I regularly help developers with keychain problems, both here on DevForums and for my Day Job™ in DTS. Many of these problems are caused by a fundamental misunderstanding of how the keychain works. This post is my attempt to explain that. I wrote it primarily so that Future Quinn™ can direct folks here rather than explain everything from scratch (-: If you have questions or comments about any of this, put them in a new thread and apply the Security tag so that I see it. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" SecItem: Fundamentals or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the SecItem API The SecItem API seems very simple. After all, it only has four function calls, how hard can it be? In reality, things are not that easy. Various factors contribute to making this API much trickier than it might seem at first glance. This post explains the fundamental underpinnings of the keychain. For information about specific issues, see its companion post, SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices. Keychain Documentation Your basic starting point should be Keychain Items. If your code runs on the Mac, also read TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations. Read the doc comments in <Security/SecItem.h>. In many cases those doc comments contain critical tidbits. When you read keychain documentation [1] and doc comments, keep in mind that statements specific to iOS typically apply to iPadOS, tvOS, and watchOS as well (r. 102786959). Also, they typically apply to macOS when you target the data protection keychain. Conversely, statements specific to macOS may not apply when you target the data protection keychain. [1] Except TN3137, which is very clear about this (-: Caveat Mac Developer macOS supports two different keychain implementations: the original file-based keychain and the iOS-style data protection keychain. IMPORTANT If you’re able to use the data protection keychain, do so. It’ll make your life easier. See the Careful With that Shim, Mac Developer section of SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices for more about this. TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations explains this distinction. It also says: The file-based keychain is on the road to deprecation. This is talking about the implementation, not any specific API. The SecItem API can’t be deprecated because it works with both the data protection keychain and the file-based keychain. However, Apple has deprecated many APIs that are specific to the file-based keychain, for example, SecKeychainCreate. TN3137 also notes that some programs, like launchd daemons, can’t use the file-based keychain. If you’re working on such a program then you don’t have to worry about the deprecation of these file-based keychain APIs. You’re already stuck with the file-based keychain implementation, so using a deprecated file-based keychain API doesn’t make things worse. The Four Freedoms^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H Functions The SecItem API contains just four functions: SecItemAdd(_:_:) SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:) SecItemUpdate(_:_:) SecItemDelete(_:) These directly map to standard SQL database operations: SecItemAdd(_:_:) maps to INSERT. SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:) maps to SELECT. SecItemUpdate(_:_:) maps to UPDATE. SecItemDelete(_:) maps to DELETE. You can think of each keychain item class (generic password, certificate, and so on) as a separate SQL table within the database. The rows of that table are the individual keychain items for that class and the columns are the attributes of those items. Note Except for the digital identity class, kSecClassIdentity, where the values are split across the certificate and key tables. See Digital Identities Aren’t Real in SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices. This is not an accident. The data protection keychain is actually implemented as an SQLite database. If you’re curious about its structure, examine it on the Mac by pointing your favourite SQLite inspection tool — for example, the sqlite3 command-line tool — at the keychain database in ~/Library/Keychains/UUU/keychain-2.db, where UUU is a UUID. WARNING Do not depend on the location and structure of this file. These have changed in the past and are likely to change again in the future. If you embed knowledge of them into a shipping product, it’s likely that your product will have binary compatibility problems at some point in the future. The only reason I’m mentioning them here is because I find it helpful to poke around in the file to get a better understanding of how the API works. For information about which attributes are supported by each keychain item class — that is, what columns are in each table — see the Note box at the top of Item Attribute Keys and Values. Alternatively, look at the Attribute Key Constants doc comment in <Security/SecItem.h>. Uniqueness A critical part of the keychain model is uniqueness. How does the keychain determine if item A is the same as item B? It turns out that this is class dependent. For each keychain item class there is a set of attributes that form the uniqueness constraint for items of that class. That is, if you try to add item A where all of its attributes are the same as item B, the add fails with errSecDuplicateItem. For more information, see the errSecDuplicateItem page. It has lists of attributes that make up this uniqueness constraint, one for each class. These uniqueness constraints are a major source of confusion, as discussed in the Queries and the Uniqueness Constraints section of SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices. Parameter Blocks Understanding The SecItem API is a classic ‘parameter block’ API. All of its inputs are dictionaries, and you have to know which properties to set in each dictionary to achieve your desired result. Likewise for when you read properties in output dictionaries. There are five different property groups: The item class property, kSecClass, determines the class of item you’re operating on: kSecClassGenericPassword, kSecClassCertificate, and so on. The item attribute properties, like kSecAttrAccessGroup, map directly to keychain item attributes. The search properties, like kSecMatchLimit, control how the system runs a query. The return type properties, like kSecReturnAttributes, determine what values the query returns. The value type properties, like kSecValueRef perform multiple duties, as explained below. There are other properties that perform a variety of specific functions. For example, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain tells macOS to use the data protection keychain instead of the file-based keychain. These properties are hard to describe in general; for the details, see the documentation for each such property. Inputs Each of the four SecItem functions take dictionary input parameters of the same type, CFDictionary, but these dictionaries are not the same. Different dictionaries support different property groups: The first parameter of SecItemAdd(_:_:) is an add dictionary. It supports all property groups except the search properties. The first parameter of SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:) is a query and return dictionary. It supports all property groups. The first parameter of SecItemUpdate(_:_:) is a pure query dictionary. It supports all property groups except the return type properties. Likewise for the only parameter of SecItemDelete(_:). The second parameter of SecItemUpdate(_:_:) is an update dictionary. It supports the item attribute and value type property groups. Outputs Two of the SecItem functions, SecItemAdd(_:_:) and SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:), return values. These output parameters are of type CFTypeRef because the type of value you get back depends on the return type properties you supply in the input dictionary: If you supply a single return type property, except kSecReturnAttributes, you get back a value appropriate for that return type. If you supply multiple return type properties or kSecReturnAttributes, you get back a dictionary. This supports the item attribute and value type property groups. To get a non-attribute value from this dictionary, use the value type property that corresponds to its return type property. For example, if you set kSecReturnPersistentRef in the input dictionary, use kSecValuePersistentRef to get the persistent reference from the output dictionary. In the single item case, the type of value you get back depends on the return type property and the keychain item class: For kSecReturnData you get back the keychain item’s data. This makes most sense for password items, where the data holds the password. It also works for certificate items, where you get back the DER-encoded certificate. Using this for key items is kinda sketchy. If you want to export a key, called SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation. Using this for digital identity items is nonsensical. For kSecReturnRef you get back an object reference. This only works for keychain item classes that have an object representation, namely certificates, keys, and digital identities. You get back a SecCertificate, a SecKey, or a SecIdentity, respectively. For kSecReturnPersistentRef you get back a data value that holds the persistent reference. Value Type Subtleties There are three properties in the value type property group: kSecValueData kSecValueRef kSecValuePersistentRef Their semantics vary based on the dictionary type. For kSecValueData: In an add dictionary, this is the value of the item to add. For example, when adding a generic password item (kSecClassGenericPassword), the value of this key is a Data value containing the password. This is not supported in a query dictionary. In an update dictionary, this is the new value for the item. For kSecValueRef: In add and query dictionaries, the system infers the class property and attribute properties from the supplied object. For example, if you supply a certificate object (SecCertificate, created using SecCertificateCreateWithData), the system will infer a kSecClass value of kSecClassCertificate and various attribute values, like kSecAttrSerialNumber, from that certificate object. This is not supported in an update dictionary. For kSecValuePersistentRef: For query dictionaries, this uniquely identifies the item to operate on. This is not supported in add and update dictionaries. Revision History 2025-05-28 Expanded the Caveat Mac Developer section to cover some subtleties associated with the deprecation of the file-based keychain. 2023-09-12 Fixed various bugs in the revision history. Added a paragraph explaining how to determine which attributes are supported by each keychain item class. 2023-02-22 Made minor editorial changes. 2023-01-28 First posted.

Summary CLLocationSourceInformation.isSimulatedBySoftware (iOS 15+) fails to detect location spoofing when using third-party tools like LocaChange, despite Apple's documentation stating it should detect simulated locations. Environment iOS 18.0 (tested and confirmed) Physical device with Developer Mode enabled Third-party location spoofing tools (e.g., LocaChange etc.) Expected Behavior According to Apple's documentation, isSimulatedBySoftware should return true when: "if the system generated the location using on-device software simulation. " Actual Behavior Tested on iOS 18.0: When using LocaChange sourceInformation.isSimulatedBySoftware returns false This occurs even though the location is clearly being simulated. Steps to Reproduce Enable Developer Mode on iOS 18 device Connect device to Mac via USB Use LocaChange to spoof location to a different city/country In your app, request location updates and check CLLocation.sourceInformation?.isSimulatedBySoftware Observe that it returns false or sourceInformation is nil Compare with direct Xcode location simulation (Debug → Simulate Location) which correctly returns true

Hey devs, I have a really weird issue and at this point I cannot determine is it a Big Sur 11.1 or M1 issue or just some macOS settings issue. Short description programatically (from node, electron) I'd like to store x509 cert to keychain. I got the following error message: SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings: The authorization was denied since no user interaction was possible. (1) I could reproduce this issue on: a brand new mac mini with M1 chip and Big Sur 11.1 another brand new mac mini with M1 chip and Big Sur 11.1 a 2018 MacBook pro with Intel chip and Big Sur 11.1 I couldn't reproduce this issue on: 2020 MacBook pro with intel i9 chip and Big Sur 11.1 2020 MacBook pro with intel i9 chip and Big Sur 11.0 How am I trying to store the cert node test.js test.js const { exec } = require('child_process') exec( &#9;`osascript -e 'do shell script "security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /Users/kotapeter/ssl/testsite.local.crt" with prompt "Test APP wants to store SSL certification to keychain." with administrator privileges'`, &#9;(error, stdout, stderr) => { &#9;&#9;if (error) { &#9;&#9;&#9;console.log(error.stack) &#9;&#9;&#9;console.log(`Error code: ${error.code}`) &#9;&#9;&#9;console.log(`Signal received: ${error.signal}`) &#9;&#9;} &#9;&#9;console.log(`STDOUT: ${stdout}`) &#9;&#9;console.log(`STDERR: ${stderr}`) &#9;&#9;process.exit(1) &#9;} ) testsite.local.crt: ----BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIIDUzCCAjugAwIBAgIUD9xMnL73y7fuida5TXgmklLswsowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOdGVzdHNpdGUubG9jYWwwHhcNMjEwMTE3MTExODU1WhcN NDEwMTEyMTExODU1WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA50ZXN0c2l0ZS5sb2NhbDCCASIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANM08SDi06dvnyU1A6//BeEFd8mXsOpD QCbYEHX/Pz4jqaBYwVjD5pG7FkvDeUKZnEVyrsofjZ4Y1WAT8jxPMUi+jDlgNTiF jPVc4rA6hcGX6b70HjsCACmc8bZd+EU7gm4b5eL6exTsVzHc+lFz4eQFXgutYTL7 guDQE/gFHwqPkLvnfg3rgY31p3Hm/snL8NuD154iE9O1WuSxEjik65uOQaewZmJ9 ejJEuuEhMA8O9dXveJ71TMV5lqA//svDxBu3zXIxMqRy2LdzfROd+guLP6ZD3jUy cWi7GpF4yN0+rD/0aXFJVHzV6TpS9oqb14jynvn1AyVfBB9+VQVNwTsCAwEAAaOB kjCBjzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIC9DA7BgNVHSUENDAyBggrBgEFBQcD AQYIKwYBBQUHAwIGCCsGAQUFBwMDBggrBgEFBQcDBAYIKwYBBQUHAwgwHQYDVR0O BBYEFDjAC2ObSbB59XyLW1YaD7bgY8ddMBkGA1UdEQQSMBCCDnRlc3RzaXRlLmxv Y2FsMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBsU6OA4LrXQIZDXSIZPsDhtA7YZWzbrpqP ceXPwBd1k9Yd9T83EdA00N6eoOWFzwnQqwqKxtYdl3x9JQ7ewhY2huH9DRtCGjiT m/GVU/WnNm4tUTuGU4FyjSTRi8bNUxTSF5PZ0U2/vFZ0d7T43NbLQAiFSxyfC1r6 qjKQCYDL92XeU61zJxesxy5hxVNrbDpbPnCUZpx4hhL0RHgG+tZBOlBuW4eq249O 0Ql+3ShcPom4hzfh975385bfwfUT2s/ovng67IuM9bLSWWe7U+6HbOEvzMIiqK94 YYPmOC62cdhOaZIJmro6lL7eFLqlYfLU4H52ICuntBxvOx0UBExn----END CERTIFICATE testsite.local.key: ----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEA0zTxIOLTp2+fJTUDr/8F4QV3yZew6kNAJtgQdf8/PiOpoFjB WMPmkbsWS8N5QpmcRXKuyh+NnhjVYBPyPE8xSL6MOWA1OIWM9VzisDqFwZfpvvQe OwIAKZzxtl34RTuCbhvl4vp7FOxXMdz6UXPh5AVeC61hMvuC4NAT+AUfCo+Qu+d+ DeuBjfWnceb+ycvw24PXniIT07Va5LESOKTrm45Bp7BmYn16MkS64SEwDw711e94 nvVMxXmWoD/+y8PEG7fNcjEypHLYt3N9E536C4s/pkPeNTJxaLsakXjI3T6sP/Rp cUlUfNXpOlL2ipvXiPKe+fUDJV8EH35VBU3BOwIDAQABAoIBAQDDGLJsiFqu3gMK IZCIcHCDzcM7Kq43l2uY9hkuhltrERJNle70CfHgSAtubOCETtT1qdwfxUnR8mqX 15T5dMW3xpxNG7vNvD/bHrQfyc9oZuV6iJGsPEreJaV5qg/+E9yFzatrIam0SCS7 YL6xovPU58hZzQxuRbo95LetcT2dSBY33+ttY7ayV/Lx7k6nh0xU6RmTPHyyr8m7 yHpoJoSxdT/xv5iBSZ8mM9/2Vzhr14SWipVuwVVhDSfbn8ngHpIoQDkaJLMpWr+m 4z3PqfftAwR6s6i96HnhYLnRir618TQh4B9IEngeEwCMn4XAzE3L+VTaKU1hg9el aMfXzPERAoGBAPa+sJ2p9eQsv0vCUUL8KeRWvwjDZRTd+YAIfpLMWrb0tMmrBM4V V0L2joF76kdDxt1SAlHoYCT/3Rn8EPmK0TN3MEskiXQ7v57iv+LZOZcpe0ppG/4A ZihF9+wUjFCDw4ymnRQD463535O6BgZV+rcZksFRD2AwvEjt1nYm93VXAoGBANsh AYM+FPmMnzebUMB0oGIkNkE9nVb9MPbQYZjEeOeHJqmt1Nl6xLuYBWTmWwCy7J4e QPtnuMCdO6C1kuOGjQPBFIpeyFMzll+E3hKzicumgCpt5U8nTZoKc/jZckRD7n3p lbYYgHOR3A/3GCDK5L3rwziWpSRAGMSCQylvkOC9AoGBAKLfZL3t/r3LO8rKTdGl mhF7oUYrlIGdtJ/q+4HzGr5B8URdeyJ9u8gb8B1Qqmi4OIDHLXjbpvtFWbFZTesq 0sTiHCK9z23GMsqyam9XbEh3vUZ082FK6iQTa3+OYMCU+XPSV0Vq+9NPaWGeHXP5 NTG/07t/wmKASQjq1fHP7vCpAoGBAK4254T4bqSYcF09Vk4savab46aq3dSzJ6KS uYVDbvxkLxDn6zmcqZybmG5H1kIP/p8XXoKCTBiW6Tk0IrxR1PsPHs2D3bCIax01 /XjQ1NTcYzlYdd8gWEoH1XwbJQWxHINummBTyowXguYOhVhM9t8n+eWbn1/atdZF 2i+vS3fhAoGAYKw6rkJfTSEswgBKlQFJImxVA+bgKsEwUti1aBaIA2vyIYWDeV10 G8hlUDlxvVkfwCJoy5zz6joGGO/REhqOkMbFRPseA50u2NQVuK5C+avUXdcILJHN zp0nC5eZpP1TC++uCboJxo5TIdbLL7GRwQfffgALRBpK12Vijs195cc=----END RSA PRIVATE KEY What I've already found If I run the following command from terminal It asks my password first in terminal and after that It asks my password again in OS password prompt. sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /Users/kotapeter/ssl/testsite.local.crt It looks like I'm getting the above error message because osascript hides the second password asking dialog. The cert always gets stored in keychain but when I get the error message the cert "Trust" value is not "Always Trust". References StackOverflow question: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/65699160/electron-import-x509-cert-to-local-keychain-macos-the-authorization-was-deni opened issue on sudo-prompt electron package: https://github.com/jorangreef/sudo-prompt/issues/137

Hi,is there an option to mark the file or folder or item stored in user defaults ... not to be backed up when doing unencrypted backup in iTunes?We are developing iOS app that contains sensitive data. But even if we enable Data Protection for the iOS app it can be backed up on mac unencrypted using iTunes. Is there a way to allow backing up content only if the backup is encrypted?

Hi, We are running into issues with iOS app prewarming, where the system launches our app before the user has entered their passcode. In our case, the app stores flags, counters, and session data in UserDefaults and the Keychain. During prewarm launches: UserDefaults only returns default values (nil, 0, false). We have no way of knowing whether this information is valid or just a placeholder caused by prewarming. Keychain items with kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly are inaccessible, which can lead to broken business logic (the app can assume no session exists). No special launch options or environment variables appear to be set. We can reproduce this 100% of the time by starting a Live Activity in the app before reboot. Here’s an example of the workaround we tried, following older recommendations: __attribute__((constructor)) static void ModuleInitializer(void) { char* isPrewarm = getenv("ActivePrewarm"); if (isPrewarm != NULL && isPrewarm[0] == '1') { exit(0); // prevent prewarm launch from proceeding } } On iOS 16+, the ActivePrewarm environment variable doesn’t seem to exist anymore (though older docs and SDKs such as Sentry reference it). We also tried listening for UIApplication.protectedDataDidBecomeAvailableNotification, but this is not specific to prewarming (it also fires when the device gets unlocked) and can cause watchdog termination if we delay work too long. Questions: Is there a supported way to opt out of app prewarming? What is the correct way to detect when an app is being prewarmed? Is the ActivePrewarm environment variable still supported in iOS 16+? Ideally, the UserDefaults API itself should indicate whether it is returning valid stored values or defaults due to the app being launched in a prewarm session. We understand opting out may impact performance, but data security and integrity are our priority. Any guidance would be greatly appreciated.

The header documentation for the (deprecated) LAContext.evaluatedPolicyDomainState property contains the following: @warning Please note that the value returned by this property can change exceptionally between major OS versions even if the state of biometry has not changed. I noticed that the documentation for the new LAContext.domainState property does not contain a similar warning. I also found this related thread from 2016/17. Is the domainState property not susceptible to changes between major OS versions? Or is this generally not an issue anymore?

Title's basically the whole question. I'm writing an SMS/Call Reporting extension (ILClassificationUIExtensionViewController). My goal is to keep everything on device and not use the built-in SMS/network reporting. To that end, I'm trying to write to a file in the App Group container from the classificationResponse handler. I'm getting Error 513: "You don’t have permission to save the file “classification_log.txt” in the [app group container folder]". I haven't been able to find much in the documentation on whether this behavior is enforced in classificationResponse handlers. Apple's barebones page on "SMS and Call Spam Reporting"[1] says "the system always deletes your extension’s container after your extension terminates," but that doesn't answer whether you can write to an App Group container. I haven't been able to find that answer elsewhere. ChatGPT and Gemini are both very sure it can be done. Any thoughts? [1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/identitylookup/sms-and-call-spam-reporting

Command: com.apple.WebKit.Networking Path: /private/preboot/Cryptexes/OS/System/Library/ExtensionKit/Extensions/NetworkingExtension.appex/com.apple.WebKit.Networking Identifier: com.apple.WebKit.Networking Version: ??? (8621.3.11.10.3) Resource Coalition: "com.apple.mobilesafari"(1005) Architecture: arm64e Parent: launchd [1] PID: 1708

Hi guys, I need to configure a VPN to work only for specific apps. I already have a supervised iPhone, and I’ve successfully configured the VPN, but right now it applies to the whole phone. I need it to work just for some apps. I tried using both Apple Configurator and iMazing, but I can’t find this option there.

Hi everyone. Since the update to iOS 26, we are no longer able to tap the person's name and view the certificate of a signed email and choose to install the certificate or remove it. This has always worked just fine but seems to be broken on iOS 26 and I have verified that it does not work on iOS 26.1 beta as well. The part that is strange is it does work just fine on an iPad running iPad OS 26. This makes it impossible to send encrypted emails to someone via the mail app on an iPhone. I have found a temporary workaround which is to install Outlook for iOS and install the certificates through that app which then allows me to send encrypted emails via Outlook. This appears to be a bug just with the iPhone as I have also seen a few other people online talking about the same problem. Has anyone found a solution to this?

Macbook OS Version: macOS 14.7.3 (23H417) Mobile OS: iOS Mobile OS Version: iOS 18.6.2 Mobile Manufacturer: Apple Mobile Model: iPhone 12 Pro Max Page Type: vue vue Version: vue2 Packaging Method: Cloud Packaging Project Creation Method: HBuilderX Steps: The backend server is deployed on AWS in Japan with a Japanese IP. Packaging the APP in HBuilderX and publishing it to the Apple App Store were both successful. In a subsequent version, we planned to add a push notification feature and selected uniPush V2. Due to the separation of frontend and backend, the frontend APP implements functions such as registration, login, password change, page content display, and product lists through the server's RESTful APIs. Test colleagues reported that the APP could not load pages when used in Japan; however, it worked normally in China. In China: Pinging the server IP and domain from a MacBook was successful. Testing the API with Postman on a MacBook was successful. In Japan: Pinging the server IP and domain from a MacBook was successful. Testing the API with Postman on a MacBook failed with the error: HandshakeException: Connection terminated during handshake This appears to be an SSL communication failure. We tested the SSL certificate using www.ssllabs.com/ssltest and received an A+ rating. The certificate should not be an issue. we deselected uniPush V2, repackaged the APP, and uploaded it to TestFlight. The result remained the same: the APP content failed to load in Japan, while it worked normally in China. Expected Result: Access to the Japanese server APIs should work normally both in China and Japan. Actual Result: The APP content fails to load when used in Japan, but works normally in China.

Our app server is having some TLS related issue with the new iOS 26 (It works with iOS 18 and below). When opening the domain url in iPhone Safari browser with iOS 26, it showing the error as below: We followed the instructions from this link (https://support.apple.com/en-sg/122756), to run the following command: nscurl --tls-diagnostics https://test.example in Terminal app. It shows TLS failed with error: -9808 Could anyone please help explain what exactly the issue is with our server certificate, and how we should fix it? Thanks so much!

With Let's Encrypt having completely dropped support for OCSP recently [1], I wanted to ask if macOS has a means of keeping up to date with their CRLs and if so, roughly how often this occurs? I first observed an issue where a revoked-certificate test site, "revoked.badssl.com" (cert signed by Let's Encrypt), was not getting blocked on any browser, when a revocation policy was set up using the SecPolicyCreateRevocation API, in tandem with the kSecRevocationUseAnyAvailableMethod and kSecRevocationPreferCRL flags. After further investigation, I noticed that even on a fresh install of macOS, Safari does not block this test website, while Chrome and Firefox (usually) do, due to its revoked certificate. Chrome and Firefox both have their own means of dealing with CRLs, while I assume Safari uses the system Keychain and APIs. I checked cert info for the site here [2]. It was issued on 2025-07-01 20:00 and revoked an hour later. [1] https://letsencrypt.org/2024/12/05/ending-ocsp/ [2] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=revoked.badssl.com

Hi! I'm trying to prototype a macOS app related to wifi features. The main hiccup I've encountered is "Connect to a saved network without re-entering the network password". So far I've been unsuccessful in this without entering the password manually each time asking the user for authentication to access the saved network in keychain I read somewhere on the internet that CWInterface.associate would use saved credentials automatically if you gave a nil password, but my attempts have proven that to be false. Is this not currently available because it raises security concerns, or it just hasn't been considered? Or am I missing a way to do this? I don't need access to the credentials, just for the system to connect for me.

I am working on implementing mTLS authentication in my iOS app (Apple Inhouse &amp; intune MAM managed app). The SCEP client certificate is deployed on the device via Intune MDM. When I try accessing the protected endpoint via SFSafariViewController/ASWebAuthenticationSession, the certificate picker appears and the request succeeds. However, from within my app (using URLSessionDelegate), the certificate is not found (errSecItemNotFound). The didReceive challenge method is called, but my SCEP certificate is not found in the app. The certificate is visible under Settings &gt; Device Management &gt; SCEP Certificate. How can I make my iOS app access and use the SCEP certificate (installed via Intune MDM) for mTLS requests? Do I need a special entitlement, keychain access group, or configuration in Intune or Developer account to allow my app to use the certificate? Here is the sample code I am using: final class KeychainCertificateDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate { func urlSession(_ session: URLSession, didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge, completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -&gt; Void) { guard challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodClientCertificate else { completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil) return } // Get the DNs the server will accept guard let expectedDNs = challenge.protectionSpace.distinguishedNames else { completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil) return } var identityRefs: CFTypeRef? = nil let err = SecItemCopyMatching([ kSecClass: kSecClassIdentity, kSecMatchLimit: kSecMatchLimitAll, kSecMatchIssuers: expectedDNs, kSecReturnRef: true, ] as NSDictionary, &amp;identityRefs) if err != errSecSuccess { completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil) return } guard let identities = identityRefs as? [SecIdentity], let identity = identities.first else { print("Identity list is empty") completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil) return } let credential = URLCredential(identity: identity, certificates: nil, persistence: .forSession) completionHandler(.useCredential, credential) } } func perform_mTLSRequest() { guard let url = URL(string: "https://sample.com/api/endpoint") else { return } var request = URLRequest(url: url) request.httpMethod = "POST" request.setValue("application/json", forHTTPHeaderField: "Accept") request.setValue("Bearer \(bearerToken)", forHTTPHeaderField: "Authorization") let delegate = KeychainCertificateDelegate() let session = URLSession(configuration: .ephemeral, delegate: delegate, delegateQueue: nil) let task = session.dataTask(with: request) { data, response, error in guard let httpResponse = response as? HTTPURLResponse, (200...299).contains(httpResponse.statusCode) else { print("Bad response") return } if let data = data { print(String(data: data, encoding: .utf8)!) } } task.resume() }

We are interested in using a hardware-bound key in a launch daemon. In a previous post, Quinn explicitly told me this is not possible to use an SE keypair outside of the system context and my reading of the Apple documentation also supports that. That said, we have gotten the following key-creation and persistence flow to work, so we have some questions as to how this fits in with the above. (1) In a launch daemon (running thus as root), we do: let key = SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey() (2) We then use key.dataRepresentation to store a reference to the key in the system keychain as a kSecClassGenericPassword. (3) When we want to use the key, we fetch the data representation from system keychain and we "rehydrate" the key using: SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: data) (4) We then use the output of the above to sign whatever we want. My questions: in the above flow, are we actually getting a hardware-bound key from the Secure Enclave or is this working because it's actually defaulting to a non-hardware-backed key? if it is an SE key, is it that the Apple documentation stating that you can only use the SE with the Data Protection Keychain in the user context is outdated (or wrong)? does the above work, but is not an approach sanctioned by Apple? Any feedback on this would be greatly appreciated.

We are using SecPKCS12Import C API in our application to import a self seigned public key certificate. We tried to run the application for the first time on Tahoe and it failed with OSStatus -26275 error. The release notes didn't mention any deprecation or change in the API as per https://developer.apple.com/documentation/macos-release-notes/macos-26-release-notes. Are we missing anything? There are no other changes done to our application.

Hi, My app was recently rejected with the following message: The app references non-public symbols in App: _BIO_s_socket, _OPENSSL_cleanse The confusing part is that these symbols do not come from iOS system libraries. They are defined inside a third-party static library (gRPC/OpenSSL) that my app links. I am not calling any Apple private API, only linking against the third-party code where those symbols are defined. Questions: Why does App Review treat these symbols as “non-public” when they are provided by my own bundled third-party library, not by the system? What is Apple’s recommended approach in this situation — should I rebuild the third-party library with symbol renaming / hidden visibility, or is there another supported method? It would help to understand the official reasoning here, because it seems strange that a vendor-namespaced or self-built OpenSSL would cause a rejection even though I am not using Apple’s internal/private APIs. Thanks for any clarification.

We are facing an issue with Keychain sharing across our apps after our Team ID was updated. Below are the steps we have already tried and the current observations: Steps we have performed so far: After our Team ID changed, we opened and re-saved all the provisioning profiles. We created a Keychain Access Group: xxxx.net.soti.mobicontrol (net.soti.mobicontrol is one bundle id of one of the app) and added it to the entitlements of all related apps. We are saving and reading certificates using this access group only. Below is a sample code snippet we are using for the query: [genericPasswordQuery setObject:(id)kSecClassGenericPassword forKey:(id)kSecClass]; [genericPasswordQuery setObject:identifier forKey:(id)kSecAttrGeneric]; [genericPasswordQuery setObject:accessGroup forKey:(id)kSecAttrAccessGroup]; [genericPasswordQuery setObject:(id)kSecMatchLimitOne forKey:(id)kSecMatchLimit]; [genericPasswordQuery setObject:(id)kCFBooleanTrue forKey:(id)kSecReturnAttributes]; Issues we are facing: Keychain items are not being shared consistently across apps. We receive different errors at different times: Sometimes errSecDuplicateItem (-25299), even when there is no item in the Keychain. Sometimes it works in a debug build but fails in Ad Hoc / TestFlight builds. The behavior is inconsistent and unpredictable. Expectation / Clarification Needed from Apple: Are we missing any additional configuration steps after the Team ID update? Is there a known issue with Keychain Access Groups not working correctly in certain build types (Debug vs AdHoc/TestFlight)? Guidance on why we are intermittently getting -25299 and how to properly reset/re-add items in the Keychain. Any additional entitlement / provisioning profile configuration that we should double-check. Request you to please raise a support ticket with Apple Developer Technical Support including the above details, so that we can get guidance on the correct setup and resolve this issue.

Hi everyone, I'm encountering a behaviour related to Secure Event Input on macOS and wanted to understand if it's expected or if there's a recommended approach to handle it. Scenario: App A enables secure input using EnableSecureEventInput(). While secure input is active, App A launches App B using NSWorkspace or similar. App B launches successfully, but it does not receive foreground focus — it starts in the background. The system retains focus on App A, seemingly to preserve the secure input session. Observed Behavior: From what I understand, macOS prevents app switching during Secure Event Input to avoid accidental or malicious focus stealing (e.g., to prevent UI spoofing during password entry). So: Input focus remains locked to App A. App B runs but cannot become frontmost unless the secure input session ends or App B is brought to the frontmost by manual intervention or by running a terminal script. This is consistent with system security behaviour, but it presents a challenge when App A needs to launch and hand off control to another app. Questions: Is this behaviour officially documented anywhere? Is there a recommended pattern for safely transferring focus to another app while Secure Event Input is active? Would calling DisableSecureEventInput() just before launching App B be the appropriate (and safe) solution? Or is there a better way to defer the transition? Thanks in advance for any clarification or advice.

Note: in this post I discuss sceneDidEnterBackground/WillResignActive but I assume any guidance provided would also apply to the now deprecated applicationDidEnterBackground/applicationWillResignActive and SwiftUI's ScenePhase (please call out if that's not the case!). A common pattern for applications with sensitive user data (banking, health, private journals, etc.) is to obsurce content in the app switcher. Different apps appear to implement this in two common patterns. Either immediately upon becoming inactive (near immediately upon moving to task switcher) or only upon becoming backgrounded (not until you've gone to another app or back to the home screen). I’d like to make sure we’re aligned with Apple’s intended best practices and am wondering if an anti-pattern of using sceneWillResignActive(_:) may be becoming popularized and has minor user experience inconviences (jarring transitions to the App Switcher/Control Center/Notification Center and when the system presents alerts.) Our applications current implementation uses sceneDidEnterBackground(_:) to obscure sensitive elements instead of sceneWillResignActive(_:), based on the recomendations from tech note QA1838 and the documentation in sceneDidEnterBackground(_:) ... Shortly after this method [sceneWillEnterBackground] returns, UIKit takes a snapshot of your scene’s interface for display in the app switcher. Make sure your interface doesn’t contain sensitive user information. Both QA1838 and the sceneDidEnterBackground documentation seem to indicate backgrounding is the appropriate event to respond to for this pattern but I am wondering if "to display in the app switcher" may be causing confusion since your app can also display in the app switcher upon becoming inactive and if some guidance could be added to sceneWillResignActive that it is not nesscary to obsure content during this state (if that is true). In our testing, apps seems to continue to play any in-progress animations when entering the app switcher from the application (inactive state), suggesting no snapshot capture. We also discovered that it appears sceneWillResignActive not always be called (it usually is) but occasionally you can swipe into the app switcher without it being called but that sceneDidEnterBackground is triggered more consistently. It appears the Wallet app behaves as I'd expect with sceneDidEnterBackground on card details screens as well (ejecting you to the card preview if you switch apps) but will keep you on the card details screen upon becoming inactive. Questions: Is sceneDidEnterBackground(_:) still Apple’s recommended place to obscure sensitive content, or should apps handle this earlier (e.g. on inactive)? Would it actually be recommended against using sceneWillResignActive active given it seems to not be gauranteed to be called? Ask: Provide an updated version of QA1838 to solidfy the extrapolation of applicationDidEnterBackground -> sceneDidEnterBackground Consider adding explicit guidance to sceneWillResignActive documentation