Prioritize user privacy and data security in your app. Discuss best practices for data handling, user consent, and security measures to protect user information.

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Local Authentication & localized reason string
In a project I was using Local Authentication to authenticate a user. When I got a request to support smartcard/PIV token authentication (which Local Authentication does not support), I had to switch to Authorization Services, which works pretty. There's only one issue I have. Local Authentication's evaluatePolicy:localizedReason:reply: requires a reason in the form "<appname>" is trying to <localized reason>. The app is currently translated into 41 languages and I would like to use the localized strings for the AuthorizationEnvironment of Authorization Services as well. The problem is that Local Authentication prefixes the localized string with something like "<appname>" is trying to and Authorization Services does not do this. Is there a way to get this prefix from somewhere so I can manually add it to the (partially) localized string? Any help would be highly appreciated. Thank you, Marc
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827
Feb ’25
How to use App Attest Environment?
Hi, I'm looking at adding App Attest to an app, and I think I understand the mechanics of the attestation process, but I'm having trouble figuring out how development and testing are supposed to work. Two main questions: The "App Attest Environment" -- the documentation says that attestation requests made in the .development sandbox environment don't affect the app's risk metrics, but I'm not sure how to actually use this sandbox. My understanding is that one of the things App Attest does is to ensure that your app has been appropriately signed by the App Store, so it knows that it hasn't been tampered with. But the docs say that App Store builds (and Test Flight and Developer Enterprise Program) always use the .production environment. Does App Attest actually work for local developer-build apps if you have this entitlement set? Presumably only on hardware devices since it requires the Secure Enclave? Does our headend have to do something different when verifying the public key and subsequent attested requests for an app that's using the .development sandbox? The docs do mention that a headend server should potentially track two keys per device/user pair so that it can have a production and development key. How does the headend know if a key is from the sandbox environment? Thanks!
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125
Jun ’25
Change in the behaviour of SFAuthorizationPluginView in macOS 15
Hi, I've recently tested my custom AuthorizationPlugin on macOS 15 (Sequoia) and I'm seeing a significant change in rendering (or precisely not rendering) the control returned by my SFAuthorizationPluginView's subclass' viewForType method comparing to macOS 14. (I developed and tested my solution on macOS 14 earlier this year). I use SFAuthorizationPluginView to present a NSView (Custom view) which contains a NSSecureTextField and a NSImageView. I show my custom plugin after the user successfully entered username and password (or only the password if the List of Users is configured in System Settings) into the builtin fields provided by loginwindow:login, so injecting my plugin:mechanism pair into the system.login.console after loginwindow:success. (I need to run my mechanism after builtin:authenticate,privileged since my plugin relies on the authentication result coming from my custom PAM module). This setup now however doesn't seem to be working: after entering the (username and) password, the circular spinner appears and my NSView never gets rendered. I've found a workaround to place my plugin:mechanism pair after loginwindow:done, so in the end of the whole authorization chain. I tried to run the good old NameAndPassword bundle, injecting it into the place of the loginwindow:login. Controls are being rendered correctly, but if I place it even right after loginwindow:login it doesn't get rendered as my custom plugin. Is anybody aware if there's anything has intentionally been changed in macOS 15? Or may it be a bug? I guess the original intention of the SFAuthorizationPluginView class was to overwrite/redefine the UI instead of the builtin username + password field, so if I look at it that way it's expected that the view it contains only gets rendered if we use it instead of loginwindow:login. On the other hand this hasn't been the case until now. Thanks for any help!
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306
Dec ’24
Ask for help on Guideline 1.1.6-Safety-Objectionable Content
Our company developed an app that relies on the collected list to display the phone's label in the list when the user's phone receives an incoming call. However, we have been rejected. The main reason for the rejection is as follows: “ Guideline 1.1.6 - Safety - Objectionable Content The app still allows users to unblock and reveal blocked incoming numbers to identify the individual calling or texting, which is not appropriate. Specifically, your app claims to offer the call blocking functionality, but solely identifies numbers that the user has explicitly blocked themselves. Since users can choose to hide their caller ID in iPhone Settings, apps should not attempt to circumvent this iOS feature to reveal the caller's number. ” But our developers clearly stated that there is no way to bypass these settings, and CallDirectory Extensionde cannot directly "unlock hidden numbers" or bypass the built-in restrictions of IOS. We don't know how to solve this problem next, and hope to get everyone's help.
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409
Jan ’25
App Tracking Transparency - Pre-Modal Explanation
Hi, I hope someone is able to help me with this query: Is there a mandatory requirement to display a view before presenting the App Tracking Transparency modal to explain to the user why the app is asking for tracking? I see there are a few apps which do this, but I don't see any mention of this as a mandatory requirement within the app store review guidelines. The modal can be customised with a description detailing why the app is asking for tracking and I believe this may be sufficient to pass an app store review. The guidelines also mention that the app must provide access to information about how and where the data will be used. We have these details in our privacy policy which is accessible from within the app. Is this sufficient or do we need a pre-modal view which contains a direct link the the privacy policy. Any advice on this would be much appreciated.
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380
Feb ’25
Apple Attestation unknownSystemFailure error
Hi, I’ve added attestation to my app, and everything worked as expected during setup. However, after deployment, I noticed some unknownSystemFailure entries in the production logs on New Relic. Could you help me understand what typically causes this error? The documentation suggests issues such as failing to generate a token. What scenarios could lead to that?
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Trusted Execution Resources
Trusted execution is a generic name for a Gatekeeper and other technologies that aim to protect users from malicious code. General: Forums topic: Code Signing Forums tag: Gatekeeper Developer > Signing Mac Software with Developer ID Apple Platform Security support document Safely open apps on your Mac support article Hardened Runtime document WWDC 2022 Session 10096 What’s new in privacy covers some important Gatekeeper changes in macOS 13 (starting at 04: 32), most notably app bundle protection WWDC 2023 Session 10053 What’s new in privacy covers an important change in macOS 14 (starting at 17:46), namely, app container protection WWDC 2024 Session 10123 What’s new in privacy covers an important change in macOS 15 (starting at 12:23), namely, app group container protection Updates to runtime protection in macOS Sequoia news post Testing a Notarised Product forums post Resolving Trusted Execution Problems forums post App Translocation Notes forums post Most trusted execution problems are caused by code signing or notarisation issues. See Code Signing Resources and Notarisation Resources. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
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3.2k
Jul ’25
Passkey issue- Unable to verify webcredentials
Recently, we have adapted the passkey function on the Mac, but we always encounter the error message "Unable to verify the web credentials association of xxx with domain aaa. Please try again in a few seconds." We can confirm that https://aaa/.well-known/apple-app-site-association has been configured and is accessible over the public network. Additionally, the entitlements in the app have also been set with webcredentials:aaa. This feature has been experiencing inconsistent performance. When I restart my computer or reinstall the pkg, this feature may work or it may still not work. I believe this is a system issue. Here is feed back ID: FB20876945 In the feedback, I provided the relevant logs. If you have any suggestions or assistance, please contact me. I would be extremely grateful!
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My first launch and... My Apple Developer Account suddenly disappeared
Hi! I've just opened Xcode and found that I can't build my app anymore. The error was about signing. Basically, there's no team in my account. Also, I've found that all my certificates have been revoked! I created my dev account a month ago and released only one macOS app. It's SecFolder (it's not self-promotion!!!). App not even in the App Store. I planned to self-distribute it. I'm in a little shock right now since I've just launched and had my first users. And of course, my app is now gone from their Macs, screaming "malware" popup in their faces now :( Since my app is all about paranoia security, this is basically a death sentence for my project... Could someone with experience in the Apple dev ecosystem help me understand what might have gone wrong? Why might Apple think that my app is malware or something? P.S. My app is about Advanced File Access Control for macOS. It gives user complete control over which applications can access specified by user files and folders
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390
Dec ’24
The Case for Sandboxing a Directly Distributed App
I’ve explained this point many times on the forums, so I figured I’d write it up properly once and for all. If you have questions or comments, start a new thread in Privacy & Security > General and add the App Sandbox tag. That way I’ll be sure to see it. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" The Case for Sandboxing a Directly Distributed App Many folks consider the App Sandbox to be a binary choice: “My app ships in the Mac App Store, so I must sandbox it.” “I directly distribute my app, so I’ll ignore the App Sandbox.” However, those are not your only options. In many cases it makes sense to sandbox a directly distributed app. Sandboxing your app has at least three benefits: It enables app container protection. See Trusted Execution Resources for a link to more info on that. If your app includes any app extensions, it simplifies your development experience because your app and its extensions run in a similar environment. It improves your app’s security (although the actual benefits vary based on the specifics of your app). Sandboxing some apps can be tricky because of the additional security limits applied by the sandbox. However, in a directly distributed app you have access to two techniques that are not available to Mac App Store apps: Temporary exception entitlements Non-sandboxed XPC services Temporary exception entitlements Use temporary exception entitlements to selectively disable specific sandbox security limits. Imagine, for example, that you’re creating a simple document-based app that’s generally compatible with the sandbox. However, that app needs to send an Apple event to Music to create a playlist. That Apple event is blocked by the sandbox. You don’t need to disable the entire App Sandbox just to get around this security limit. Instead, use the com.apple.security.temporary-exception.apple-events entitlement to open a small hole in the sandbox. There are temporary exception entitlements to disable most sandbox security limits. For more information about them, follow the link in App Sandbox Resources. IMPORTANT Don’t be alarmed by the temporary in temporary exception entitlements. That word makes sense when you view this from the Mac App Store perspective. Back in the early days of the Mac App Store, some apps were allowed to use temporary exception entitlements because of limitations in the App Sandbox. Once App Sandbox was sufficiently enhanced, these temporary exception entitlements were no longer allowed in the Mac App Store. However, there’s nothing temporary about the implementation of these entitlements. They work today and are expected to continue working in the future. Using them in a directly distributed app is not a problem. Non-sandboxed XPC services Not all sandbox security limits have a corresponding temporary exception entitlement. For example, the sandbox prevents you from sending a Unix signal to other processes, and there’s no temporary exception entitlement to allow that. If you run into such a limit, move that code to a non-sandboxed XPC service, then have the main app request that the XPC service perform the operation on its behalf. An XPC service can be useful even when there is a temporary exception entitlement to disable a specific sandbox security limit. Continuing the Apple event example from above, if you put the code that sends the Apple event into an XPC service, you only need to apply the temporary exception entitlement to that service, not to your app as a whole. Conclusion If you directly distribute your app, consider enabling the App Sandbox. It has some important benefits, and it might be more feasible than you think.
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412
Mar ’25
How to Digitally Sign a PDF File in Swift?
I'm currently working on a project in Swift where I need to digitally sign a PDF file. I have the following resources available: Private Key stored in the iOS Keychain with a tag. Public Key also stored in the iOS Keychain with a tag. A valid certificate stored as a PEM string. I need to digitally sign a PDF file with the above keys and certificate, but I'm struggling to find a clear and straightforward example or guidance on how to achieve this in Swift. Specifically, I’m looking for help with: Creating the digital signature using the private key and certificate. Embedding this signature into the PDF file. Any considerations I should be aware of regarding the format of the signed PDF (e.g., CMS, PKCS7, etc.). If anyone has experience with digitally signing PDFs in Swift, I would greatly appreciate your guidance or code examples. Thank you in advance!
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533
Dec ’24
Passkey returns unknown error instead of excludedCredentials error when “Saving on another device” option is used.
Hello, I'm receiving an unknown error instead of the excluded credentials error when using the "Save on another device" option for Passkey creation. When creating the ASAuthorizationPlatformPublicKeyCredentialProvider request to pass to the ASAuthorizationController. The excludedCredentials property is used to add a list of credentials to exclude in the registration process. This is to prevent duplicate passkeys from being created if one already exists for the user. When trying to create a duplicate passkey using the same device, the ASAuthorizationControllerDelegate method authorizationController(controller, didCompleteWithError:) is called. The error received has localized description “At least one credential matches an entry of the excludeCredentials list in the platform attached authenticator." When trying to create a duplicate passkey using the “Save on another device” option. The delegate method is called, but the error received has code 1000 ("com.apple.AuthenticationServices.AuthorizationError" - code: 1000). Which maps to the unknown error case in ASAuthorization error type.
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199
May ’25
Keychain Item Lost During Resetting Face ID
I'm using the following code to store a Keychain item: SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags( kCFAllocatorDefault, kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, .biometryAny, &error ) One of my app users reported an issue: 1. The user navigated to his iPhone’s Face ID settings and click `Reset Face ID`. 2. Then, before he set new Face ID, he accidentally tapped the "Back" button and returned to the iPhone Settings page. 3. He later reopened the Face ID setup page and completed the process. 4. Upon returning to my app, the Keychain item secured by Face ID was no longer found. I understand that .biometryAny may cause Keychain items to become invalidated when biometric data is reset. However, the user’s scenario — where the setup was temporarily interrupted — seems to have caused the item to disappear. 1. Is there a way to detect and handle such interruptions to prevent the Keychain item from being lost? 2. How can I design a better experience to guide the user in recreating the Keychain item when this occurs?
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304
Dec ’24
Regarding licensed applet
To apply for NFC & SE Platform entitlement, I need to provide information regarding licensed applets and TSM. However, I currently lack background knowledge in these areas. Could you provide me with an overview or examples of what licensed applets and TSM entail?
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424
Dec ’24
iPad App Suggestions - Api Security
Hi , I have a requirement like, Develop an app for iPad and app uses .net core apis. App will be in kiosk mode, and app doesn't have any type of authentication even OTP also. As the apis will be publishing to all over internet, how can we achieve security to apis? Kindly provide suggestions for this implementation
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191
Sep ’25
Rooted iPhone 15 Pro
iOS 18.2 (22C152) My phone is currently on lockdown mode and I have gotten alerts from Experian that my information is on the dark web as well as having to reset all my accounts. However this has not fixed the issue. Even if I hard factory reset settings etc the root makes its way very shortly after, if not immediately. Though I recently got these notifications and purchased the phone in Feb. 2024 the has been an ongoing issue for a few years. I can elaborate if needed. To make it short I have a reinstalled root on my phone. Apple nor Spectrum (who I have my phone with) have been able to assist with this issue. I have been able to clarify this ”hijacking” with the Geek Squad who didn’t want their legal team involved when asking for a report so the PD can do an internal cyber investigation. So, I’ve just lived with it. Let me know what your thoughts to resolve this issue would be before spending thousands to find a resolution on my own. Side note before asked: what I’ve been told may be it’s ”gateway” is via “DNS hijacking” with WiFi or internally hotspot. I can also elaborate if needed-I’m not a web developer, however I do know where this issue stems from whom has their masters in such industry as well as 30 years experience. It’s annoying and inconvenient at this point and I’m looking for clarity, resolution and if no justice for the criminal then liability. thank you! please refrain from saying “APpLe CaNt bE hiJaCked“ ..
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560
Dec ’24
App Attest Validation Nonce Not Matched
Greetings, We are struggling to implement device binding according to your documentation. We are generation a nonce value in backend like this: public static String generateNonce(int byteLength) { byte[] randomBytes = new byte[byteLength]; new SecureRandom().nextBytes(randomBytes); return Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(randomBytes); } And our mobile client implement the attestation flow like this: @implementation AppAttestModule - (NSData *)sha256FromString:(NSString *)input { const char *str = [input UTF8String]; unsigned char result[CC_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; CC_SHA256(str, (CC_LONG)strlen(str), result); return [NSData dataWithBytes:result length:CC_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } RCT_EXPORT_MODULE(); RCT_EXPORT_METHOD(generateAttestation:(NSString *)nonce resolver:(RCTPromiseResolveBlock)resolve rejecter:(RCTPromiseRejectBlock)reject) { if (@available(iOS 14.0, *)) { DCAppAttestService *service = [DCAppAttestService sharedService]; if (![service isSupported]) { reject(@"not_supported", @"App Attest is not supported on this device.", nil); return; } NSData *nonceData = [self sha256FromString:nonce]; NSUserDefaults *defaults = [NSUserDefaults standardUserDefaults]; NSString *savedKeyId = [defaults stringForKey:@"AppAttestKeyId"]; NSString *savedAttestation = [defaults stringForKey:@"AppAttestAttestationData"]; void (^resolveWithValues)(NSString *keyId, NSData *assertion, NSString *attestationB64) = ^(NSString *keyId, NSData *assertion, NSString *attestationB64) { NSString *assertionB64 = [assertion base64EncodedStringWithOptions:0]; resolve(@{ @"nonce": nonce, @"signature": assertionB64, @"deviceType": @"IOS", @"attestationData": attestationB64 ?: @"", @"keyId": keyId }); }; void (^handleAssertion)(NSString *keyId, NSString *attestationB64) = ^(NSString *keyId, NSString *attestationB64) { [service generateAssertion:keyId clientDataHash:nonceData completionHandler:^(NSData *assertion, NSError *assertError) { if (!assertion) { reject(@"assertion_error", @"Failed to generate assertion", assertError); return; } resolveWithValues(keyId, assertion, attestationB64); }]; }; if (savedKeyId && savedAttestation) { handleAssertion(savedKeyId, savedAttestation); } else { [service generateKeyWithCompletionHandler:^(NSString *keyId, NSError *keyError) { if (!keyId) { reject(@"keygen_error", @"Failed to generate key", keyError); return; } [service attestKey:keyId clientDataHash:nonceData completionHandler:^(NSData *attestation, NSError *attestError) { if (!attestation) { reject(@"attestation_error", @"Failed to generate attestation", attestError); return; } NSString *attestationB64 = [attestation base64EncodedStringWithOptions:0]; [defaults setObject:keyId forKey:@"AppAttestKeyId"]; [defaults setObject:attestationB64 forKey:@"AppAttestAttestationData"]; [defaults synchronize]; handleAssertion(keyId, attestationB64); }]; }]; } } else { reject(@"ios_version", @"App Attest requires iOS 14+", nil); } } @end For validation we are extracting the nonce from the certificate like this: private static byte[] extractNonceFromAttestationCert(X509Certificate certificate) throws IOException { byte[] extensionValue = certificate.getExtensionValue("1.2.840.113635.100.8.2"); if (Objects.isNull(extensionValue)) { throw new IllegalArgumentException("Apple App Attest nonce extension not found in certificate."); } ASN1Primitive extensionPrimitive = ASN1Primitive.fromByteArray(extensionValue); ASN1OctetString outerOctet = ASN1OctetString.getInstance(extensionPrimitive); ASN1Sequence sequence = (ASN1Sequence) ASN1Primitive.fromByteArray(outerOctet.getOctets()); ASN1TaggedObject taggedObject = (ASN1TaggedObject) sequence.getObjectAt(0); ASN1OctetString nonceOctet = ASN1OctetString.getInstance(taggedObject.getObject()); return nonceOctet.getOctets(); } And for the verification we are using this method: private OptionalMethodResult<Void> verifyNonce(X509Certificate certificate, String expectedNonce, byte[] authData) { byte[] expectedNonceHash; try { byte[] nonceBytes = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(expectedNonce.getBytes()); byte[] combined = ByteBuffer.allocate(authData.length + nonceBytes.length).put(authData).put(nonceBytes).array(); expectedNonceHash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(combined); } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { log.error("Error while validations iOS attestation: {}", e.getMessage(), e); return OptionalMethodResult.ofError(deviceBindError.getChallengeNotMatchedError()); } byte[] actualNonceFromCert; try { actualNonceFromCert = extractNonceFromAttestationCert(certificate); } catch (Exception e) { log.error("Error while extracting nonce from certificate: {}", e.getMessage(), e); return OptionalMethodResult.ofError(deviceBindError.getChallengeNotMatchedError()); } if (!Arrays.equals(expectedNonceHash, actualNonceFromCert)) { return OptionalMethodResult.ofError(deviceBindError.getChallengeNotMatchedError()); } return OptionalMethodResult.empty(); } But the values did not matched. What are we doing wrong here? Thanks.
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917
Sep ’25
AASA not being fetched immediately upon app install
Hi Apple Devs, For our app, we utilize passkeys for account creation (not MFA). This is mainly for user privacy, as there is 0 PII associated with passkey account creation, but it additionally also satisfies the 4.8: Login Services requirement for the App Store. However, we're getting blocked in Apple Review. Because the AASA does not get fetched immediately upon app install, the reviewers are not able to create an account immediately via passkeys, and then they reject the build. I'm optimistic I can mitigate the above. But even if we pass Apple Review, this is a pretty catastrophic issue for user security and experience. There are reports that 5% of users cannot create passkeys immediately (https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/756740). That is a nontrivial amount of users, and this large of an amount distorts how app developers design onboarding and authentication flows towards less secure experiences: App developers are incentivized to not require MFA setup on account creation because requiring it causes significant churn, which is bad for user security. If they continue with it anyways, for mitigation, developers are essentially forced to add in copy into their app saying something along the lines of "We have no ability to force Apple to fetch the config required to continue sign up, so try again in a few minutes, you'll just have to wait." You can't even implement a fallback method. There's no way to check if the AASA is available before launching the ASAuthorizationController so you can't mitigate a portion of users encountering an error!! Any app that wants to use the PRF extension to encrypt core functionality (again, good for user privacy) simply cannot exist because the app simply does not work for an unspecified amount of time for a nontrivial portion of users. It feels like a. Apple should provide a syscall API that we can call to force SWCD to verify the AASA or b. implement a config based on package name for the app store such that the installation will immediately include a verified AASA from Apple's CDN. Flicking the config on would require talking with Apple. If this existed, this entire class of error would go away. It feels pretty shocking that there isn't a mitigation in place for this already given that it incentivizes app developers to pursue strictly less secure and less private authentication practices.
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343
Aug ’25