https://developer.apple.com/documentation/apptrackingtransparency/attrackingmanager/authorizationstatus/notdetermined Note: Discussion If you call ATTrackingManager.trackingAuthorizationStatus in macOS, the result is always ATTrackingManager.AuthorizationStatus.notDetermined. So, does macOS support getting ATT?

Problem Description: In our App, When we launch the web login part using ASWebAuthentication + Universal Links with callback scheme as "https", we are not receiving callback. Note: We are using "SwiftUIWebAuthentication" Swift Package Manager to display page in ASWebAuth. But when we use custom url scheme instead of Universal link, app able to receive call back every time. We use ".onOpenURL" to receive universal link callback scheme.

I work for Brave, a browser with ~80M users. We want to introduce a new system for automatic updates called Omaha 4 (O4). It's the same system that powers automatic updates in Chrome. O4 runs as a separate application on users' systems. For Chrome, this works as follows: An app called GoogleUpdater.app regularly checks for updates in the background. When a new version is found, then GoogleUpdater.app installs it into Chrome's installation directory /Applications/Google Chrome.app. But consider what this means: A separate application, GoogleUpdater.app, is able to modify Google Chrome.app. This is especially surprising because, for example, the built-in Terminal.app is not able to modify Google Chrome.app. Here's how you can check this for yourself: (Re-)install Chrome with its DMG installer. Run the following command in Terminal: mkdir /Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/test. This works. Undo the command: rm -rf /Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/test Start Chrome and close it again. mkdir /Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/test now fails with "Operation not permitted". (These steps assume that Terminal does not have Full Disk Access and System Integrity Protection is enabled.) In other words, once Chrome was started at least once, another application (Terminal in this case) is no longer allowed to modify it. But at the same time, GoogleUpdater.app is able to modify Chrome. It regularly applies updates to the browser. For each update, this process begins with an mkdir call similarly to the one shown above. How is this possible? What is it in macOS that lets GoogleUpdater.app modify Chrome, but not another app such as Terminal? Note that Terminal is not sandboxed. I've checked that it's not related to codesigning or notarization issues. In our case, the main application (Brave) and the updater (BraveUpdater) are signed and notarized with the same certificate and have equivalent requirements, entitlements and provisioning profiles as Chrome and GoogleUpdater. The error that shows up in the Console for the disallowed mkdir call is: kernel (Sandbox) System Policy: mkdir(8917) deny(1) file-write-create /Applications/Google Chrome.app/foo (It's a similar error when BraveUpdater tries to install a new version into /Applications/Brave Browser.app.) The error goes away when I disable System Integrity Protection. But of course, we cannot ask users to do that. Any help would be greatly appreciated.

With Let's Encrypt having completely dropped support for OCSP recently [1], I wanted to ask if macOS has a means of keeping up to date with their CRLs and if so, roughly how often this occurs? I first observed an issue where a revoked-certificate test site, "revoked.badssl.com" (cert signed by Let's Encrypt), was not getting blocked on any browser, when a revocation policy was set up using the SecPolicyCreateRevocation API, in tandem with the kSecRevocationUseAnyAvailableMethod and kSecRevocationPreferCRL flags. After further investigation, I noticed that even on a fresh install of macOS, Safari does not block this test website, while Chrome and Firefox (usually) do, due to its revoked certificate. Chrome and Firefox both have their own means of dealing with CRLs, while I assume Safari uses the system Keychain and APIs. I checked cert info for the site here [2]. It was issued on 2025-07-01 20:00 and revoked an hour later. [1] https://letsencrypt.org/2024/12/05/ending-ocsp/ [2] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=revoked.badssl.com

Since Sun 15th Jun 04:30 (UTC+7) we received lots of following error that causes our device test failure. Could Apple please investigate further? ############################# Operations could not be completed. (com.apple.devicecheck.error error 4.) (serverUnavailable)

Testing my security agent plugin on Tahoe and find that when unlocking the screen, I now get an extra window that pops up over the SFAuthorizationPluginView that says "macOS You must enter a password to unlock the screen" with a Cancel (enabled) and OK button (disabled). See the attached photo. This is new with Tahoe. When unlocking the screen, I see the standard username and password entry view and I enter my password and click OK. That is when this new view appears. I can only click cancel so there is no way to complete authenticating.

Hi. We are writing to report a critical issue we've encountered following the recent release of iOS 26 beta 6. After updating our test devices, we discovered that our application is no longer able to establish HTTPS connections to several of our managed FQDNs. This issue was not present in beta 5 and appears to be a direct result of changes introduced in beta 6. The specific FQDNs that are currently unreachable are: d.socdm.com i.socdm.com tg.scodm.com We have reviewed the official iOS & iPadOS 26 Beta 6 Release Notes, particularly the updates related to TLS. While the notes mention changes, we have confirmed that our servers for all affected FQDNs support TLS 1.2, so we believe they should still be compliant. We have also investigated several of Apple's support documents regarding TLS connection requirements (e.g., HT214774, HT214041), but the information does not seem to apply to our situation, and we are currently unable to identify the root cause of this connection failure. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102028 https://support.apple.com/en-us/103214 Although we hope this issue might be resolved in beta 7 or later, the official release is fast approaching, and this has become a critical concern for us. Could you please provide any advice or insight into what might be causing this issue? Any guidance on potential changes in the networking or security frameworks in beta 6 that could affect TLS connections would be greatly appreciated. We have attached the relevant code snippet that triggers the error, along with the corresponding Xcode logs, for your review. Thank you for your time and assistance. #import "ViewController.h" @interface ViewController () @end @implementation ViewController - (void)viewDidLoad { [super viewDidLoad]; NSURL *url = [NSURL URLWithString:@"https://i.socdm.com/sdk/js/adg-script-loader-b-stg.js"]; NSMutableURLRequest *req = [NSMutableURLRequest requestWithURL:url cachePolicy:NSURLRequestReloadIgnoringLocalCacheData timeoutInterval:30.0]; [self sendWithRequest:req completionHandler:^(NSData *_Nullable data, NSHTTPURLResponse *_Nonnull response, NSError *_Nullable error) { if (error){ NSLog(@"Error occurred: %@", error.localizedDescription); return; }else{ NSLog(@"Success! Status Code: %ld", (long)response.statusCode); } }]; } - (void) sendWithRequest:(NSMutableURLRequest *)request completionHandler:(void (^ _Nullable)(NSData *_Nullable data, NSHTTPURLResponse *response, NSError *_Nullable error))completionHandler { NSURLSessionConfiguration *configuration = [NSURLSessionConfiguration defaultSessionConfiguration]; NSURLSession *session = nil; session = [NSURLSession sessionWithConfiguration:configuration delegate:self delegateQueue:nil]; NSURLSessionTask *task = [session dataTaskWithRequest:request completionHandler:^(NSData *data, NSURLResponse *response, NSError *error) { [session finishTasksAndInvalidate]; NSHTTPURLResponse *httpResponse = (NSHTTPURLResponse *) response; if (error) { if (completionHandler) { completionHandler(nil, httpResponse, error); } } else { if (completionHandler) { completionHandler(data, httpResponse, nil); } } }]; [task resume]; } @end error Connection 1: default TLS Trust evaluation failed(-9807) Connection 1: TLS Trust encountered error 3:-9807 Connection 1: encountered error(3:-9807) Task <C50BB081-E1DA-40FF-A1E5-A03A2C4CB733>.<1> HTTP load failed, 0/0 bytes (error code: -1202 [3:-9807]) Task <C50BB081-E1DA-40FF-A1E5-A03A2C4CB733>.<1> finished with error [-1202] Error Domain=NSURLErrorDomain Code=-1202 "The certificate for this server is invalid. You might be connecting to a server that is pretending to be “i.socdm.com” which could put your confidential information at risk." UserInfo={NSLocalizedRecoverySuggestion=Would you like to connect to the server anyway?, _kCFStreamErrorDomainKey=3, NSErrorPeerCertificateChainKey=( "<cert(0x10621ca00) s: *.socdm.com i: GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018>", "<cert(0x106324e00) s: GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018 i: GlobalSign>" ), NSErrorClientCertificateStateKey=0, NSErrorFailingURLKey=https://i.socdm.com/sdk/js/adg-script-loader-b-stg.js, NSErrorFailingURLStringKey=https://i.socdm.com/sdk/js/adg-script-loader-b-stg.js, NSUnderlyingError=0x1062bf960 {Error Domain=kCFErrorDomainCFNetwork Code=-1202 "(null)" UserInfo={_kCFStreamPropertySSLClientCertificateState=0, kCFStreamPropertySSLPeerTrust=<SecTrustRef: 0x10609d140>, _kCFNetworkCFStreamSSLErrorOriginalValue=-9807, _kCFStreamErrorDomainKey=3, _kCFStreamErrorCodeKey=-9807, kCFStreamPropertySSLPeerCertificates=( "<cert(0x10621ca00) s: *.socdm.com i: GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018>", "<cert(0x106324e00) s: GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018 i: GlobalSign>" )}}, _NSURLErrorRelatedURLSessionTaskErrorKey=( "LocalDataTask <C50BB081-E1DA-40FF-A1E5-A03A2C4CB733>.<1>" ), _kCFStreamErrorCodeKey=-9807, _NSURLErrorFailingURLSessionTaskErrorKey=LocalDataTask <C50BB081-E1DA-40FF-A1E5-A03A2C4CB733>.<1>, NSURLErrorFailingURLPeerTrustErrorKey=<SecTrustRef: 0x10609d140>, NSLocalizedDescription=The certificate for this server is invalid. You might be connecting to a server that is pretending to be “i.socdm.com” which could put your confidential information at risk.} Error occurred: The certificate for this server is invalid. You might be connecting to a server that is pretending to be “i.socdm.com” which could put your confidential information at risk. 折りたたむ

Hello Experts, I am in need of your help with this feedback from the App Reviewer. Issue Description: One or more purpose strings in the app do not sufficiently explain the use of protected resources. Purpose strings must clearly and completely describe the app's use of data and, in most cases, provide an example of how the data will be used. Next Steps: Update the location purpose string to explain how the app will use the requested information and provide a specific example of how the data will be used. See the attached screenshot. Resources: Purpose strings must clearly describe how an app uses the ability, data, or resource. The following are hypothetical examples of unclear purpose strings that would not pass review: "App would like to access your Contacts" "App needs microphone access" Feedback #2 "Regarding 5.1.1, we understand why your app needs access to location. However, the permission request alert does not sufficiently explain this to your users before accessing the location. To resolve this issue, it would be appropriate to revise the location permission request, specify why your app needs access, and provide an example of how your app will use the user's data. To learn more about purpose string requirements, watch a video from App Review with tips for writing clear purpose strings. We look forward to reviewing your app once the appropriate changes have been made." May I know how can I update my purpose string? I appealed on the first feedback by explaining what is the purpose of it but got the Feedback #2. TYIA!!

We are interested in using a hardware-bound key in a launch daemon. In a previous post, Quinn explicitly told me this is not possible to use an SE keypair outside of the system context and my reading of the Apple documentation also supports that. That said, we have gotten the following key-creation and persistence flow to work, so we have some questions as to how this fits in with the above. (1) In a launch daemon (running thus as root), we do: let key = SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey() (2) We then use key.dataRepresentation to store a reference to the key in the system keychain as a kSecClassGenericPassword. (3) When we want to use the key, we fetch the data representation from system keychain and we "rehydrate" the key using: SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: data) (4) We then use the output of the above to sign whatever we want. My questions: in the above flow, are we actually getting a hardware-bound key from the Secure Enclave or is this working because it's actually defaulting to a non-hardware-backed key? if it is an SE key, is it that the Apple documentation stating that you can only use the SE with the Data Protection Keychain in the user context is outdated (or wrong)? does the above work, but is not an approach sanctioned by Apple? Any feedback on this would be greatly appreciated.

Hello, We are working on integrating app integrity verification into our service application, following Apple's App Attest and DeviceCheck guide. Our server issues a challenge to the client, which then sends the challenge, attestation, and keyId in CBOR format to Apple's App Attest server for verification. However, we are unable to reach both https://attest.apple.com and https://attest.development.apple.com due to network issues. These attempts have been made from both our internal corporate network and mobile hotspot environments. Despite adjusting DNS settings and other configurations, the issue persists. Are there alternative methods or solutions to address this problem? Any recommended network configurations or guidelines to successfully connect to Apple's App Attest servers would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Hi , I have a requirement like, Develop an app for iPad and app uses .net core apis. App will be in kiosk mode, and app doesn't have any type of authentication even OTP also. As the apis will be publishing to all over internet, how can we achieve security to apis? Kindly provide suggestions for this implementation

Hi Forum, We’re building a security-focused SDK for iOS that includes SIM Binding and SIM Swap detection to help prevent fraud and unauthorised device access, particularly in the context of banking and fintech apps. We understand that iOS limits access to SIM-level data, and that previously available APIs (such as those in CoreTelephony, now deprecated from iOS 16 onwards) provide only limited support for these use cases. We have a few questions and would appreciate any guidance from the community or Apple engineers: Q1. Are there any best practices or Apple-recommended approaches for binding a SIM to a device or user account? Q2. Is there a reliable way to detect a SIM swap when the app is not running (e.g., via system callback, entitlement, or background mechanism)? Q3. Are fields like GID1, GID2, or ICCID accessible through any public APIs or entitlements (such as com.apple.coretelephony.IdentityAccess)? If so, what is the process to request access? Q4. For dual SIM and eSIM scenarios, is there a documented approach to identify which SIM is active or whether a SIM slot has changed? Q5. In a banking or regulated environment, is it possible for an app vendor (e.g., a bank) to acquire certain entitlements from Apple and securely expose that information to a security SDK like ours? What would be the compliant or recommended way to structure such a partnership? Thanks in advance for any insights!

Hello, I’m storing some values in the Keychain with the attribute ‘ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly’ (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly). When I migrate user data between iPhones via iCloud, this behaves as expected and the keys are not preserved. However, when I migrate using a direct connection between two devices, the keys are preserved, which seems to contradict the attribute’s intent. Is this a known behavior, and if so, is there a workaround?

Hi , I did The MFA(2FA) of Email OTP For MacOS Login Screen using, Authorization Plugin, Using This git hub project. It is working For Login Screen , Im trying to Add The Same plugin for LockScreen but it is not working at lock Screen , Below is the reffrense theard For The issue , https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/127614, please Share The Code that should Present the NSwindow at Screen Saver (Lock Screen) MacOS .

Since October 3rd, I've stopped receiving responses to the Private Access Tokens challenge. I'm using this link: https://demo-issuer.private-access-tokens.fastly.com/.well-known/token-issuer-directory. I receive tokens from Fastly and return a header to the iOS app, but then I don't receive another authentication request from iOS. The user has automatic verification enabled on their phone. The problem is global and affects all my mobile app users. Has anyone encountered a similar problem and found a solution?

I have a custom NSWindow that I want to exclude from screen capture by setting its sharing state to kCGWindowSharingStateSharingNone. The goal is to prevent this window from appearing in the content captured by ScreenCaptureKit. [window setSharingType:NSWindowSharingType::NSWindowSharingNone]; However, on macOS 15.4+ (Sequoia), the window is still captured by ScreenCaptureKit and appears in the shared content. Does anyone know if kCGWindowSharingStateSharingNone is still effective with ScreenCaptureKit on macOS 15.4 and later?

I am developing a daemon-based product that needs a cryptographic, non-spoofable proof of machine identity so a remote management server can grant permissions based on the physical machine. I was thinking to create a signing key in the Secure Enclave and use a certificate signed by that key as the machine identity. The problem is that the Secure Enclave key I can create is only accessible from user context, while my product runs as a system daemon and must not rely on user processes or launchAgents. Could you please advise on the recommended Apple-supported approaches for this use case ? Specifically, Is there a supported way for a system daemon to generate and use an unremovable Secure Enclave key during phases like the pre-logon, that doesn't have non user context (only the my application which created this key/certificate will have permission to use/delete it) If Secure Enclave access from a daemon is not supported, what Apple-recommended alternatives exist for providing a hardware-backed machine identity for system daemons? I'd rather avoid using system keychain, as its contents may be removed or used by root privileged users. The ideal solution would be that each Apple product, would come out with a non removable signing certificate, that represent the machine itself (lets say that the cetificate name use to represent the machine ID), and can be validated by verify that the root signer is "Apple Root CA"

Hi, A certificate imported on macOS 15 using the security command with the "non-exportable" option was imported in an exportable state. I would like to know how to change this certificate to be non-exportable. Regards, CTJ

Hi, After enabling the new Enhanced Security capability in Xcode 26, I’m seeing install failures on devices running < iOS 26. Deployment target: iOS 15.0 Capability: Enhanced Security (added via Signing & Capabilities tab) Building to iOS 18 device error - Unable to Install ...Please ensure sure that your app is signed by a valid provisioning profile. It works fine on iOS 26 devices. I’d like to confirm Apple’s intent here: Is this capability formally supported only on iOS 26 and later, and therefore incompatible with earlier OS versions? Or should older systems ignore the entitlement, meaning this behavior might be a bug?

When presenting a cookie banner for GDPR purposes, should ATT precede the cookie banner? It seems that showing a Cookie Banner and then showing the ATT permission prompt afterwards (if a user elects to allow cookies/tracking) would be more appropriate. Related question: Should the “Allow Tracking” toggle for an app in system settings serve as a master switch for any granular tracking that might be managed by a 3rd party Consent Management Platform? If ATT is intended to serve as a master switch for tracking consent, if the ATT prompt is presented before a cookie banner, should the banner even appear if a user declines tracking consent? I’m not finding any good resources that describe this flow in detail and I’m seeing implementations all over the place on this. Help! Thanks!!!