Hi, I’m seeing a production issue on iOS 26+ that only affects some users.
symptoms:
It does NOT happen for all users.
It happens for a subset of users on iOS 26+.
If we write a value to Keychain and read it immediately in the same session, it succeeds.
However, after terminating the app and relaunching, the value appears to be gone:
SecItemCopyMatching returns errSecItemNotFound (-25300).
Repro (as observed on affected devices):
Launch app (iOS 26+).
Save PIN data to Keychain using SecItemAdd (GenericPassword).
Immediately read it using SecItemCopyMatching -> success.
Terminate the app (swipe up / kill).
Relaunch the app and read again using the same service -> returns -25300.
Expected:
The Keychain item should persist across app relaunch and remain readable (while the device is unlocked).
Actual:
After app relaunch, SecItemCopyMatching returns errSecItemNotFound (-25300) as if the item does not exist.
Implementation details (ObjC):
We store a “PIN” item like this (simplified):
addItem:
kSecClass: kSecClassGenericPassword
kSecAttrService: <FIXED_STRING>
kSecValueData:
kSecAttrAccessControl: SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(..., kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, 0, ...)
readItem (SecItemCopyMatching):
kSecClass: kSecClassGenericPassword
kSecAttrService: <FIXED_STRING>
kSecReturnData: YES
(uses kSecUseOperationPrompt in our async method)
Question:
On iOS 26+, is there any known issue or new behavior where a successfully added GenericPassword item could later return errSecItemNotFound after app termination/relaunch for only some users/devices?
What should we check to distinguish:
OS behavior change/bug vs.
entitlement/access-group differences (app vs extension, provisioning/team changes),
device state/policies (MDM, passcode/biometrics changes),
query attributes we should include to make the item stable across relaunch?
Build / Dev Environment:
macOS: 15.6.1 (24G90)
Xcode: 26.2
Prioritize user privacy and data security in your app. Discuss best practices for data handling, user consent, and security measures to protect user information.
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Our Goal: We are implementing a workflow for derived credentials. Our objective is to have a PIV/CAC derived credential (from Entrust), installed via the Intune MDM Company Portal app, and then use it within our (managed) app to generate digital signatures.
Challenge: The Intune Company Portal installs these identities into the System Keychain. Because third-party apps are restricted from accessing private keys in the System Keychain, we are running into a roadblock.
Our Question: 1) Is there an API that allows us to create a signature without us having to pass the private key itself, but instead just pass a handle/some reference to the private key and then the API can access the private key in the system keychain and create the signature under the hood. SecKeyCreateSignature is the API method that creates a signature but requires passing a private key. 2) If #1 is not feasible, is there a way to get access to system keychain to retrieve certs + private key for managed apps
Critical Privacy and Security Issue: Spotlight disregards explicit exclusions and exposes user files
Apple has repeatedly ignored my reports about a critical privacy issue in Spotlight on macOS 26, and the problem persists in version 26.3 RC. This is not a minor glitch, it is a fundamental breach of user trust and privacy.
Several aspects of Spotlight fail to respect user settings:
• Hidden apps still exposed: In the Apps section (Cmd+1), Spotlight continues to display apps marked with the hidden flag, even though they should remain invisible.
• Clipboard reactivation: The clipboard feature repeatedly turns itself back on after logout or restart, despite being explicitly disabled by the user.
• Excluded files revealed: Most concerning, Spotlight exposes files in Suggestions and Recents (Cmd+3) even when those files are explicitly excluded under System Settings > Spotlight > Search Privacy.
This behavior directly violates user expectations and system settings. It is not only a major privacy issue but also a security risk, since sensitive files can be surfaced without consent.
Apple must address this immediately. Users rely on Spotlight to respect their privacy configurations, and the current behavior undermines both trust and security.
a
I am submitting this appeal because we believe our app was misunderstood and the review outcome and follow-up communication have been unfair and mechanically handled.
1) What happened / Outcome we disagree with
Our submission was rejected under Guideline 4.8 – Design – Login Services, with the reviewer stating that our app uses a third-party login service but does not provide an equivalent login option that meets Apple’s requirements (limited data collection, private email option, no advertising tracking without consent).
However, our game does not require or force any third-party login. The feature being treated as “login” is not a login service at all—it is Mainland China real-name / anti-addiction compliance verification.
2) Why we believe we comply with the App Review Guidelines
A. The feature in question is compliance verification, not login
Players do not need to create or log into any in-game account to play.
The flow exists solely to satisfy Mainland China real-name/anti-addiction compliance requirements.
Verification can be completed by either:
Using TapTap only as a real-name verification authorization option, or
Manually entering a Chinese ID number + legal name to pass verification and play.
Because this is verification, not an account login, Guideline 4.8 “Login Services” should not apply in the way the rejection message assumes.
B. There is no “playable account” to provide
After we clarified the above, we continued to receive repeated, template-like requests to provide a “playable account.” This request does not match our product design: there is no account system required for gameplay, so there is no “review account” to provide.
We have already provided the information needed to complete the verification path (ID + name for the compliance flow), yet the responses remained repetitive and did not reflect that the reviewer checked our explanation.
3) Why we believe the handling was unfair
Even after clearly explaining that this is not a login system, the review communication continued with mechanical responses that did not address the clarification. This caused significant delays to our release timeline and appears to be unfair treatment compared with many existing App Store apps that use similar compliance verification flows.
4) What we are requesting from the Appeals Team
Please investigate and correct the misclassification of our real-name compliance verification as a “login service” under Guideline 4.8.
If the team still believes Guideline 4.8 applies, please provide:
The specific guideline rationale, and
The exact screen/step in our app that is being interpreted as “login.”
Please advise what specific materials you need to proceed efficiently (e.g., screen recording of the verification flow, step-by-step review instructions, configuration notes). We are ready to provide them immediately.
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
Sign in with Apple
I have filed bug reports on this to no avail, so I am bringing it up here hoping someone at Apple will address this. Since the first beta of 26.3, with voice control enabled there are now two icons in the menu bar (*plus an orange dot in full screen) that never go away. That orange microphone isn't serving its intended purpose to notify me that something is accessing my microphone if it is always displayed. I use voice control extensively, so it is nearly always on. In every prior version of macOS, the orange icon was not on for voice control. Even if voice control is not listening but simply enabled in system settings, the orange icon will be there. And there is no need for this icon to be on for a system service that is always listening. This orange icon in the menu bar at all times is incredibly irritating, as it takes up valuable space to the right of the notch, and causes other actual useful menu bar items to be hidden. As well, if some other application on my system were to turn on the mic and start recording me I would never know since that orange icon is always on. It also places an orange dot next to the control center icon taking up even more of the precious little menu bar real estate. Please fix this! Either exempt voice control (as Siri is always listening and it doesn't get the orange icon) or exempt all system services, or give me a way to turn this off. If you cannot tell, I find this incredibly annoying and frustrating.
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
% curl -v https://app-site-association.cdn-apple.com/a/v1/zfcs.bankts.cn
Host app-site-association.cdn-apple.com:443 was resolved.
IPv6: (none)
IPv4: 218.92.226.151, 119.101.148.193, 218.92.226.6, 115.152.217.3
Trying 218.92.226.151:443...
Connected to app-site-association.cdn-apple.com (218.92.226.151) port 443
ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1
(304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
CAfile: /etc/ssl/cert.pem
CApath: none
(304) (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
(304) (IN), TLS handshake, Unknown (8):
(304) (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
(304) (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):
(304) (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
(304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384 / [blank] / UNDEF
ALPN: server accepted http/1.1
Server certificate:
subject: C=US; ST=California; O=Apple Inc.; CN=app-site-association.cdn-apple.com
start date: Sep 25 13:58:08 2025 GMT
expire date: Mar 31 17:44:25 2026 GMT
subjectAltName: host "app-site-association.cdn-apple.com" matched cert's "app-site-association.cdn-apple.com"
issuer: CN=Apple Public Server RSA CA 11 - G1; O=Apple Inc.; ST=California; C=US
SSL certificate verify ok.
using HTTP/1.x
GET /a/v1/zfcs.bankts.cn HTTP/1.1
Host: app-site-association.cdn-apple.com
User-Agent: curl/8.7.1
Accept: /
Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
< Content-Length: 10
< Connection: keep-alive
< Server: nginx
< Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2026 02:26:00 GMT
< Expires: Wed, 04 Feb 2026 02:26:10 GMT
< Age: 24
< Apple-Failure-Details: {"cause":"context deadline exceeded (Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers)"}
< Apple-Failure-Reason: SWCERR00301 Timeout
< Apple-From: https://zfcs.bankts.cn/.well-known/apple-app-site-association
< Apple-Try-Direct: true
< Vary: Accept-Encoding
< Via: https/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pst-003.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363), http/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pac-043.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363), https/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pfe-002.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363)
< X-Cache: MISS KS-CLOUD
< CDNUUID: 736dc646-57fb-43c9-aa0d-eedad3a534f8-1154605242
< x-link-via: yancmp83:443;xmmp02:443;fzct321:443;
< x-b2f-cs-cache: no-cache
< X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-FZ-CT-321-35
< X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-XM-MP-02-16
< X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-YANC-MP-83-15
< X-KSC-Request-ID: c4a640c815640ee93c263a357ee919d6
< CDN-Server: KSFTF
< X-Cdn-Request-ID: c4a640c815640ee93c263a357ee919d6
<
Not Found
Connection #0 to host app-site-association.cdn-apple.com left intact
I'm developing a passkey manager using ASCredentialProviderViewController. I've set a custom AAGUID in the attestation object during registration:
let aaguid = Data([
0xec, 0x78, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0xe0, 0x56, 0x97,
0x8e, 0x94, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x28, 0xc3, 0x95, 0x00
])
However, when I test on webauthn.io, the relying party receives:
AAGUID: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
Provider Name: "iCloud Keychain"
It appears that macOS overwrites the AAGUID to all zeros for third-party Credential Provider Extensions.
This makes it impossible for relying parties to distinguish between different passkey providers, which is one of the key purposes of AAGUID in the WebAuthn specification.
Is this expected behavior? Is there a way for third-party Credential Provider Extensions to use their own registered AAGUID?
Environment:
macOS 26.2
Xcode 26.2
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Extensions
macOS
Authentication Services
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
I'm testing app transferring, before, I have migrate user from teamA to teamB, including subA->transferSub->subB process, now I'm transfer the app from teamB to teamC, after the transfer requested, I can't get transfer_id by /usermigrationinfo api, which response 400 invalid request.
the question is I can still get transfer sub by the auth/token api(grant_type: authorization_code) with teamB parameters(teamIdB/clientIdB/appSecretB/redirectUrlB/subB),but the value is same as first time transfer_id which get during teamA to teamB.
when use parameters above with target(teamIdC) to request /usermigrationinfo, invalid request was responsed.
im sure that all parameters is correct, dose it cause by teamB still in 60-days first transferring(sure already accepted)?
Hello,
I am currently process of migrating an app from Team A to Team B and attempting to generate transfer identifiers using the migration endpoint:
POST https://appleid.apple.com/auth/usermigrationinfo.
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
However, I am consistently receiving an
{
"error": "access_denied"
} response.
[Current Configuration]
Team A (Source):
Primary App ID: com.example.primary
Grouped App IDs:
com.example.service (Services ID for Web)
com.example.app (App ID for iOS - The one being transferred)
All identifiers are under the same App Group.
Team B (Destination):
New App ID and Key created.
[Steps Taken]
Created a Client Secret (JWT) using Team A's Key ID and Team ID.
The sub (subject) in the JWT is set to the Primary App ID of Team A.
Requesting with client_id (Primary App ID), client_secret (JWT), and user_token.
[Questions]
1. App Group Impact: Does the fact that the App being transferred is a Grouped App ID (not the Primary) affect the usermigrationinfo request? Should I use the Primary App ID or the specific Grouped App ID as the client_id?
2. Ungrouping Safety: If I need to ungroup the App ID from the Primary App ID to resolve this:
Will existing users still be able to sign in without issues?
Is there any risk of changing the sub (user identifier) that the app receives from Apple?
Will this cause any immediate service interruption for the live app?
Any insights on why access_denied occurs in this Primary-Grouped configuration would be greatly appreciated.
Feedback ticket ID: FB21797397
Summary
When using posix_spawn() with posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np() to spawn a child process with a different UID, the eslogger incorrectly reports a setuid event as an event originating from the parent process instead of the child process.
Steps to Reproduce
Create a binary that do the following:
Configure posix_spawnattr_t that set the process UIDs to some other user ID (I'll use 501 in this example).
Uses posix_spawn() to spawn a child process
Run eslogger with the event types setuid, fork, exec
Execute the binary as root process using sudo or from root owned shell
Terminate the launched eslogger
Observe the process field in the setuid event
Expected behavior
The eslogger will report events indicating a process launch and uid changes so the child process is set to 501. i.e.:
fork
setuid - Done by child process
exec
Actual behavior
The process field in the setuid event is reported as the parent process (that called posix_spawn) - indicating UID change to the parent process.
Attachments
I'm attaching source code for a small project with a 2 binaries:
I'll add the source code for the project at the end of the file + attach filtered eslogger JSONs
One that runs the descirbed posix_spawn flow
One that produces the exact same sequence of events by doing different operation and reaching a different process state:
Parent calls fork()
Parent process calls setuid(501)
Child process calls exec()
Why this is problematic
Both binaries in my attachment do different operations, achieving different process state (1 is parent with UID=0 and child with UID=501 while the other is parent UID=501 and child UID=0), but report the same sequence of events.
Code
#include <cstdio>
#include <spawn.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <string.h>
// environ contains the current environment variables
extern char **environ;
extern "C" {
int posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, uid_t uid);
int posix_spawnattr_set_gid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, gid_t gid);
}
int main() {
pid_t pid;
int status;
posix_spawnattr_t attr;
// 1. Define the executable path and arguments
const char *path = "/bin/sleep";
char *const argv[] = {(char *)"sleep", (char *)"1", NULL};
// 2. Initialize spawn attributes
if ((status = posix_spawnattr_init(&attr)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_init: %s\n", strerror(status));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
// 3. Set the UID for the child process (e.g., UID 501)
// Note: Parent must be root to change to a different user
uid_t target_uid = 501;
if ((status = posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(&attr, target_uid)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np: %s\n", strerror(status));
posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
// 4. Spawn the process
printf("Spawning /bin/sleep 1 as UID %d...\n", target_uid);
status = posix_spawn(&pid, path, NULL, &attr, argv, environ);
if (status == 0) {
printf("Successfully spawned child with PID: %d\n", pid);
// Wait for the child to finish (will take 63 seconds)
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) {
printf("Child process exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else {
perror("waitpid");
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawn: %s\n", strerror(status));
}
// 5. Clean up
posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr);
return (status == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
}
#include <cstdio>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
// This program demonstrates fork + setuid + exec behavior for ES framework bug report
// 1. Parent forks
// 2. Parent does setuid(501)
// 3. Child waits with sleep syscall
// 4. Child performs exec
int main() {
printf("Parent PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid());
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
// Fork failed
perror("fork");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (pid == 0) {
// Child process
printf("Child PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid());
// Child waits for a bit with sleep syscall
printf("Child sleeping for 2 seconds...\n");
sleep(2);
// Child performs exec
printf("Child executing child_exec...\n");
// Get the path to child_exec (same directory as this executable)
char *const argv[] = {(char *)"/bin/sleep", (char *)"2", NULL};
// Try to exec child_exec from current directory first
execv("/bin/sleep", argv);
// If exec fails
perror("execv");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
} else {
// Parent process
printf("Parent forked child with PID: %d\n", pid);
// Parent does setuid(501)
printf("Parent calling setuid(501)...\n");
if (setuid(501) != 0) {
perror("setuid");
// Continue anyway to observe behavior
}
printf("Parent after setuid - UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getuid(), geteuid());
// Wait for child to finish
int status;
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) {
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
printf("Child exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
printf("Child killed by signal %d\n", WTERMSIG(status));
}
} else {
perror("waitpid");
}
}
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
posix_spawn.json
fork_exec.json
I have a user (myself, during development) who originally signed in with Apple successfully. I attempted to revoke
access via Settings > Apple ID > Sign-In & Security > Sign in with Apple, but the app appears stuck in the list and
cannot be fully removed. Now when attempting to sign in again, the identity token contains the correct sub but email is
undefined. According to Apple's documentation, "Apple provides the user's email address in the identity token on all
subsequent API responses." I've tried programmatically revoking via the /auth/revoke endpoint (received 200 OK), and
I've implemented the server-to-server notification endpoint to handle consent-revoked events, but subsequent sign-in
attempts still return no email. The same Apple ID works fine with other apps. Is there a way to fully reset the
credential state for a specific app, or is this a known issue with partially-revoked authorizations?
I have a user (myself, during development) who originally signed in with Apple successfully. I attempted to revoke
access via Settings > Apple ID > Sign-In & Security > Sign in with Apple, but the app appears stuck in the list and
cannot be fully removed. Now when attempting to sign in again, the identity token contains the correct sub but email is
undefined. According to Apple's documentation, "Apple provides the user's email address in the identity token on all
subsequent API responses." I've tried programmatically revoking via the /auth/revoke endpoint (received 200 OK), and
I've implemented the server-to-server notification endpoint to handle consent-revoked events, but subsequent sign-in
attempts still return no email. The same Apple ID works fine with other apps. Is there a way to fully reset the
credential state for a specific app, or is this a known issue with partially-revoked authorizations?
We are using SecItemCopyMatching from LocalAuthentication to access the private key to sign a challenge in our native iOS app twice in a few seconds from user interactions.
This was working as expected up until about a week ago where we started getting reports of it hanging on the biometrics screen (see screenshot below).
From our investigation we've found the following:
It impacts newer iPhones using iOS 26.1 and later. We have replicated on these devices:
iPhone 17 Pro max
iPhone 16 Pro
iPhone 15 Pro max
iPhone 15
Only reproducible if the app tries to access the private key twice in quick succession after granting access to face ID.
Looks like a race condition between the biometrics permission prompt and Keychain private key access
We were able to make it work by waiting 10 seconds between private key actions, but this is terrible UX.
We tried adding adding retries over the span of 10 seconds which fixed it on some devices, but not all.
We checked the release notes for iOS 26.1, but there is nothing related to this.
Screenshot:
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Face ID
Entitlements
Touch ID
Local Authentication
In these threads, it was clarified that Credential Provider Extensions must set both Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags to 1 in authenticator data:
https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/745605
https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/787629
However, I'm developing a passkey manager that intentionally stores credentials only on the local device. My implementation uses:
kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for keychain items
kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave for private keys
No iCloud sync or backup
These credentials are, by definition, single-device credentials. According to the WebAuthn specification, they should be represented with BE=0, BS=0.
Currently, I'm forced to set BE=1, BS=1 to make the extension work, which misrepresents the actual backup status to relying parties. This is problematic because:
Servers using BE/BS flags for security policies will incorrectly classify these as synced passkeys
Users who specifically want device-bound credentials for higher security cannot get accurate flag representation
Request: Please allow Credential Provider Extensions to return credentials with BE=0, BS=0 for legitimate device-bound passkey implementations.
Environment: macOS 26.2 (25C56), Xcode 26.2 (17C52)
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Extensions
macOS
Authentication Services
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
Hi,
I'm using webauthn.io to test my macOS Passkey application. When registering a passkey whichever value I set for User Verification, that's what I get when I check registrationRequest.userVerificationPreference on prepareInterface(forPasskeyRegistration registrationRequest: any ASCredentialRequest).
However, when authenticating my passkey I can never get discouraged UV on prepareInterfaceToProvideCredential(for credentialRequest: any ASCredentialRequest).
In the WWDC 2022 Meet Passkeys video, it is stated that Apple will always require UV when biometrics are available. I use a Macbook Pro with TouchID, but if I'm working with my lid closed, shouldn't I be able to get .discouraged?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Authentication Services
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
Estou compartilhando algumas observações técnicas sobre Crash Detection / Emergency SOS no ecossistema Apple, com base em eventos amplamente observados em 2022 e 2024, quando houve chamadas automáticas em massa para serviços de emergência.
A ideia aqui não é discutir UX superficial ou “edge cases isolados”, mas sim comportamento sistêmico em escala, algo que acredito ser relevante para qualquer time que trabalhe com sistemas críticos orientados a eventos físicos.
Contexto resumido
A partir do iPhone 14, a Detecção de Acidente passou a correlacionar múltiplos sensores (acelerômetros de alta faixa, giroscópio, GPS, microfones) para inferir eventos de impacto severo e acionar automaticamente chamadas de emergência. Em 2022, isso resultou em um volume significativo de falsos positivos, especialmente em atividades com alta aceleração (esqui, snowboard, parques de diversão). Em 2024, apesar de ajustes, houve recorrência localizada do mesmo padrão.
Ponto técnico central
O problema não parece ser hardware, nem um “bug pontual”, mas sim o estado intermediário de decisão:
Aceleração ≠ acidente
Ruído ≠ impacto real
Movimento extremo ≠ incapacidade humana
Quando o classificador entra em estado ambíguo, o sistema depende de uma janela curta de confirmação humana (toque/voz). Em ambientes ruidosos, com o usuário em movimento ou fisicamente ativo, essa confirmação frequentemente falha. O sistema então assume incapacidade e executa a ação fail-safe: chamada automática.
Do ponto de vista de engenharia de segurança, isso é compreensível. Do ponto de vista de escala, é explosivo.
Papel da Siri
A Siri não “decide” o acidente, mas é um elo sensível na cadeia humano–máquina. Falhas de compreensão por ruído, idioma, respiração ofegante ou ausência de resposta acabam sendo interpretadas como sinal de emergência real. Isso é funcionalmente equivalente ao que vemos em sistemas automotivos como o eCall europeu, quando a confirmação humana é inexistente ou degradada.
O dilema estrutural
Há um trade-off claro e inevitável:
Reduzir falsos negativos (não perder um acidente real)
Aumentar falsos positivos (chamadas indevidas)
Para o usuário individual, errar “para mais” faz sentido. Para serviços públicos de emergência, milhões de dispositivos errando “para mais” criam ruído operacional real.
Por que isso importa para developers
A Apple hoje opera, na prática, um dos maiores sistemas privados de segurança pessoal automatizada do mundo, interagindo diretamente com infraestrutura pública crítica. Isso coloca Crash Detection / SOS na mesma categoria de sistemas safety-critical, onde:
UX é parte da segurança
Algoritmos precisam ser auditáveis
“Human-in-the-loop” não pode ser apenas nominal
Reflexões abertas
Alguns pontos que, como developer, acho que merecem discussão:
Janelas de confirmação humana adaptativas ao contexto (atividade física, ruído).
Cancelamento visual mais agressivo em cenários de alto movimento.
Perfis de sensibilidade por tipo de atividade, claramente comunicados.
Critérios adicionais antes da chamada automática quando o risco de falso positivo é estatisticamente alto.
Não é um problema simples, nem exclusivo da Apple. É um problema de software crítico em contato direto com o mundo físico, operando em escala planetária. Justamente por isso, acho que vale uma discussão técnica aberta, sem ruído emocional.
Curioso para ouvir perspectivas de quem trabalha com sistemas similares (automotivo, wearables, safety-critical, ML embarcado).
— Rafa
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Siri Event Suggestions Markup
Core ML
App Intents
Communication Safety
Hi
I am experiencing a persistent 'invalid_client' error when attempting to exchange the authorization code for an access token using Sign in with Apple for my website (https://www.vitamarinaweb.com).
Current Setup & Steps Taken:
Identifier: I am using the Service ID com.vitamarinaweb.web1, which is correctly linked to the Primary App ID com.vitamarinaweb.web.
Client Secret: I have generated a fresh Client Secret (JWT) using a valid Key (.p8) and confirmed the Team ID (29J763Q88J) and Key ID (RRW6536D27) are correct.
Redirect URIs: My Return URL is set to https://www.vitamarinaweb.com/login.php and I have verified there are no trailing spaces or mismatches.
Manual Test (CURL): When I perform a manual POST request via CURL using the generated Client Secret, I receive an 'invalid_grant' response (meaning the Client Secret and Client ID are accepted, and only the temporary code is rejected as expected).
The Issue: Despite the CURL success, every request initiated through the web browser/PHP application returns {"error":"invalid_client"}.
Verification Requested:
Could you please verify if there is a synchronization delay or a specific block on Service ID com.vitamarinaweb.web1?
Is there any internal mismatch between the Key ID RRW6536D27 and its association with the newly created Service ID?
I have already cleared browser caches and tried multiple devices (different IP addresses) with the same result.
Thank you for your assistance."
Hi
I'm developing an app that autofills Passkeys. The app allows the user to authenticate to their IdP to obtain an access token. Using the token the app fetches from <server>/attestation/options.
The app will generate a Passkey credential using a home-grown module - the extension has no involvement, neither does ASAuthorizationSecurityKeyPublicKeyCredentialProvider. I can confirm the passkey does get created.
Next the credential is posted to <server>/attestation/results with the response JSON being parsed and used to create a ASPasskeyCredentialIdentity - a sample of the response JSON is attached.
Here is my save function:
static func save(authenticator: AuthenticatorInfo) async throws {
guard let credentialID = Data(base64URLEncoded: authenticator.attributes.credentialId) else {
throw AuthenticatorError.invalidEncoding("Credential ID is not a valid Base64URL string.")
}
guard let userHandle = authenticator.userId.data(using: .utf8) else {
throw AuthenticatorError.invalidEncoding("User handle is not a valid UTF-8 string.")
}
let identity = ASPasskeyCredentialIdentity(
relyingPartyIdentifier: authenticator.attributes.rpId,
userName: authenticator.userId, // This is what the user sees in the UI
credentialID: credentialID,
userHandle: userHandle,
recordIdentifier: authenticator.id
)
try await ASCredentialIdentityStore.shared.saveCredentialIdentities([identity])
}
Although no error occurs, I don't get any identities returned when I call this method:
let identities = await ASCredentialIdentityStore.shared.credentialIdentities(
forService: nil,
credentialIdentityTypes: [.passkey]
)
Here is the Info.plist in the Extension:
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>NSExtension</key>
<dict>
<key>NSExtensionAttributes</key>
<dict>
<key>ASCredentialProviderExtensionCapabilities</key>
<dict>
<key>ProvidesPasskeys</key>
<true/>
</dict>
<key>ASCredentialProviderExtensionShowsConfigurationUI</key>
<true/>
</dict>
<key>NSExtensionPointIdentifier</key>
<string>com.apple.authentication-services-credential-provider-ui</string>
<key>NSExtensionPrincipalClass</key>
<string>$(PRODUCT_MODULE_NAME).CredentialProviderViewController</string>
</dict>
</dict>
</plist>
The entitlements are valid and the app and extension both support the same group.
I'm stumped as to why the identity is not getting saved. Any ideas and not getting retrieved.
attestationResult.json
Hi,
In our app we are using DeviceCheck (App Attest) in a production environment iOS. The service works correctly for most users, but a user reported failure in a flow that use device check service. This failure is not intermittently, it is constant.
We are unable to reproduce this failure and we are believing that this failure occurred by new version ios 26.3 because for others users using early versions the service is normally.
Environment
iOS 26.3
Real device
App Attest capability enabled
Correct App ID, Team ID and App Attest entitlement
Production environment
Characteristics:
appears constantly
affects only unique user
-Don't resolves after time or reinstall
not reproducible on our test devices
NSError contains no additional diagnostic info (Error Domain=com.apple.devicecheck.error Code=3 "(null)")
We saw about this error code 3 in this post 812308, but it's not our case because the ios version in this case is not iOS 17.0 or earlier.
Please, help us any guidance for solution. Thank you
Hello,
I would like to seek clarification regarding the availability of the NFC Secure Element (SE) / ISO7816 entitlement by region, specifically for Indonesia.
I recently contacted Apple Developer Support regarding the use of NFC for reading ISO7816-compatible cards. I was informed that, at this time, the NFC & Secure Element entitlement is not available in Indonesia.
For technical planning and compliance purposes, I would like to confirm the following:
Is the NFC Secure Element / ISO7816 entitlement currently restricted by region, and is Indonesia officially unsupported at this time?
For apps distributed on the App Store in Indonesia, is Core NFC limited to NDEF and non–Secure Element tag reading only?
Are there any publicly supported alternatives or recommended architectural approaches for NFC-based workflows in regions where the Secure Element entitlement is unavailable?
Is there any public documentation or guidance that outlines regional availability for NFC Secure Element features?
I understand that entitlement approvals and availability may vary by region and are handled on a case-by-case basis. Any clarification from Apple engineers or developers with experience in this area would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you for your time and assistance.
Best regards.