In my app, I use SecItem to store some data in the Keychain. I’d like to know — when a user sets up a new iPhone and transfers data from the old device, will those Keychain items be migrated or synced to the new device?
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Hi,
I am using CryptoKit in my app. I am getting an error sometimes with some users. I log the description to Firebase but I am not sure what is it exactly about.
CryptoKit.CryptoKitError error 2
CryptoKit.CryptoKitError error 3
I receive both of these errors. I also save debug prints to a log file and let users share them with me. Logs are line-by-line encrypted but after getting these errors in the app also decryption of log files doesn't work and it throws these errors too.
I couldn't reproduce the same error by myself, and I can't reach the user's logs so I am a little blind about what triggers this.
It would be helpful to understand what these errors mean.
Thanks
I am working on implementing mTLS authentication in my iOS app (Apple Inhouse & intune MAM managed app). The SCEP client certificate is deployed on the device via Intune MDM. When I try accessing the protected endpoint via SFSafariViewController/ASWebAuthenticationSession, the certificate picker appears and the request succeeds. However, from within my app (using URLSessionDelegate), the certificate is not found (errSecItemNotFound).
The didReceive challenge method is called, but my SCEP certificate is not found in the app. The certificate is visible under Settings > Device Management > SCEP Certificate.
How can I make my iOS app access and use the SCEP certificate (installed via Intune MDM) for mTLS requests?
Do I need a special entitlement, keychain access group, or configuration in Intune or Developer account to allow my app to use the certificate?
Here is the sample code I am using:
final class KeychainCertificateDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate {
func urlSession(_ session: URLSession,
didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,
completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {
guard challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodClientCertificate else {
completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
return
}
// Get the DNs the server will accept
guard let expectedDNs = challenge.protectionSpace.distinguishedNames else {
completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
return
}
var identityRefs: CFTypeRef? = nil
let err = SecItemCopyMatching([
kSecClass: kSecClassIdentity,
kSecMatchLimit: kSecMatchLimitAll,
kSecMatchIssuers: expectedDNs,
kSecReturnRef: true,
] as NSDictionary, &identityRefs)
if err != errSecSuccess {
completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
return
}
guard let identities = identityRefs as? [SecIdentity],
let identity = identities.first
else {
print("Identity list is empty")
completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
return
}
let credential = URLCredential(identity: identity, certificates: nil, persistence: .forSession)
completionHandler(.useCredential, credential)
}
}
func perform_mTLSRequest() {
guard let url = URL(string: "https://sample.com/api/endpoint") else {
return
}
var request = URLRequest(url: url)
request.httpMethod = "POST"
request.setValue("application/json", forHTTPHeaderField: "Accept")
request.setValue("Bearer \(bearerToken)", forHTTPHeaderField: "Authorization")
let delegate = KeychainCertificateDelegate()
let session = URLSession(configuration: .ephemeral, delegate: delegate, delegateQueue: nil)
let task = session.dataTask(with: request) { data, response, error in
guard let httpResponse = response as? HTTPURLResponse, (200...299).contains(httpResponse.statusCode) else {
print("Bad response")
return
}
if let data = data {
print(String(data: data, encoding: .utf8)!)
}
}
task.resume()
}
Hi,
I develop a Mac application, initially on Catalina/Xcode12, but I recently upgrade to Monterey/Xcode13. I'm about to publish a new version: on Monterey all works as expected, but when I try the app on Sequoia, as a last step before uploading to the App Store, I encountered some weird security issues:
The main symptom is that it's no longer possible to save any file from the app using the Save panel, although the User Select File entitlement is set to Read/Write.
I've tried reinstalling different versions of the app, including the most recent downloaded from TestFlight. But, whatever the version, any try to save using the panel (e.g. on the desktop) results in a warning telling that I don't have authorization to record the file to that folder.
Moreover, when I type spctl -a -t exec -v /Applications/***.app in the terminal, it returns rejected, even when the application has been installed by TestFlight.
An EtreCheck report tells that my app is not signed, while codesign -dv /Applications/***.app returns a valid signature. I'm lost...
It suspect a Gate Keeper problem, but I cannot found any info on the web about how this system could be reset. I tried sudo spctl --reset-default, but it returns This operation is no longer supported...
I wonder if these symptoms depend on how the app is archived and could be propagated to my final users, or just related to a corrupted install of Sequoia on my local machine. My feeling is that a signature problem should have been detected by the archive validation, but how could we be sure?
Any idea would be greatly appreciated, thanks!
My high-level goal is to add support for Game Mode in a Java game, which launches via a macOS "launcher" app that runs the actual java game as a separate process (e.g. using the java command line tool).
I asked this over in the Graphics & Games section and was told this, which is why I'm reposting this here.
I'm uncertain how to speak to CLI tools and Java games launched from a macOS app. These sound like security and sandboxing questions which we recommend you ask about in those sections of the forums.
The system seems to decide whether to enable Game Mode based on values in the Info.plist (e.g. for LSApplicationCategoryType and GCSupportsGameMode). However, the child process can't seem to see these values. Is there a way to change that?
(The rest of this post is copied from my other forums post to provide additional context.)
Imagine a native macOS app that acts as a "launcher" for a Java game.** For example, the "launcher" app might use the Swift Process API or a similar method to run the java command line tool (lets assume the user has installed Java themselves) to run the game.
I have seen How to Enable Game Mode. If the native launcher app's Info.plist has the following keys set:
LSApplicationCategoryType set to public.app-category.games
LSSupportsGameMode set to true (for macOS 26+)
GCSupportsGameMode set to true
The launcher itself can cause Game Mode to activate if the launcher is fullscreened. However, if the launcher opens a Java process that opens a window, then the Java window is fullscreened, Game Mode doesn't seem to activate. In this case activating Game Mode for the launcher itself is unnecessary, but you'd expect Game Mode to activate when the actual game in the Java window is fullscreened.
Is there a way to get Game Mode to activate in the latter case?
** The concrete case I'm thinking of is a third-party Minecraft Java Edition launcher, but the issue can also be demonstrated in a sample project (FB13786152). It seems like the official Minecraft launcher is able to do this, though it's not clear how. (Is its bundle identifier hardcoded in the OS to allow for this? Changing a sample app's bundle identifier to be the same as the official Minecraft launcher gets the behavior I want, but obviously this is not a practical solution.)
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Games
Inter-process communication
macOS
Performance
I am developing a daemon-based product that needs a cryptographic, non-spoofable proof of machine identity so a remote management server can grant permissions based on the physical machine.
I was thinking to create a signing key in the Secure Enclave and use a certificate signed by that key as the machine identity. The problem is that the Secure Enclave key I can create is only accessible from user context, while my product runs as a system daemon and must not rely on user processes or launchAgents.
Could you please advise on the recommended Apple-supported approaches for this use case ?
Specifically, Is there a supported way for a system daemon to generate and use an unremovable Secure Enclave key during phases like the pre-logon, that doesn't have non user context (only the my application which created this key/certificate will have permission to use/delete it)
If Secure Enclave access from a daemon is not supported, what Apple-recommended alternatives exist for providing a hardware-backed machine identity for system daemons?
I'd rather avoid using system keychain, as its contents may be removed or used by root privileged users.
The ideal solution would be that each Apple product, would come out with a non removable signing certificate, that represent the machine itself (lets say that the cetificate name use to represent the machine ID), and can be validated by verify that the root signer is "Apple Root CA"
Hi,
I'm working on developing my own CryptoTokenKit (CTK) extension to enable codesign with HSM-backed keys. Here's what I’ve done so far:
The container app sets up the tokenConfiguration with TKTokenKeychainCertificate and TKTokenKeychainKey.
The extension registers successfully and is visible via pluginkit when launching the container app.
The virtual smartcard appears when running security list-smartcards.
The certificate, key, and identity are all visible using security export-smartcard -i [card].
However, nothing appears in the Keychain.
After adding logging and reviewing output in the Console, I’ve observed the following behavior when running codesign:
My TKTokenSession is instantiated correctly, using my custom TKToken implementation — so far, so good.
However, none of the following TKTokenSession methods are ever called:
func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, beginAuthFor operation: TKTokenOperation, constraint: Any) throws -> TKTokenAuthOperation
func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, supports operation: TKTokenOperation, keyObjectID: TKToken.ObjectID, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm) -> Bool
func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, sign dataToSign: Data, keyObjectID: Any, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm) throws -> Data
func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, decrypt ciphertext: Data, keyObjectID: Any, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm) throws -> Data
func tokenSession(_ session: TKTokenSession, performKeyExchange otherPartyPublicKeyData: Data, keyObjectID objectID: Any, algorithm: TKTokenKeyAlgorithm, parameters: TKTokenKeyExchangeParameters) throws -> Data
The only relevant Console log is:
default 11:31:15.453969+0200 PersistentToken [0x154d04850] invalidated because the client process (pid 4899) either cancelled the connection or exited
There’s no crash report related to the extension, so my assumption is that ctkd is closing the connection for some unknown reason.
Is there any way to debug this further?
Thank you for your help.
Hello,
I've developed a macOS app with an AutoFill Credential Provider extension that functions as a passkey provider. In the registration flow, I want my app to appear as a passkey provider only when specific conditions are met.
Is there a way to inspect the request from the web before the passkey provider selection list is displayed to the user, determine whether my app can handle it, and then use that result to instruct the OS on whether to include my app in the passkey provider selection list?
Alternatively, is there a way to predefine conditions that must be met before my app is offered as a passkey provider in the selection list?
Thanks!
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Tags:
Extensions
Autofill
Authentication Services
Passkeys in iCloud Keychain
The Core Problem
After Users sign out from the App, the app isn’t properly retrieving the user on second sign in. Instead, it’s treating the user as “Unknown” and saving a new entry in CloudKit and locally. Is there a tutorial aside from 'Juice' that is recent and up to date?
Our background monitoring application uses a Unix executable that requests Screen Recording permission via CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess(). This worked correctly in macOS Tahoe 26.0.1, but broke in 26.1.
Issue:
After calling CGRequestScreenCaptureAccess() in macOS Tahoe 26.1:
System dialog appears and opens System Settings
Our executable does NOT appear in the Screen Recording list
Manually adding via "+" button grants permission internally, but the executable still doesn't show in the UI
Users cannot verify or revoke permissions
Background:
Unix executable runs as a background process (not from Terminal)
Uses Accessibility APIs to retrieve window titles
Same issue occurs with Full Disk Access permissions
Environment:
macOS Tahoe 26.1 (worked in 26.0.1)
Background process (not launched from Terminal)
Questions:
Is this a bug or intentional design change in 26.1?
What's the recommended approach for background executables to properly register with TCC?
Are there specific requirements (Info.plist, etc.) needed?
This significantly impacts user experience as they cannot manage permissions through the UI.
Any guidance would be greatly appreciated. Thank you
Can you please give me a hand with importing certificates under MacOS?
I want to connect to Wi-Fi with 802.1X authentication (EAP-TLS) using a certificate that my homebrew application imported into my data protection keychain, but the imported certificate does not show up and I cannot select the certificate.
It also does not show up in the Keychain Access app.
One method I have tried is to import it into the data protection keychain by using the SecItemAdd function and setting kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain to true, but it does not work.
Is there a better way to do this?
ID:
for id in identities {
let identityParams: [String: Any] = [
kSecValueRef as String: id,
kSecReturnPersistentRef as String: true,
kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain as String: true
]
let addIdentityStatus = SecItemAdd(identityParams as CFDictionary, nil)
if addIdentityStatus == errSecSuccess {
print("Successfully added the ID.: \(addIdentityStatus)")
} else {
print("Failed to add the ID.: \(addIdentityStatus)")
}
}
Certificate:
for cert in certificates {
let certParams: [String: Any] = [
kSecValueRef as String: cert,
kSecReturnPersistentRef as String: true,
kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain as String: true
]
let addCertStatus = SecItemAdd(certParams as CFDictionary, nil)
if addCertStatus == errSecSuccess {
print("Successfully added the certificate.: (\(addCertStatus))")
} else {
print("Failed to add the certificate.: (\(addCertStatus))")
}
}
Private key:
for privateKey in keys {
let keyTag = UUID().uuidString.data(using: .utf8)!
let keyParams: [String: Any] = [
kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: keyTag,
kSecValueRef as String: privateKey,
kSecReturnPersistentRef as String: true,
kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain as String: true
]
let addKeyStatus = SecItemAdd(keyParams as CFDictionary, nil)
if addKeyStatus == errSecSuccess {
print("Successfully added the private key.: \(addKeyStatus)")
} else {
print("Failed to add the private key.: \(addKeyStatus)")
}
}
There’s a critical, actively exploited vulnerability in Apple’s iOS activation servers allowing unauthenticated XML payload injection:
https://cyberpress.org/apple-ios-activation-vulnerability/
This flaw targets the core activation process, bypassing normal security checks. Despite the severity, it’s barely discussed in public security channels.
Why is this not being addressed or publicly acknowledged? Apple developers and security researchers should urgently review and audit activation flows—this is a direct attack vector on device trust integrity.
Any insights or official response appreciated.
Hello, I am currently researching to develop an application where I want to apply the MacOS updates without the password prompt shown to the users.
I did some research on this and understand that an MDM solution can apply these patches without user intervention.
Are there any other ways we can achieve this? Any leads are much appreciated.
Having trouble decrypting a string using an encryption key and an IV.
var key: String
var iv: String
func decryptData(_ encryptedText: String) -> String?
{
if let textData = Data(base64Encoded: iv + encryptedText) {
do {
let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.SealedBox(combined: textData)
let key = SymmetricKey(data: key.data(using: .utf8)!)
let decryptedData = try AES.GCM.open(sealedBox, using: key)
return String(data: decryptedData, encoding: .utf8)
} catch {
print("Decryption failed: \(error)")
return nil
}
}
return nil
}
Proper coding choices aside (I'm just trying anything at this point,) the main problem is opening the SealedBox. If I go to an online decryption site, I can paste in my encrypted text, the encryption key, and the IV as plain text and I can encrypt and decrypt just fine.
But I can't seem to get the right combo in my Swift code. I don't have a "tag" even though I'm using the combined option. How can I make this work when all I will be receiving is the encrypted text, the encryption key, and the IV. (the encryption key is 256 bits)
Try an AES site with a key of 32 digits and an IV of 16 digits and text of your choice. Use the encrypted version of the text and then the key and IV in my code and you'll see the problem. I can make the SealedBox but I can't open it to get the decrypted data. So I'm not combining the right things the right way. Anyone notice the problem?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
Hi Team,
We are trying to understand deep sleep behaviour, can you please help us clarifying on the below questions:
When will we configure Hibernate 25, is it valid for M series MacBooks?
Is Hibernate 25 called deep sleep mode?
What are the settings I need to do on Mac, to make my Mac go in to deep sleep?
When awakening from deep sleep , what would be macOS system behaviour?
If we have custom SFAuthorization plug in at system.login.screensaver, what would be the behaviour with deep sleep?
I am using the CryptoKit SecureEnclave enum to generate Secure Enclave keys. I've got a couple of questions:
What is the lifetime of these keys?
When I don't store them somewhere, how does the Secure Enclave know they are gone? Do backups impact these keys? I.e. can I lose access to the key when I restore a backup?
Do these keys count to the total storage capacity of the Secure Enclave?
If I recall correctly, the Secure Enclave has a limited storage capacity. Do the SecureEnclave key instances count towards this storage capacity?
What is the dataRepresentation and how can I use this?
I'd like to store the Secure Enclave (preferably not in the Keychain due to its limitations). Is it "okay" to store this elsewhere, for instance in a file or in the UserDefaults?
Can the dataRepresentation be used in other apps?
If I had the capability of extracting the dataRepresentation as an attacker, could I then rebuild that key in my malicious app, as the key can be rebuilt with the Secure Enclave on the same device, or are there measures in place to prevent this (sandbox, bundle id, etc.)
Trying to validate external reference identifiers with SecTrustEvaluateWithError Method by setting reference Ids to SecPolicyCreateSSL() & SecPolicyCreateWithProperties()
But two concerns are -
Validates for correct reference IDs but gives error for combination of wrong & correct reference Ids
398 days validity works mandatorily before reference Ids check.
Is there any other to validate external reference Ids?, which give flexibility
To pass multiple combinations of reference IDs string (wrong, correct, IP, DNS)
To validate reference ID without days validity of 398.
Please suggest. Any help here is highly appreciated.
I am developing a macOS application (targeting macOS 13 and later) that is non-sandboxed and needs to install and trust a root certificate by adding it to the System keychain programmatically.
I’m fine with prompting the user for admin privileges or password, if needed.
So far, I have attempted to execute the following command programmatically from both:
A user-level process
A root-level process
sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/cert.pem
While the certificate does get installed, it does not appear as trusted in the Keychain Access app.
One more point:
The app is not distributed via MDM.
App will be distributed out side the app store.
Questions:
What is the correct way to programmatically install and trust a root certificate in the System keychain?
Does this require additional entitlements, signing, or profile configurations?
Is it possible outside of MDM management?
Any guidance or working samples would be greatly appreciated.
Hello,
I’m storing some values in the Keychain with the attribute ‘ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly’ (https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/ksecattraccessibleafterfirstunlockthisdeviceonly).
When I migrate user data between iPhones via iCloud, this behaves as expected and the keys are not preserved.
However, when I migrate using a direct connection between two devices, the keys are preserved, which seems to contradict the attribute’s intent.
Is this a known behavior, and if so, is there a workaround?
Topic:
Privacy & Security
SubTopic:
General
I have something with a new individual on my team I've never seen before. They checked out our code repository from git and now anytime they try to open a .json file that is legitimately just a text file, GateKeeper tells them it cannot verify the integrity of this file and offers to have them throw this file away. I've seen this with binaries, and that makes sense. I removed the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute from all executable files in our source tree, but I've never seen GateKeeper prompt on text files. I could remove the extended attribute from all files in our source tree, but I fear the next time he pulls from git he'll get new ones flagged. Is there someway around this? I've never personally seen GateKeeper blocking text files.