0x000000018e092644 -[NSMutableDictionary(NSMutableDictionary) initWithContentsOfFile:] + 0 3 UIKitCore 0x00000001c5dae8ec _screenBasedFocusUnsupported + 272 4 UIKitCore 0x00000001c5dae960 -[UIScreen _preferredFocusedWindow] + 24 5 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4ea3a60 -[UIScreen _mainSceneReferenceBounds] + 200 6 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4ea3914 -[UIScreen _mainSceneBoundsForInterfaceOrientation:] + 40 7 UIKitCore 0x00000001c5708134 +[UINavigationBar defaultSizeForOrientation:] + 76 8 UIKitCore 0x00000001c6222c88 -[_UISearchPresentationController _layoutPresentationWithSize:transitionCoordinator:] + 704 9 UIKitCore 0x00000001c622296c -[_UISearchPresentationController containerViewWillLayoutSubviews] + 84 10 UIKitCore 0x00000001c549304c block_destroy_helper.13 + 25112 11 UIKitCore 0x00000001c549344c block_destroy_helper.13 + 26136 12 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4ea26a8 -[UIView(CALayerDelegate) layoutSublayersOfLayer:] + 1648 13 QuartzCore 0x0000000196103dbc _ZN2CA5Layer15perform_update_EPS0_P7CALayerjNS_17LayerUpdateReasonEPNS_11TransactionE + 460 14 QuartzCore 0x000000019610390c _ZN2CA5Layer17update_if_needed_EPNS_11TransactionENS_17LayerUpdateReasonE + 692 15 QuartzCore 0x0000000196035d2c _ZN2CA7Context18commit_transactionEPNS_11TransactionEdPd + 608 16 QuartzCore 0x0000000195e69520 _ZN2CA11Transaction6commitEv + 652 17 AppKit 0x0000000190fe116c __37+[NSDisplayCycle currentDisplayCycle]_block_invoke.7 + 44 18 CoreFoundation 0x000000018be34ad0 __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_A_BLOCK__ + 28 19 CoreFoundation 0x000000018be34a10 __CFRunLoopDoBlocks + 396 20 CoreFoundation 0x000000018be33e54 __CFRunLoopRun + 2356 21 CoreFoundation 0x000000018bf06234 _CFRunLoopRunSpecificWithOptions + 532 22 HIToolbox 0x0000000198c1f560 RunCurrentEventLoopInMode + 320 23 HIToolbox 0x0000000198c228bc ReceiveNextEventCommon + 488 24 HIToolbox 0x0000000198dac14c _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInMode + 48 25 AppKit 0x00000001909163d0 _DPSBlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInMode + 228 26 AppKit 0x000000019026a084 _DPSNextEvent + 576 27 AppKit 0x0000000190dff96c -[NSApplication(NSEventRouting) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] + 688 28 AppKit 0x0000000190dff678 -[NSApplication(NSEventRouting) nextEventMatchingMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] + 72 29 AppKit 0x000000019025d13c -[NSApplication run] + 368 30 AppKit 0x00000001902357b0 NSApplicationMain + 880 31 AppKit 0x000000019047c958 +[NSWindow _savedFrameFromString:] + 0 32 UIKitMacHelper 0x00000001aa2651bc UINSApplicationMain + 972 33 UIKitCore 0x00000001c4e1aed4 UIApplicationMain + 144 34 UIKitCore 0x00000001c548bda0 block_destroy_helper.31 + 8880 35 DigitalConcertHall.debug.dylib 0x0000000106e41bd8 $sSo21UIApplicationDelegateP5UIKitE4mainyyFZ + 128 36 DigitalConcertHall.debug.dylib 0x0000000106e41b4c $s18DigitalConcertHall11AppDelegateC5$mainyyFZ + 32 37 DigitalConcertHall.debug.dylib 0x0000000106e4afc0 __debug_main_executable_dylib_entry_point + 28 38 dyld 0x000000018b9ac4e4 start + 6992 ) I could not test with the iOS 27 beta 4 SDK due to this blocking issue: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/839012 However, when I tried to set up a simple sample project, I could not reproduce the issue. Does anybody know what might be causing this? I filed feedback FB24201508
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1d
Credential Provider Extension should allow BE=0, BS=0 for device-bound passkeys
In these threads, it was clarified that Credential Provider Extensions must set both Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags to 1 in authenticator data: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/745605 https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/787629 However, I'm developing a passkey manager that intentionally stores credentials only on the local device. My implementation uses: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for keychain items kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave for private keys No iCloud sync or backup These credentials are, by definition, single-device credentials. According to the WebAuthn specification, they should be represented with BE=0, BS=0. Currently, I'm forced to set BE=1, BS=1 to make the extension work, which misrepresents the actual backup status to relying parties. This is problematic because: Servers using BE/BS flags for security policies will incorrectly classify these as synced passkeys Users who specifically want device-bound credentials for higher security cannot get accurate flag representation Request: Please allow Credential Provider Extensions to return credentials with BE=0, BS=0 for legitimate device-bound passkey implementations. Environment: macOS 26.2 (25C56), Xcode 26.2 (17C52)
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Activity
1d
Battery chart time labels shifted hours ahead on macOS 27 (endOfDay wrong in BatteryUI.plist)
the "last 24 hours" battery level and screen on usage charts in system settings > battery have the hour labels shifted way ahead of real time. the bars are in the right order, the axis is just wrong. at 17:13 it was showing stuff up to like 23:00. at 10:05 a few days later it was about 12 hours ahead. the "last charged to 100%" time above the chart is correct tho. my clock and time zone are fine (asia/manila, set automatically, synced). the battery data itself is right too, i checked the power log and the plug in and unplug times match what actually happened. i dug into it and found the problem in `/private/var/db/powerlog/Library/BatteryLife/Debug/BatteryUI.plist`, which is what the battery pane gets from PerfPowerServices. `endOfDay` comes back as the next hour instead of midnight: PLBatteryUIQueryTime 2026-10-24 17:13:25 (local) endOfHour 2026-10-24 18:00:00 <- correct endOfDay 2026-10-24 18:00:00 <- should be 2026-10-25 00:00:00 so the chart puts 00:00 at 18:00 yesterday and everything ends up 6 hours off. it looks like the chart always labels its right edge as 24:00, so the further you are from midnight the worse it gets. restarting PerfPowerServices (`sudo killall PerfPowerServices`) doesn't fix it, the new process sends the same values right away. macos 27.0.1 (26A434). this was fine on macos 26. looks like the same bug as https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/852392
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118
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1d
CloudKit sync fails in macOS TestFlight build – sandbox denies com.apple.cloudd
I have a macOS SwiftUI app using SwiftData with CloudKit synchronization. Bundle ID: com.mjsapps.PhrasePin CloudKit container: iCloud.com.mjsapps.PhrasePin CloudKit synchronization works when running the app from Xcode using the Development environment. However, synchronization does not work in the TestFlight / Production build. The Production schema has been deployed successfully. The TestFlight build has the expected entitlements, including: com.apple.developer.icloud-container-environment = Production com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers = iCloud.com.mjsapps.PhrasePin com.apple.developer.icloud-services = CloudKit com.apple.security.app-sandbox = true com.apple.security.network.client = true The TestFlight build is signed as: Authority=TestFlight Beta Distribution Identifier=com.mjsapps.PhrasePin TeamIdentifier=8D6TX86CQK CloudKit/Core Data logging shows that the app is trying to use: container=iCloud.com.mjsapps.PhrasePin:Production but synchronization fails with: CKErrorDomain Code=6 Error connecting to CloudKit daemon NSCocoaErrorDomain Code=4099 The macOS sandbox log shows: Sandbox: PhrasePin(...) deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd As a result, no com.apple.coredata.cloudkit.zone is created in the Production private database and no SwiftData records are synchronized. The problem has been reproduced on: macOS Sequoia 15.7.7 macOS Sequoia 15.7.9 The same app works with CloudKit in Development when run from Xcode. I have already submitted a Feedback Assistant report, but have not received a response. Has anyone seen this behavior with SwiftData + CloudKit in a sandboxed macOS TestFlight build? Is there an additional entitlement or provisioning requirement needed for access to com.apple.cloudd in Production?
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52
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2d
macos 27 - unexpected/new errno from BSD socket connect() when pending connections exceed backlog
Please consider the trivial C program attached to this thread. The code creates a socket() and listen()s for connections, but (intentionally) doesn't accept() the connections. The listen() is done using a small backlog (of 1). This test then does several connect() attempts and expects that the connect() attempts will accumulate in the pending queue and once the queue exceeds the backlog limit, then as specified in man listen: The backlog parameter defines the maximum length for the queue of pending connections. If a connection request arrives with the queue full, the client may receive an error with an indication of ECONNREFUSED. then the connect() attempt will receive a ECONNREFUSED. However, in macos 27, such a connect() attempt leads to ECONNRESET (Connection reset by peer) instead of ECONNREFUSED. Is this expected? Experiments show that prior versions of macos were returning a ETIMEDOUT for such connect() attempts. If this new error is expected from connect() when the backlog limit has exceeded, should it be specified in the man listen documentation? Rename the attached main.c.txt to main.c. Compiling the attached program on macos 27, using clang main.c and then running ./a.out results in: ----------------------- MacOS version: 27.0.1 Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 27.0.0: Tue Aug 11 21:02:16 PDT 2026; root:xnu-13432.1.9~1/RELEASE_ARM64_T8112 ----------------------- started server at at 127.0.0.1:52753 with a backlog of 1 connect() attempt 1 - connected connect() attempt 2 - connected connect() attempt 3 - connected connect() attempt 4 - connected connect() attempt 5 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 connect() attempt 6 - connected connect() attempt 7 - connected connect() attempt 8 - connected connect() attempt 9 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 connect() attempt 10 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 connect() attempt 11 - failed to connect() - Connection reset by peer <-- FAILURE: Unexpected error code, expected either ETIMEDOUT or ECONNREFUSED but got 54 On a related note, it's unclear why several of the connect() attempts succeeded instead of just 1 of them succeeding. On prior versions of macos, the output of the same program is: ----------------------- MacOS version: 26.7.1 Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 25.6.0: Tue Aug 18 17:49:13 PDT 2026; root:xnu-12377.161.15.700.19~2/RELEASE_ARM64_T6000 ----------------------- started server at at 127.0.0.1:52451 with a backlog of 1 connect() attempt 1 - connected connect() attempt 2 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 3 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 4 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 5 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 6 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 7 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 8 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 9 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 10 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out connect() attempt 11 - failed to connect() - Operation timed out and this output is much more understandable and deterministic. main.c.txt
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371
Activity
2d
Supported App Sandbox metadata access through an inherited file descriptor, without reopening the object
We are evaluating a macOS design before implementation. This is a platform-support question, not a report of an observed runtime failure. No actual controller executable, helper executable or deployment configuration has been selected or qualified. Our objective is to let a small, fixed-purpose helper examine an already-open object’s identity and access control list (ACL) metadata while preserving the original object reference and ownership. Proposed configuration A trusted controller would launch one native C helper using an explicit executable target and posix_spawn. The controller would need to qualify for the documented nonsandboxed-parent case, without a conflicting inherited sandbox. We do not assume that an absent entitlement alone establishes this. The helper would be the main executable of its own signed application bundle, using its own ordinary App Sandbox rather than inheriting the controller’s sandbox. Its proposed additional filesystem permission would be com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-only, containing exactly two fixed directory entries beneath a user’s development workspace, outside the helper’s container. The literal private paths are omitted. The controller would already own a read-only file descriptor for one regular file or directory within those trees. It would retain its original reference and pass a known duplicate referring to the same open object to the helper. The helper would perform one metadata observation. The proposed operations are fstat for object identity and fgetattrlist requesting ATTR_CMN_RETURNED_ATTRS and ATTR_CMN_EXTENDED_SECURITY, with FSOPT_REPORT_FULLSIZE and without FSOPT_PACK_INVAL_ATTRS. Required boundaries The helper must use only the inherited descriptor for the subject observation. The design does not permit: Reopening or resolving the subject through a pathname, bookmark or URL. Substituting a copied file or another object reference. Reading file contents, enumerating directories, changing permissions, or modifying shared descriptor flags or file offsets. Expanding the exception to an ancestor, home directory or broader workspace. Disabling an existing sandbox or using private interfaces to bypass restrictions. Parent-side traversal and identity checks remain separate responsibilities. Strict ancestor directories are not additional helper ACL subjects. We understand that a read-only directory exception and ordinary sandbox/container capabilities may permit more than the helper’s intended metadata operations. Metadata-only behaviour would be a reviewed-code obligation; we are not asking App Sandbox to enforce an exact metadata-only operation filter. Questions Supported launch and activation: Under what documented parent-context, signing, bundle, container and launch conditions can this helper establish its own ordinary App Sandbox? What supported mechanism or guarantee establishes that the sandbox is effective before the subject metadata operation? Required metadata permissions: Does the proposed read-only exception support fstat and the specified extended-security fgetattrlist request through an inherited read-only descriptor, for both regular files and directories? Please distinguish descriptor survival from permission to perform these operations, including any additional access-control conditions. Scope, identity and lifetime: What documented behaviour applies to descendant coverage, aliases, hard links, renames or namespace changes after the descriptor was opened? Please distinguish the lifetime of the inherited object reference from the lifetime of the static directory permission. Our design would refuse uncertainty rather than reopen, rebind or widen access. Evidence and support boundary: Which public documentation, interfaces or authoritative guarantees support this exact composition, and which parts require separate empirical qualification? Please identify applicable macOS versions and restrictions. Distinguish platform support from any distribution or App Store review requirements. If these requirements cannot be combined through supported interfaces, please identify the incompatible requirement. An approach requiring broader access, pathname reopening, a replacement object or a different handoff architecture would be a design change requiring separate review, not a solution within the stated constraints. Permission failures, unsupported requests and incomplete metadata would remain unavailable results. They would not be interpreted as proof that an ACL is absent. Complete ACL-absence interpretation and native resource bounds remain separate qualification questions. Apple material already reviewed Resolving App Sandbox Inheritance Problems App Sandbox Temporary Exception Entitlements Accessing files from the macOS App Sandbox
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233
Activity
2d
Control fan speed on MacPro 3.1 (early 2008)
I have a MacPro 3.1 (early 2008) that has Linux installed on it (Debian 13). One of the fans runs at top speed of 2500 rpm because some sensor in the board can't report the temperature to the OS. The Motherboard model is Mac-F42C88C8. Searched the internet to see if I could find any information on how to identify the sensor or the SMC information about it. I would like to know if there is any information that anyone knows about this and where could I start trying to make a driver to control the fan by getting the value in the sensor. I can see in the program coolercontrol in Linux the Fan that is at high speed is named 'IO' Thanks Regards
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88
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5d
Sandboxed app can't delete AppleDouble (._) files of quarantined files on exFAT, even with user-selected access.
My Mac App Store utility removes Mac metadata files (._* AppleDouble files and .DS_Store) from external drives formatted exFAT or FAT32. The app is sandboxed with com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write and com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope. The user grants access to the volume through NSOpenPanel. Deleting a ._ file works, except when its companion file carries com.apple.quarantine (for example, a file downloaded with Safari and copied to the drive with Finder). Then: let partner = volume + "/Nirvana.zip" // has com.apple.quarantine let appleDouble = volume + "/._Nirvana.zip" removexattr(partner, "com.apple.quarantine", XATTR_NOFOLLOW) // -1, errno 1 (EPERM) unlink(appleDouble) // -1, errno 1 (EPERM)The same unlink succeeds from Terminal (not sandboxed, without Full Disk Access). On exFAT the extended attributes live in the ._ file, so I assume the sandbox refuses because deleting it would remove the quarantine attribute. Tried, with no change: Full Disk Access granted to the app. Adding com.apple.security.files.user-selected.executable (verified in the built app with codesign -d --entitlements -). On a real drive (a music library), about 71% of the ._ files belong to quarantined files, so this is most of what users want removed. Is there a supported way for a sandboxed app to remove these files: an entitlement, an API, or an explicit user action? If not, can you confirm it's intended behavior, so I can explain it accurately to users? macOS 27.2, Xcode 27.2, Apple silicon. Focused sample project available (one source file). DTS case 23240704.
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5d
Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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5d
Is NavigationSplitView on macOS 27 broken?
On macOS 27 Beta 2, a simple NavigationSplitView example exhibits bizarre behaviour when the window is resized. The sidebar seemingly expands and collapses at random as the window is resized. The symptoms can be exacerbated with toolbar items. The sidebar appears to behave correctly when an inspector view is not present. Copy paste the code below into a new Xcode 27 project and run on macOS 27 and then resize the window: File -> New -> Project... -> App import SwiftUI @main struct MyApp: App { var body: some Scene { WindowGroup { ContentView() } } } struct ContentView: View { var body: some View { NavigationSplitView { Text("Sidebar") } detail: { Text("Content") } .inspector(isPresented: .constant(true)) { Text("Inspector") } } } Adding .frame or .inspectorColumnWidth to any of the Text views does not appear to fix the issues. macOS: 27.0 Beta (26A5368g) Xcode: 27.0 beta 2 (27A5209h)
Topic: UI Frameworks SubTopic: SwiftUI Tags:
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6d
Kernel tag check fault after wake on Mac17 hardware, Google Chrome Helper, macOS 26.5–27.0.1 — related to r.172793638?
We're seeing a recurring kernel panic across six Mac17-family Macs (Mac17,2 / Mac17,4 / Mac17,8; T8142 and T6050) in a managed fleet. 34 panic logs collected 30 Sept – 9 Oct, all with the same signature: panic(cpu N caller ...): Kernel tag check fault (expected tagged address: 0x...028), esr 0x96000011 Faulting address is always at offset 0x28 of the object Same crash PC per build: kernel text exec base + 0x48da38 on 27.0/27.0.1, + 0x46a784 on 26.7, + 0x466ee0 on 26.5 Panicked task is "Google Chrome Helper" in all 34 cases, thread Chrome_ChildIOThread (Chrome's IPC/network I/O thread) Always 3–60 s after wake from sleep, usually a dark wake with the lid closed (overnight or after a 3–18 min sleep) No third-party kexts loaded; "Post-boot loaded kexts" lists only Apple drivers Affected builds: 26.5 (25F71), 26.7 (25G229), 27.0 (26A428), 27.0.1 (26A434). Not a regression from one update: a machine still on 26.5 panics identically. Only Mac17-family hardware is affected. Older Apple silicon Macs with the same software stack are fine. Present on every affected machine: Chrome PWAs (Gmail/Chat/Meet) running in the background, keeping Chrome's network service alive across sleep. On one machine Microsoft Edge is the primary browser and never panics; only Chrome Helper does. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint with its network filter (content filter) extension, MDM-managed. This looks related to thread 821372, where DTS described a kernel networking panic on M5-family hardware with a Network Extension present (r.172793638 / FB22401652), fixed in 26.5b2. We appear to be seeing a tag-check-fault variant on 26.5 release and later. Questions: Is this a known issue, and is it the same root cause as r.172793638? Is there a build where it's fixed? Any recommended mitigation beyond preventing sleep and quitting Chrome? Feedback Assistant: FB25128015 with panic logs and sysdiagnose. Happy to collect more data or test a build. Backtrace from a 27.0.1 panic (kernel text exec base 0xfffffe003aa54000), panic PC first: lr: 0xfffffe003aee1a38 lr: 0xfffffe003aeec580 lr: 0xfffffe003b12cf34 lr: 0xfffffe003b12dc50 lr: 0xfffffe003b07b1f8 lr: 0xfffffe003b07c758 lr: 0xfffffe003b237ff4 lr: 0xfffffe003ac787f0 lr: 0xfffffe003aa576ac lr: 0x000000018747a57c (userspace)
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6d
RLIMIT_AS across posix_spawn and exec on Apple silicon: documented guarantees?
What supported behaviour, if any, may applications rely on for inherited RLIMIT_AS when launching a process on macOS on Apple silicon using posix_spawn and subsequent exec transitions? An older published XNU header defines RLIMIT_AS: XNU resource.h (immutable revision) I am looking for the documented support and virtual-address-space accounting scope, including exclusions. For a finite limit already set in the launching process, does any documented guarantee cover the new process from its first executable or dynamic-loader mapping and across later exec transitions, or does the limit take effect at a later stage? If the limit cannot be applied, does launch abort before any target user code executes, what failure is reported, and can mappings occur before that failure? An explicit statement that this guarantee is not provided would also be helpful. My question concerns virtual address space, rather than resident memory or a language runtime's heap. A successful setter or getrlimit readback by itself does not answer when the limit takes effect. If an answer relies on published XNU code, what public release/build record would be needed to relate an immutable source revision to a released macOS build on Apple silicon, and what limits apply to that correspondence? I am asking about the supported public interface and publicly available documentation/source, without requesting private implementation details. A link to an existing answer or the documented boundary would be appreciated.
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6d
Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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6d
macOS Spaces transitions silently discard input during the final animation tail
I've reported a longstanding macOS Spaces input-reliability issue to Apple: typing and scrolling are ignored during the slow final tail of a Space-switching animation, even when the destination looks ready. It happens with multi-finger trackpad swipes across my Macs and interrupts my work countless times a day, including when switching to Screen Sharing. To reproduce, leave a focused text editor on one Space, swipe away and back, and start typing as the destination settles but before the transition fully finishes. Compare with typing after completion. Repeat with a scrollable window. Reduce Motion changes the slide to a fade but doesn't solve the interaction delay for me. The desired fix is to accept input on the destination once the switch is committed, while preserving the spatial animation. Has anyone found a supported way for destination apps to receive input during this interval, or confirmed the same behavior on their current macOS version? Related reports: https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/434555/ https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/475139/ Apple Feedback ID: FB25534557.
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1w
Is it safe to strip with All Symbols for a content filter?
We would like to minimise the amount of code exposed in the product we have developed and an obvious option is to configure our build setting to use the All Symbols for Strip Style. Some investigation with an AI tool reports there are possible problems doing so. ContentFilter: non-global → all — risky. The NetworkExtension and XPC subsystems load your bundle and look up classes by name through the ObjC runtime, which uses __objc_classlist and friends (not the Mach-O symbol table), so in principle all works. In practice it occasionally breaks bundle loading in edge cases. If you try this, test specifically that systemextensionsctl activates the bundle and the filter actually traps packets. Is it safe to use All Symbols with a content filter or do we need to accept Non-Global symbols? Thanks, Dave
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PDF Widget Annotations Disappear After Saving in PDFKit (including with Preview)
The Problem When a user toggles radio buttons or checkboxes in a PDF using Preview, the widgets disappear following subsequent interactions after the file is saved and reopened. This renders the form fields unusable. Steps to Reproduce the Problem Open a PDF with radio buttons or checkboxes in Preview. Toggle a radio button or checkbox. Save and close the file. Re-open the PDF in Preview. Toggle the same button again. The button (and any others with the same field name) will disappear. Expected Results Toggling a radio button or checkbox should update the field value without causing the button (or related buttons) to disappear. This behavior is consistent with previous versions of PDFKit. What is Happening In Preview, interacting with radio buttons and checkboxes correctly updates their appearance as expected. Saving the PDF, however, causes the appearance dictionary to reference a new N entry that is a single appearance stream unassociated with any state. The annotation's AS entry is not updated. The original N entry remains but is no longer referenced. Subsequent interactions fail to update the visual presentation because the appearance stream is missing. Impact on User Experience Radio buttons and checkboxes may disappear and become unusable when toggled. PDF documents become irreparably altered after a button is toggled and the file is saved. PDF file size significantly increases when the file is saved. Users may believe they have successfully completed a form, only for the data to become inaccessible or invisible to recipients. Forms may need to be completely restarted or recreated from scratch if the original becomes unusable. The corrupted PDF structure might cause the file to render incorrectly or crash in third-party PDF viewers. Affected Apps/OSs Tested with Preview 11.0 (1147), as well as other apps that use PDFKit, on macOS Golden Gate 27.0 (26A428). This problem also affects PDFKit on iOS 27.0 and iPadOS 27.0. Feedback/bug report: FB24866826 Related Sample Output Original PDF File Checkbox widget annotation (6 0 obj), its appearance dictionary (17 0 obj), and normal appearance dictionary (18 0 obj). Button is not checked. 6 0 obj << /Border [ 0 0 0 ] /Rect [ 90 390 110 410 ] /T (button1) /F 4 /Subtype /Widget /DA (/.AppleSystemUIFont 13 Tf 0 g) /MK 16 0 R /C [ 0 ] /AP 17 0 R /V /Off /M (D:20260919225320Z00'00') /AS /Off /FT /Btn /Type /Annot /Ff 0 >> endobj 17 0 obj << /N 18 0 R >> endobj 18 0 obj << /Yes 20 0 R /Off 22 0 R >> endobj PDF File after Save Checkbox widget annotation object (6 0 obj), its new appearance dictionary object (8 0 obj), a new normal appearance stream object (20 0 obj), and the original appearance stream dictionary (now 21 0 obj). File saved after user checked button. 6 0 obj << /Ff 0 /Type /Annot /AS /Off /AP 8 0 R /MK 9 0 R /C [ 0 ] /FT /Btn /M (D:20260919225320Z00'00') /DA (/.AppleSystemUIFont 13 Tf 0 g) /Subtype /Widget /F 4 /Border [ 0 0 0 ] /Rect [ 90 390 110 410 ] /T (button1) /V (Yes) >> endobj 8 0 obj << /N 20 0 R >> endobj 20 0 obj << /Filter /FlateDecode /Resources << /ColorSpace << /CS1 [ /ICCBased 29 0 R ] /CS2 [ /ICCBased 30 0 R ] >> >> /BBox [ 0 0 20 20 ] /Type /XObject /Subtype /Form /Length 123 >> stream x UéA ¬0 Ô}≈|†≈nà¢úÛÇ* —SA =}Ïr(»ñµ≤w◊€YËà’|ÙÎŒç'óRï∂#SäÏÌü∞¢S‰Ì§ôRÌX }–É•åY Éçˆ BŒ H " *â´8™ˆZø6z⁄ÿ ”ú6ɀ੠"∫t˘‹;'¬ endstream endobj 21 0 obj << /Off 22 0 R /Yes 23 0 R >> endobj Note: No object references 21 0 obj in the PDF.
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1w
PDF Widget Annotations appear Pixelated/Rasterized
The Problem On opening a PDF document in the Preview app, PDF widget annotations appear pixelated/rasterized. This problem exists with button, text, and choice widget subtypes. The pixelation becomes more apparent when zoomed in. Expected Results PDF widgets should appear sharp and smooth, without pixelation. In previous versions of the Preview app, widgets appear vector-based as expected. Impact on User Experience PDF widgets appear pixelated and inconsistent with text content in the same PDF document. Widgets do not look like elements of an interactive form but, instead, resemble low-quality embedded images. Affected Apps/OSs: Preview 11.0 (1147), as well as other apps that use PDFKit, on macOS Golden Gate 27.0 (26A428). A similar problem appears to affect PDFKit on iOS 27.0 and iPadOS 27.0 as well. Feedback/bug report: FB24843022
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