Hello I'm using Auth0 for handling auth in my app When the user wants to sign in, it will show the auth system pop-up And when the user wants to log out it shows the same pop-up My issue is how to replace the Sign In text in this pop-up to show Sign Out instead of Sign In when the user wants to sign out?

We’ve noticed an unexpected behavior in our production iOS app where the UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor value occasionally changes, even though: The app is distributed via the App Store (not TestFlight or Xcode builds) We do not switch provisioning profiles or developer accounts No App Clips, App Thinning, or other advanced features are in use There’s no manual reinstall or device reset in the scenarios observed (as per user feedback) Any insights or confirmations would be much appreciated. Thanks!

% curl -v https://app-site-association.cdn-apple.com/a/v1/zfcs.bankts.cn Host app-site-association.cdn-apple.com:443 was resolved. IPv6: (none) IPv4: 218.92.226.151, 119.101.148.193, 218.92.226.6, 115.152.217.3 Trying 218.92.226.151:443... Connected to app-site-association.cdn-apple.com (218.92.226.151) port 443 ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 (304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): CAfile: /etc/ssl/cert.pem CApath: none (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Unknown (8): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): (304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384 / [blank] / UNDEF ALPN: server accepted http/1.1 Server certificate: subject: C=US; ST=California; O=Apple Inc.; CN=app-site-association.cdn-apple.com start date: Sep 25 13:58:08 2025 GMT expire date: Mar 31 17:44:25 2026 GMT subjectAltName: host "app-site-association.cdn-apple.com" matched cert's "app-site-association.cdn-apple.com" issuer: CN=Apple Public Server RSA CA 11 - G1; O=Apple Inc.; ST=California; C=US SSL certificate verify ok. using HTTP/1.x GET /a/v1/zfcs.bankts.cn HTTP/1.1 Host: app-site-association.cdn-apple.com User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: / Request completely sent off < HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 < Content-Length: 10 < Connection: keep-alive < Server: nginx < Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2026 02:26:00 GMT < Expires: Wed, 04 Feb 2026 02:26:10 GMT < Age: 24 < Apple-Failure-Details: {"cause":"context deadline exceeded (Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers)"} < Apple-Failure-Reason: SWCERR00301 Timeout < Apple-From: https://zfcs.bankts.cn/.well-known/apple-app-site-association < Apple-Try-Direct: true < Vary: Accept-Encoding < Via: https/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pst-003.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363), http/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pac-043.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363), https/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pfe-002.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363) < X-Cache: MISS KS-CLOUD < CDNUUID: 736dc646-57fb-43c9-aa0d-eedad3a534f8-1154605242 < x-link-via: yancmp83:443;xmmp02:443;fzct321:443; < x-b2f-cs-cache: no-cache < X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-FZ-CT-321-35 < X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-XM-MP-02-16 < X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-YANC-MP-83-15 < X-KSC-Request-ID: c4a640c815640ee93c263a357ee919d6 < CDN-Server: KSFTF < X-Cdn-Request-ID: c4a640c815640ee93c263a357ee919d6 < Not Found Connection #0 to host app-site-association.cdn-apple.com left intact

Hi. I enter a password using the security command at the command line. It appears in the keychain access app, but not in the passwords app. I don't understand why. rickhedin@Ricks-MacBook-Pro zalando % security add-generic-password -U -s "birds" -a "cats" -w "dogs" rickhedin@Ricks-MacBook-Pro zalando % rickhedin@Ricks-MacBook-Pro zalando % security find-generic-password -s "birds" -wa "cats" dogs rickhedin@Ricks-MacBook-Pro zalando % I'm told the two apps are two views of the same data, so I guess some filter must be being applied?

Hi Forum, We’re building a security-focused SDK for iOS that includes SIM Binding and SIM Swap detection to help prevent fraud and unauthorised device access, particularly in the context of banking and fintech apps. We understand that iOS limits access to SIM-level data, and that previously available APIs (such as those in CoreTelephony, now deprecated from iOS 16 onwards) provide only limited support for these use cases. We have a few questions and would appreciate any guidance from the community or Apple engineers: Q1. Are there any best practices or Apple-recommended approaches for binding a SIM to a device or user account? Q2. Is there a reliable way to detect a SIM swap when the app is not running (e.g., via system callback, entitlement, or background mechanism)? Q3. Are fields like GID1, GID2, or ICCID accessible through any public APIs or entitlements (such as com.apple.coretelephony.IdentityAccess)? If so, what is the process to request access? Q4. For dual SIM and eSIM scenarios, is there a documented approach to identify which SIM is active or whether a SIM slot has changed? Q5. In a banking or regulated environment, is it possible for an app vendor (e.g., a bank) to acquire certain entitlements from Apple and securely expose that information to a security SDK like ours? What would be the compliant or recommended way to structure such a partnership? Thanks in advance for any insights!

Hello everyone. Hope this one finds you well) I have an issue with integrating a FIDO2 server with ASAuthorizationController. I have managed to register a user with passkey successfully, however when authenticating, the request for authentication response fails. The server can't validate signature field. I can see 2 possible causes for the issue: ASAuthorizationPlatformPublicKeyCredentialAssertion.rawAuthenticatorData contains invalid algorithm information (the server tries ES256, which ultimately fails with false response), or I have messed up Base64URL encoding for the signature property (which is unlikely, since all other fields also require Base64URL, and the server consumes them with no issues). So the question is, what encryption algorithm does ASAuthorizationController use? Maybe someone has other ideas regarding where to look into? Please help. Thanks)

override func prepareInterface(forPasskeyRegistration registrationRequest: any ASCredentialRequest) int this function how can i get the "challenge" from user agent, the params "challenge" need to be used in webauthn navigator.credentials.create

After registe Passkey with webauthn library, i create a passkeyRegistration with follow, let passkeyRegistration = ASPasskeyRegistrationCredential(relyingParty: serviceIdentifier, clientDataHash: clientDataHashSign, credentialID: credentialId, attestationObject: attestationObject) and then completeRegistrationRequest like that, extensionContext.completeRegistrationRequest(using: passkeyRegistration) But a bad outcome occurred from user agent. NotAllowedError:The request is not allowed by the user agent or the platform in the current context. And the return data rawID & credentialPublicKey is empty,

I want iOS device identifier for a framework that is used in multiple vendor's apps. I'm developing a framework to control a peripheral. The framework has to send unique information to register the device with the peripheral. My naive idea was to use IdentifierForVendor. But this API provides the device identifier for the same vendor's apps, not the framework. (The framework will be used by multiple vendors.) Is there a usable device identifier for the framework, regardless of app vendor? Please tell me any solution.

I have a custom NSWindow that I want to exclude from screen capture by setting its sharing state to kCGWindowSharingStateSharingNone. The goal is to prevent this window from appearing in the content captured by ScreenCaptureKit. [window setSharingType:NSWindowSharingType::NSWindowSharingNone]; However, on macOS 15.4+ (Sequoia), the window is still captured by ScreenCaptureKit and appears in the shared content. Does anyone know if kCGWindowSharingStateSharingNone is still effective with ScreenCaptureKit on macOS 15.4 and later?

Recently, we received an user enquiry regarding the inability to perform bookings for the app. After investigation, we found that the issue appears to be caused by the failure of the Apple DeviceCheck service. Based on our checks, approximately 0.01% of requests fail each day (e.g., on 26 June: 6 failures out of 44,544 requests) when using Apple DeviceCheck. Could you please assist in raising the following enquiries with Apple Support? What is the typical failure rate of Apple DeviceCheck? Are there any reliability metrics or benchmarks for its performance? How can the failures be prevented, or is there a recommended retry mechanism to handle such failures? Does the iOS version affect the performance or reliability of Apple DeviceCheck? Are there known issues or limitations with specific iOS versions? How long does the token remain valid, and when should a new one be retrieved? Does using a jailbroken device affect the functionality of Apple DeviceCheck?

There is a sudden surge of users in our apps with invalidated biometrics. Even though the issue is being handled correctly and the user has another way to login, some of the users forgot their passwords and they can not login. Is there any known issue with Biometrics in iOS 18.3.2 or later? There is a (possible) related discussion here: https://discussions.apple.com/thread/256011565

We are experiencing a significant issue with macOS security alerts that began on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. This alert is incorrectly identifying output files from our snippet tests as malware, causing these files to be blocked and moved to the Trash. This is completely disrupting our automated testing workflows. Issue Description: Alert: We are seeing the "Malware Blocked and Moved to Trash" popup window. Affected Files: The security alert triggers when attempting to execute .par files generated as outputs from our snippet tests. These .par files are unique to each individual test run; they are not a single, static tool. System-Wide Impact: This issue is impacting multiple macOS hosts across our testing infrastructure. Timeline: The issue began abruptly on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. Before that time, our tests were functioning correctly. macOS Versions: The problem is occurring on hosts running both macOS 14.x and 15.x. Experimental Host: Even after upgrading an experimental host to macOS 15.6 beta 2, the issue persisted. Local execution: The issue can be reproduced locally. Observations: The security system is consistently flagging these snippet test output files as malware. Since each test generates a new .par file, and this issue is impacting all generated files, the root cause doesn't appear to be specific to the code within the .par files themselves. This issue is impacting all the snippet tests, making us believe that the root cause is not related to our code. The sudden and widespread nature of the issue strongly suggests a change in a security database or rule, rather than a change in our testing code. Questions: Could a recent update to the XProtect database be the cause of this false positive? Are there any known issues or recent changes in macOS security mechanisms that could cause this kind of widespread and sudden impact? What is the recommended way to diagnose and resolve this kind of false positive? We appreciate any guidance or assistance you can provide. Thank you.

Hi, I’d like to confirm something regarding the hosting of the apple-app-site-association (AASA) file. We have a server that publicly hosts the AASA file and is accessible globally. However, this server sits behind an additional security layer (a security server/reverse proxy). My question is: Will this security layer affect Apple’s ability to access and validate the AASA file for Universal Links or App Clips? Are there specific requirements (e.g. headers, redirects, TLS versions, etc.) that we need to ensure the security server does not block or modify? Any guidance or best practices would be appreciated.

I’d like to confirm something regarding the hosting of the apple-app-site-association (AASA) file. We have a server that publicly hosts the AASA file and is accessible globally. However, this server sits behind an additional security layer (a security server/reverse proxy). My question is: Will this security layer affect Apple’s ability to access and validate the AASA file for Universal Links or App Clips? Are there specific requirements (e.g. headers, redirects, TLS versions, etc.) that we need to ensure the security server does not block or modify? Any guidance or best practices would be appreciated. Thanks!

Why are we doing this nonsense? We want to be able to run builds in a sandbox such that they can only see the paths they are intended to depend on, to improve reproducibility. With builds with a very large number of dependencies, there's a very large number of paths added to the sandbox, and it breaks things inside libsandbox. Either it hits some sandbox length limit (sandbox-exec: pattern serialization length 66460 exceeds maximum (65535), Nix issue #4119, worked around: Nix PR 12570), or it hits an assert (this report; also Nix issue #2311). The other options for sandboxing on macOS are not viable; we acknowledge sandbox-exec and sandbox_init_with_parameters are deprecated; App Sandbox is inapplicable because we aren't an app. Our use case is closer to a browser, and all the browsers use libsandbox internally. We could possibly use SystemExtension or a particularly diabolical use of Virtualization.framework, but the former API requires notarization which is close to a no-go for our use case as open source software: it is nearly impossible to develop the software on one's own computer, and it would require us to ship a binary blob (and have the build processes to produce one in infrastructure completely dissimilar to what we use today); it also requires a bunch of engineering time. Today, we can pretend that code signing/notarization doesn't exist and that we are writing an old-school Unix daemon, because we are one. The latter is absolutely diabolical and hard to implement. See this saga about the bug we are facing: Nix issue #4119, Nix issue #2311, etc. What is going wrong I can't attach the file fail.sb as it is too large (you can view the failing test case at Lix's gerrit, CL 2870) and run this: $ sandbox-exec -D _GLOBAL_TMP_DIR=/tmp -f fail.sb /bin/sh Assertion failed: (diff &lt;= INSTR_JUMP_NE_MAX_LENGTH), function push_jne_instr, file serialize.c, line 240. zsh: abort sandbox-exec -D _GLOBAL_TMP_DIR=/tmp -f fail.sb /bin/sh Or a stacktrace: stacktrace.txt Credits Full credits to Jade Lovelace (Lix) for writing the above text and filing a bug. This is submitted under FB16964888

Hi everyone, I’m developing a multiplayer iOS game that uses Multipeer Connectivity for local peer-to-peer networking. I’d like to display user-assigned device names in the UI to help players identify each other during the connection process. In iOS 16 and later, accessing UIDevice.current.name requires the User-Assigned Device Name Entitlement. The documentation states that the entitlement is granted for functionality involving “interaction between multiple devices that the same user operates”. My game is strictly multiplayer, with devices owned by different users, not a single user managing multiple devices. I have a few questions regarding this: Does the requirement for “devices operated by the same user” definitively exclude multiplayer scenarios where devices belong to different players? Can a Multipeer Connectivity-based game qualify for the entitlement in this case? If the entitlement is not applicable, is prompting users to enter custom names the recommended approach for identifying devices in a multiplayer UI? Has anyone successfully obtained this entitlement for a similar multiplayer use case with Multipeer Connectivity? Thanks in advance.

Hello, I would like to seek clarification regarding the availability of the NFC Secure Element (SE) / ISO7816 entitlement by region, specifically for Indonesia. I recently contacted Apple Developer Support regarding the use of NFC for reading ISO7816-compatible cards. I was informed that, at this time, the NFC & Secure Element entitlement is not available in Indonesia. For technical planning and compliance purposes, I would like to confirm the following: Is the NFC Secure Element / ISO7816 entitlement currently restricted by region, and is Indonesia officially unsupported at this time? For apps distributed on the App Store in Indonesia, is Core NFC limited to NDEF and non–Secure Element tag reading only? Are there any publicly supported alternatives or recommended architectural approaches for NFC-based workflows in regions where the Secure Element entitlement is unavailable? Is there any public documentation or guidance that outlines regional availability for NFC Secure Element features? I understand that entitlement approvals and availability may vary by region and are handled on a case-by-case basis. Any clarification from Apple engineers or developers with experience in this area would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and assistance. Best regards.

I'm trying to use ASWebAuthenticationSession on macOS but there is a weird crash and I have no idea what to do. It looks like there is a main thread check in a framework code that I have no control over. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you in advance. The stack of crashed thread has no symbols, even for supposedly my code in OAuthClient.authenticate. macOS 15.4.1 (24E263) Xcode Version 16.3 (16E140) Thread 11: EXC_BREAKPOINT (code=1, subcode=0x10039bb04) Thread 12 Queue : com.apple.NSXPCConnection.m-user.com.apple.SafariLaunchAgent (serial) #0 0x0000000100b17b04 in _dispatch_assert_queue_fail () #1 0x0000000100b52834 in dispatch_assert_queue$V2.cold.1 () #2 0x0000000100b17a88 in dispatch_assert_queue () #3 0x000000027db5f3e8 in swift_task_isCurrentExecutorWithFlagsImpl () #4 0x00000001022c7754 in closure #1 in closure #1 in OAuthClient.authenticate() () #5 0x00000001022d0c98 in thunk for @escaping @callee_guaranteed (@in_guaranteed URL?, @guaranteed Error?) -&gt; () () #6 0x00000001c7215a34 in __102-[ASWebAuthenticationSession initWithURL:callback:usingEphemeralSession:jitEnabled:completionHandler:]_block_invoke () #7 0x00000001c72163d0 in -[ASWebAuthenticationSession _endSessionWithCallbackURL:error:] () #8 0x00000001c7215fc0 in __43-[ASWebAuthenticationSession _startDryRun:]_block_invoke_2 () #9 0x0000000194e315f4 in __invoking___ () #10 0x0000000194e31484 in -[NSInvocation invoke] () #11 0x00000001960fd644 in __NSXPCCONNECTION_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_REPLY_BLOCK__ () #12 0x00000001960fbe40 in -[NSXPCConnection _decodeAndInvokeReplyBlockWithEvent:sequence:replyInfo:] () #13 0x00000001960fb798 in __88-[NSXPCConnection _sendInvocation:orArguments:count:methodSignature:selector:withProxy:]_block_invoke_3 () #14 0x0000000194a6ef18 in _xpc_connection_reply_callout () #15 0x0000000194a6ee08 in _xpc_connection_call_reply_async () #16 0x0000000100b3130c in _dispatch_client_callout3_a () #17 0x0000000100b362f8 in _dispatch_mach_msg_async_reply_invoke () #18 0x0000000100b1d3a8 in _dispatch_lane_serial_drain () #19 0x0000000100b1e46c in _dispatch_lane_invoke () #20 0x0000000100b2bfbc in _dispatch_root_queue_drain_deferred_wlh () #21 0x0000000100b2b414 in _dispatch_workloop_worker_thread () #22 0x0000000100c0379c in _pthread_wqthread () My code: @MainActor func authenticate() async throws { let authURL = api.authorizationURL( scopes: scopes, state: state, redirectURI: redirectURI ) let authorizationCodeURL: URL = try await withUnsafeThrowingContinuation { c in let session = ASWebAuthenticationSession(url: authURL, callback: .customScheme(redirectScheme)) { url, error in guard let url = url else { c.resume(throwing: error ?? Error.unknownError("Failed to get authorization code")) return } c.resume(returning: url) } session.presentationContextProvider = presentationContextProvider session.start() } let authorizationCode = try codeFromAuthorizationURL(authorizationCodeURL) (storedAccessToken, storedRefreshToken) = try await getTokens(authorizationCode: authorizationCode) } Here is disassembly of the crashed function. libdispatch.dylib`_dispatch_assert_queue_fail: 0x10067fa8c &lt;+0&gt;: pacibsp 0x10067fa90 &lt;+4&gt;: sub sp, sp, #0x50 0x10067fa94 &lt;+8&gt;: stp x20, x19, [sp, #0x30] 0x10067fa98 &lt;+12&gt;: stp x29, x30, [sp, #0x40] 0x10067fa9c &lt;+16&gt;: add x29, sp, #0x40 0x10067faa0 &lt;+20&gt;: adrp x8, 71 0x10067faa4 &lt;+24&gt;: add x8, x8, #0x951 ; "not " 0x10067faa8 &lt;+28&gt;: adrp x9, 70 0x10067faac &lt;+32&gt;: add x9, x9, #0x16b ; "" 0x10067fab0 &lt;+36&gt;: stur xzr, [x29, #-0x18] 0x10067fab4 &lt;+40&gt;: cmp w1, #0x0 0x10067fab8 &lt;+44&gt;: csel x8, x9, x8, ne 0x10067fabc &lt;+48&gt;: ldr x10, [x0, #0x48] 0x10067fac0 &lt;+52&gt;: cmp x10, #0x0 0x10067fac4 &lt;+56&gt;: csel x9, x9, x10, eq 0x10067fac8 &lt;+60&gt;: stp x9, x0, [sp, #0x10] 0x10067facc &lt;+64&gt;: adrp x9, 71 0x10067fad0 &lt;+68&gt;: add x9, x9, #0x920 ; "BUG IN CLIENT OF LIBDISPATCH: Assertion failed: " 0x10067fad4 &lt;+72&gt;: stp x9, x8, [sp] 0x10067fad8 &lt;+76&gt;: adrp x1, 71 0x10067fadc &lt;+80&gt;: add x1, x1, #0x8eb ; "%sBlock was %sexpected to execute on queue [%s (%p)]" 0x10067fae0 &lt;+84&gt;: sub x0, x29, #0x18 0x10067fae4 &lt;+88&gt;: bl 0x1006c258c ; symbol stub for: asprintf 0x10067fae8 &lt;+92&gt;: ldur x19, [x29, #-0x18] 0x10067faec &lt;+96&gt;: str x19, [sp] 0x10067faf0 &lt;+100&gt;: adrp x0, 71 0x10067faf4 &lt;+104&gt;: add x0, x0, #0x956 ; "%s" 0x10067faf8 &lt;+108&gt;: bl 0x1006b7b64 ; _dispatch_log 0x10067fafc &lt;+112&gt;: adrp x8, 108 0x10067fb00 &lt;+116&gt;: str x19, [x8, #0x2a8] -&gt; 0x10067fb04 &lt;+120&gt;: brk #0x1

Hello everyone, I'm working on a project where I intend to use Secure Enclave-based, device-bound private keys within a Webauthn flow. I have the following question: Is it possible to generate private keys in the Secure Enclave with integrated attestation in order to reliably prove to a relying party the authenticity and uncompromised state of the key? If so, I would appreciate details on the implementation—specifically, any prerequisites, limitations, or particular API calls and configuration options that need to be considered. I look forward to any advice, best practices, or pointers to further documentation on this topic. Thank you in advance for your support! Best regards, Alex