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Direct Keychain access in app-specific iOS ExtensionFoundation extensions
This is a pre-implementation question about supported direct Keychain service access, based on documentation and SDK-declaration review. No device/Simulator result, runtime failure, compiled sample or verified signing configuration is being reported. Assumed configurations An embedded, app-specific, non-UI ExtensionFoundation extension, restricted to its containing app's extension point. No unrestricted or third-party extension scope is assumed. A: the extension point requires EnhancedSecurity(true). B: the point definition omits EnhancedSecurity. This is not a claim that B is unsandboxed or equivalent to every configuration explicitly declaring EnhancedSecurity(false). Generic-password items, with valid signed membership in the destination Keychain access group assumed for the question only. If that assumption cannot hold for A or B, please identify the unsupported prerequisite. No real identifiers or profiles are supplied. Version scope The API question concerns iOS 26.0 and later only where the relevant symbols/configurations are supported. In the installed iPhoneOS 27.0 SDK declarations inspected, AppExtensionPoint, EnhancedSecurity and UserInterface have iOS 26.0 availability; some binding conveniences have iOS 26.2 availability. Those are declaration observations, not evidence of Keychain authorization or behavior on any OS release. No runtime comparison or final deployment target is selected. Please specify any finer minimum OS/SDK requirement or version-dependent difference; do not infer older-iOS support from the framework name alone. Question For A and B separately, is each of SecItemCopyMatching, SecItemAdd, SecItemUpdate and SecItemDelete supported directly from the extension process for those items, without forwarding the operation to the containing app? Please distinguish the four operations and, for any supported or conditional case, identify: The public sandbox/service rule and required entitlements, separately from access-group membership. Applicable OS/SDK versions and any device-versus-Simulator or development-versus-distribution limits. Lock state, item accessibility, user-interaction or other prerequisites that change the answer. If a case is unsupported or unspecified, stating that and citing the applicable public documentation would resolve that part of the question. API availability or absence of the EnhancedSecurity requirement alone is not being treated as permission to access the service. This asks for the direct API/service boundary only. Relevant public references https://developer.apple.com/documentation/extensionfoundation/adding-support-for-app-extensions-to-your-app https://developer.apple.com/documentation/extensionfoundation/appextensionpoint/enhancedsecurity https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/sharing-access-to-keychain-items-among-a-collection-of-apps
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347
Oct ’26
Authorization plugin problems on macOS 27: is there a supported alternative?
We develop an authorization plugin that replaces password entry at the login window and at screen unlock with a phone-based sign-in. The user scans a QR code with their phone, or the Mac reaches the phone over Bluetooth. Either way the plugin ends up with the user's password, which it hands to the authorization engine as if it had been typed. All networking runs in a LaunchDaemon that the plugin calls over XPC. Setup system.login.console: loginwindow:login → OurPlugin:login system.login.screensaver: rule use-login-window-ui → authenticate-session-owner-or-admin, with screenUnlockMode set to 2 authenticate: builtin:authenticate → OurPlugin:authenticate The UI is an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass. On success we set username and password in the context (plus home at login) and call SetResult with kAuthorizationResultAllow. What we see on macOS 27 Since moving to macOS 27 on a MacBook Pro (M3 Pro), we hit these more often: Touch ID unlocks the Mac but leaves our view on screen. Open the lid and unlock with Touch ID. The desktop becomes usable, but our plugin view stays on top, and shortly after the screen locks again. Same symptom as thread 819454, where it was filed as FB22289735. Saved passwords disappear from apps after an unlock through our plugin. They come back only after the user logs out and in again. This looks like FB13128730 (thread 796487). The lock screen stays on the desktop after sign-in. The clock, the user picture and our view, with its filled-in password field, stay on screen while the menu bar and Dock are drawn on top of them. Similar to FB12074874. We also saw this once: the password field in our view would not take keyboard input at the lock screen. Every key press just played the system alert sound, and nothing was typed. Questions Is there any workaround for these on macOS 27? Or a supported way to stop macOS offering Touch ID while our plugin handles unlock? Is an SFAuthorizationPluginView plugin still a supported way to replace the login and unlock UI? If not, what should we move to? Is Platform SSO with the new web-based authentication in macOS 27 (login window, Lock Screen and FileVault unlock) the path you would recommend? If so, is there a supported option for offline sign-in, which we do over Bluetooth today?
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Oct ’26
YubiKey Bio does not return a PRF result after fingerprint verification on iOS
I'm testing PRF evaluation with a YubiKey Bio through AuthenticationServices on iOS. Registration succeeds, but during later authentication with the enrolled fingerprint, I don't receive a PRF result. Using the key’s FIDO2 PIN works. Environment iPhone 12 iOS 27.0.1 YubiKey Bio connected through USB Firmware: 5.7.0 Steps to reproduce Configure a FIDO2 PIN and enroll a fingerprint on the YubiKey Bio. Connect the key to the iPhone. Register a credential using ASAuthorizationSecurityKeyPublicKeyCredentialProvider with PRF support requested. Request authentication for the registered credential with PRF input and userVerificationPreference = .required. Authenticate using the enrolled fingerprint. Check the returned PRF result. Compare this with authentication using the FIDO2 PIN. Expected result Successful authentication with PRF evaluation returns a 32-byte PRF output. Actual result No PRF result is returned when using fingerprint verification. The PIN flow works. Related report I found WebKit bug #314934, which reports missing PRF results with a YubiKey C Bio in Safari. The reporter observed successful authentication but a null PRF output. Could AuthenticationServices be affected by a similar issue? Is there a known limitation or workaround for PRF evaluation with YubiKey Bio fingerprint verification?
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340
Oct ’26
iOS 26/27 Passwords App: Keychain Accessibility Classes and Locked-AFU Protection
I’m looking for technical clarification on how the standalone Apple Passwords app protects credentials on iOS 26 and iOS 27, specifically when a device is locked after its first unlock since boot (AFU). Apple’s Platform Security documentation identifies Safari website passwords as using the When Unlocked Keychain protection class: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secb0694df1a/web However, it is unclear whether this documentation also describes the implementation of the newer standalone Passwords app. Keychain accessibility classes Does the Passwords app continue to store website and application passwords using kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked or an equivalent, more restrictive class? Do passkeys, TOTP verification-code secrets, and any intermediate keys necessary to decrypt stored credentials receive the same protection? Locked-AFU protection When an iPhone has been unlocked once since boot and subsequently locked again, are the cryptographic keys required to retrieve saved website passwords inaccessible until the user unlocks the device again? Specifically, does the When Unlocked class enforce this restriction cryptographically, or could a process with elevated operating-system privileges retrieve the protected material while the device remains locked? Full-filesystem and Keychain extraction Assuming an authorized forensic examiner obtains a full-filesystem extraction or privileged operating-system execution on a device that remains locked in AFU, but does not know the device passcode: Does filesystem access alone expose usable plaintext credentials stored in Apple Passwords? Are additional cryptographic keys or authentication steps required? What security guarantees remain for When Unlocked Keychain items under these conditions? I’m not requesting information about undisclosed vulnerabilities or specific forensic-tool exploits. I’m interested in the documented behavior and security boundaries of Apple’s Keychain architecture. Independent verification Are there any published technical assessments, research papers, forensic experiments, or Apple security documents that verify the actual accessibility classes used by the Passwords app on iOS 26/27? For context, a 2026 independent security assessment of Proton Pass identified its use of kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for sensitive Keychain material as a defense-in-depth weakness and recommended kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. I’m trying to understand whether Apple’s native Passwords app provides a stronger cryptographic boundary against locked-AFU extraction, rather than merely a different user-interface authentication requirement. Any clarification from an Apple engineer or references to authoritative technical documentation would be greatly appreciated.
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357
Oct ’26
Supported NSDataAccessSecurityPolicy schema and exact-owner allowlist on macOS
For macOS 26.7.1 (25G241), Xcode 27.0 (27A266a), and macOS SDK 27.0, we request the supported, exact Info.plist schema for NSDataAccessSecurityPolicy: its value type, literal key names and nesting, item types, and identity-selector grammar. Can the policy allow only the owning process signed with a specific Team ID and signing identifier, without allowing all applications signed by that Team? Are cdhash or designated-requirement selectors supported, and how do process and installer/package identities differ? Please clarify the relationship to user consent and Full Disk Access exceptions, and confirm whether this configuration is supported for the macOS build listed above. Please provide primary documentation or an authoritative schema, rather than a schema inferred from NSUpdateSecurityPolicy.
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1.1k
Oct ’26
macOS 26.3.1: creating and verifying a disabled local service account without a password credential
I’m designing a dedicated local PostgreSQL service account on macOS 26.3.1. No account has been created. Design requirements: no usable human password credential, no ordinary interactive login, shell /usr/bin/false, home /var/empty, no SSH credential, and no admin/wheel membership or Secure Token/FileVault volume-owner role. Any eventual service execution would be separately controlled. These are desired properties, not claims about established macOS behavior. I’m seeking a supported provisioning and verification procedure. Direct disabled creation: What supported Apple API/tool and attribute representation can create a local service account directly in a DisabledUser state? Can this be established during initial creation, without an externally available enabled password-authenticating intermediate state? Credential absence: Can creation occur without ever assigning or storing a usable human password credential or equivalent authentication secret? Please distinguish no password, an empty password, an unknown/generated password, disabled password authentication, and a disabled account. An empty password is unacceptable for this design. DisabledUser scope: What authentication paths does it prevent on macOS 26.3.1—password authentication, GUI/console login, SSH password authentication, and other Open Directory-backed authentication? How does this differ from system-controlled process execution under the UID, including launchd execution using UserName/GroupName? Nonauthenticating verification: What supported read-only attributes, policies, or APIs establish that the account is disabled and lacks a usable password credential, without attempting authentication or exposing hashes/secrets? Does inspecting the disabled marker establish only account state, or also credential absence? Secondary clarification: Is pwpolicy disableuser still recommended for local accounts? Is DisabledTags;SecureToken relevant only to token issuance, and can a controlled daemon run under a disabled UID without enabling human authentication? Source basis APPLE_DOCUMENTED: AuthenticationAuthority documentation identifies DisabledUser as indicating a disabled account. APPLE_DOCUMENTED: ODNode documentation provides record creation with attributes; the reviewed material does not establish the requested creation-time guarantee. LOCAL_MANUAL_DOCUMENTED: The installed pwpolicy(8) describes disableuser; its complete current authentication-path scope remains unresolved. APPLE_DOCUMENTED: Secure/bootstrap-token guidance discusses token issuance separately from account authentication. APPLE_DOCUMENTED, ARCHIVED: Daemon guidance describes selecting service identities through launch configuration. Not yet established: a safe credential-free creation sequence, the state of every intermediate step, the complete disabling scope, and sufficient nonauthenticating verification. A create-then-disable sequence would not meet the requirements unless every intermediate authentication state is characterized.
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Oct ’26
iOS 27 regression: ASWebAuthenticationSession no longer holds a form submission while the "Save Password?" modal is shown (worked on iOS 26)
Our app signs users up through ASWebAuthenticationSession (not ephemeral). The sign-up page is a normal HTML form that posts to our server. When sign-up succeeds, the server redirects to our custom-scheme redirect_uri, which closes the session, as expected. When the user types a password and submits, iOS shows the "Save Password?" modal inside the session. From there, iOS 26 and iOS 27 behave differently: iOS 26.5: iOS waits. The form isn't sent until the user answers the modal. Then the request goes out, the redirect closes the session, and the password has been saved. iOS 27.0 and 27.2 beta 2: iOS doesn't wait. The form is sent right away, the redirect closes the session in under a second, and the modal disappears with it. The user never gets to tap Save. Things we checked: Same server, same page, same device, same app build. Only the iOS version changes the result. prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession is off. Safari itself never waited on neither versions. The waiting only happened inside ASWebAuthenticationSession. Saving passwords still works on the device otherwise, and every test used a new account and password. Questions: Is the iOS 27 behaviour intended? If so, is there any supported way to let the user answer the sheet before the redirect closes the session? If it's a bug, is it tracked somewhere? The only fix we've found is to show an extra page after sign-up and only redirect from there, which adds a step for every user. We'd rather not ship that if the iOS 26 behaviour is coming back.
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510
Oct ’26
Crashing in sandbox-exec (FB16964888)
Why are we doing this nonsense? We want to be able to run builds in a sandbox such that they can only see the paths they are intended to depend on, to improve reproducibility. With builds with a very large number of dependencies, there's a very large number of paths added to the sandbox, and it breaks things inside libsandbox. Either it hits some sandbox length limit (sandbox-exec: pattern serialization length 66460 exceeds maximum (65535), Nix issue #4119, worked around: Nix PR 12570), or it hits an assert (this report; also Nix issue #2311). The other options for sandboxing on macOS are not viable; we acknowledge sandbox-exec and sandbox_init_with_parameters are deprecated; App Sandbox is inapplicable because we aren't an app. Our use case is closer to a browser, and all the browsers use libsandbox internally. We could possibly use SystemExtension or a particularly diabolical use of Virtualization.framework, but the former API requires notarization which is close to a no-go for our use case as open source software: it is nearly impossible to develop the software on one's own computer, and it would require us to ship a binary blob (and have the build processes to produce one in infrastructure completely dissimilar to what we use today); it also requires a bunch of engineering time. Today, we can pretend that code signing/notarization doesn't exist and that we are writing an old-school Unix daemon, because we are one. The latter is absolutely diabolical and hard to implement. See this saga about the bug we are facing: Nix issue #4119, Nix issue #2311, etc. What is going wrong I can't attach the file fail.sb as it is too large (you can view the failing test case at Lix's gerrit, CL 2870) and run this: $ sandbox-exec -D _GLOBAL_TMP_DIR=/tmp -f fail.sb /bin/sh Assertion failed: (diff <= INSTR_JUMP_NE_MAX_LENGTH), function push_jne_instr, file serialize.c, line 240. zsh: abort sandbox-exec -D _GLOBAL_TMP_DIR=/tmp -f fail.sb /bin/sh Or a stacktrace: stacktrace.txt Credits Full credits to Jade Lovelace (Lix) for writing the above text and filing a bug. This is submitted under FB16964888
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Oct ’26
iOS 27: “Malicious link blocked” for legitimate call forwarding codes
Hello! I develop a voicemail app service and I use MMI codes to let users enable/disable call forwarding to their voicemail number. For example, the app opens the Phone app with a code such as: **21*<phone number># This is expected behavior and is required for the service to work. However on iOS 27, those links are now blocked with a “Malicious link blocked” warning, saying that the link may forward incoming calls/messages. Is there any supported way for apps with a legitimate use case like this to request an exemption, or otherwise avoid this warning?
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Oct ’26
Supported validation of a returned iOS Keychain access-control policy
For an existing iOS generic-password Keychain item, what documented public API or query contract can establish that its returned SecAccessControl has no additional authentication, application-password, or operation-specific constraints? The item must remain WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, in an exact access group and identity, and non-synchronizing. An unknown or unverified item must be refused without modifying, deleting, or replacing it. An attribute-only creation with no explicit access-control object can return a SecAccessControl when data and attributes are read. We observed this on an iOS 26.5 Simulator. The returned object compared different from a freshly created zero-flags object. We are not treating either that comparison or a successful no-UI read as proof of its complete constraints. The public interface we reviewed exposes creation and type identification; constraint inspection and serialization appear in private headers. Evaluating one operation also does not describe the item's complete policy. Is there a supported discriminator we have missed? If not, is there a documented creation-provenance and persistent-item-identity contract that establishes this property across relaunch, and what limitations apply to existing or recreated items? Please clarify the supported contract rather than private implementation details. We need to preserve refusal of unverified existing items while using the public Keychain APIs correctly.
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390
Oct ’26
Not all items form Keychain Access are under the Passwords App
In the process of updating several Apple devices to OS 27.0.1, I accidentally updated my main workstation from Sequoia to Golden Gate. I had intended to do this, but not this soon. Now I find that the Keychain Access App no longer takes my login password to unlock items. Unfortunately, the Passwords App does not allow me to see a number of things that are stored in the Keychain Access App: e.g. Secure Notes. But in this case the problem is an application password for an IRC client. I have no way of recovering my IRC account unless I can supply the password to Keychain Access.
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1.6k
Oct ’26
Crazy Unknown App Groups in my account.
I opened Apple Connect and was setting up a new app and when I go into App Groups, I see this! AltStore?? Cydia?? I didn't put those there, and Im the only one on my team. AltStore group com rileytestut AltStore group.com.rileytestut.AltStore.44K72272WR CY- group com cydia Extender group.CY-931DA672-818E-11E8-AED3-DB7934DE71C9.com.cydia.Extender CY- group lolwtf group.CY-36A1A27E-C8FB-11E6-AC51-975482641AE2.lolwtf
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507
Oct ’26
SecItemAdd returns OSStatus 100001 from JXA launched by a sandboxed development tool
On macOS 26.6.2 (build 25G83), arm64, I am using the Security framework through JXA, executed by a static /usr/bin/osascript helper launched from the Codex desktop application's local command environment. A dummy-only test attempts to add one generic-password item to the local file-based login keychain. SecItemAdd returns OSStatus 100001. The system's "security error 100001" command describes this as "UNIX[Operation not permitted]". The helper explicitly opens the login keychain and selects it using kSecUseKeychain for the add operation. Synchronizable and Data Protection Keychain options are false. It supplies an access object created by SecAccessCreate with an empty trusted-application array. What I have confirmed: Keychain open/status calls succeed and report unlocked, readable, and writable. I understand these flags do not establish permission for this individual operation. Attribute-only exact lookups report the dummy item as not found before and after each failed add. Granting narrowly scoped filesystem write permission for the login keychain file through the launching tool did not resolve the failure. I have not performed a comparison outside that restricted execution environment. I have not established whether the cause is the environment, API/ACL configuration, or an OS issue. Is this JXA/Security usage supported for a file-based keychain? Which documented diagnostics can distinguish process/sandbox restrictions from item ACL or authentication requirements? Are there relevant constraints on this query/access-object construction? I am seeking a supported implementation, not a way to disable or bypass security protections. I can provide a dummy-only reproducer without credentials or personal paths.
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1.6k
Sep ’26
ScreenCaptureKit authorization fails after tccd exhausts file descriptors (FB24757092)
I’m seeking DTS guidance on supported ScreenCaptureKit usage and diagnostics for an intermittent authorization failure, filed as FB24757092. Captured evidence (my incident) On macOS 26.6.2 (25G83), Apple silicon, an already-authorized custom Apple Development-signed AltTabDebug build encountered renewed Screen Recording prompts. Unified logs show root tccd exhausting file descriptors during authorization. Three failing tccd processes each reported 255 total descriptors, with 250 unique descriptors referring to the same app executable. SecStaticCodeCreateWithPath failed with error 100024 (UNIX[Too many open files]); tccd could not match the existing kTCCServiceScreenCapture code requirement, and replayd reported TCC Disallow / user denied for captureScreenshot. Later checks allowed the same running app again. This confirms resource exhaustion and authorization failures. It does not establish why descriptors accumulated, a persistent leak mechanism, a per-capture leak rate, or a deterministic reproducer. The reported load spike and roughly one-second display freeze have an uncertain causal relationship to these failures. I have not established reproduction on macOS 27 or descriptor exhaustion in an unmodified release build. No incident-time sysdiagnose was collected. Separate upstream observations The AltTab maintainer reported testing the signed release in /Applications on the same OS build: 446 screenshots produced 1,350 ScreenCapture authorization requests, with repeated code-signature validation; approximately 23 ms of root-tccd CPU per thumbnail was reported. These are the maintainer’s measurements, not independently repeated by me, and do not measure descriptor growth per capture. https://github.com/lwouis/alt-tab-macos/issues/6025 https://github.com/lwouis/alt-tab-macos/issues/6025#issuecomment-5640382131 Questions Is there a supported ScreenCaptureKit capture pattern, request concurrency/rate guidance, or recovery strategy to reduce repeated authorization work and avoid renewed prompts when code validation fails from transient resource exhaustion? How should an app distinguish a genuine permission denial from an unavailable/failed authorization service, without repeatedly requesting permission? Which logging profile, trace, or incident-time diagnostics should we collect to correlate capture submissions/completions with tccd descriptor lifetime and isolate the accumulation mechanism? FB24757092 contains the focused timeline, descriptor dumps, prompt screenshot, and separately attributed maintainer findings. Raw diagnostics and private system/account information are intentionally omitted here. I built a standalone Swift/AppKit probe that uses one retained SCContentFilter per batch, logs submissions and actual callbacks, bounds outstanding requests, stops new submissions on the first error, and discards images. On macOS 27.0 (26A428), its ad-hoc-signed build captured its own window successfully in 446-request captureScreenshot batches at concurrency 1 and 4. This validates the harness, not reproduction of the original failure. The code-level form requests a focused project demonstrating the issue; this probe does not yet reproduce exhaustion. Could DTS advise the next isolation step and whether a private support case is appropriate for the existing evidence?
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782
Sep ’26
How can we test an update from a specific pre-transfer app version to the first post-transfer release?
We recently completed an app transfer between two Apple Developer Program teams. Before releasing the first post-transfer version, we need to verify the update behavior from several specific historical versions signed by the previous team. Our main question is not limited to TestFlight: we would like to know Apple's recommended and supported method for reproducing this update path. Could you clarify the following? What is Apple's recommended and supported method for testing an update from a specific pre-transfer version to the first post-transfer release? Can an archived Ad Hoc IPA signed by the previous team be used as the starting version for this test? Can that IPA be updated by a post-transfer TestFlight, Development, or Ad Hoc build signed by the recipient team? Which of these methods most accurately reproduces an App Store update after an app transfer? For a manual Development or Ad Hoc update, is the previous-application-identifiers entitlement required? If it is required, how should the recipient team request a provisioning profile that authorizes this entitlement? Thank you.
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3.0k
Sep ’26
requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:additionalInformationAction:completionHandler: Bug
I'm using the code below. It functions correctly on iOS 27.2 Beta 1 but crashes on iOS 27.2 Beta 2. API implemented here Xcode version - Version 27.2 beta (27B5019j) iOS Version - iOS 27.2 Beta 1 and Beta 2 behavior App Store region - Germany if (@available(iOS 27.2, *)) { [ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:YES additionalInformationAction:^{ NSLog(@"[ATT] Additional Information Clicked"); } completionHandler:^(ATTrackingManagerAuthorizationStatus status) { NSLog(@"[ATT] completion status: %ld", (long)status); }]; Resulted in a crash at runtime. No error at compile time. *** Terminating app due to uncaught exception 'NSInvalidArgumentException', reason: '+[ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:additionalInformationAction:completionHandler:]: unrecognized selector sent to class 0x28f3d0f80' *** First throw call stack: (0x1998ee8e0 0x19966c380 0x1999ee444 0x1998aa774 0x1998aaa30 0x1020a3a60 0x102fc8558 0x102fe1df0 0x103003dd8 0x102fd8340 0x102fd8280 0x1998a0614 0x19989187c 0x1998927e4 0x24643df24 0x19da6db54 0x1020a5264 0x1996e35b8) libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type NSException *** Terminating app due to uncaught exception 'NSInvalidArgumentException', reason: '+[ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:additionalInformationAction:completionHandler:]: unrecognized selector sent to class 0x28f3d0f80' *** First throw call stack: (0x1998ee8e0 0x19966c380 0x1999ee444 0x1998aa774 0x1998aaa30 0x1020a3a60 0x102fc8558 0x102fe1df0 0x103003dd8 0x102fd8340 0x102fd8280 0x1998a0614 0x19989187c 0x1998927e4 0x24643df24 0x19da6db54 0x1020a5264 0x1996e35b8) terminating due to uncaught exception of type NSException
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253
Sep ’26
ATT - requestTrackingAuthorization returns notDetermined without presenting the prompt on iOS 27.0 beta
Problem On iOS 27.0 beta (build 24A5430a) ATTrackingManager.requestTrackingAuthorization() completes with the status still .notDetermined and no prompt is ever presented. The ATT system prompt does not appear in any app on the Store. Environment iOS 27.0 beta 8 iPad and iPhone, both affected Country IT Question: Is this expected behavior, or is it a change in the new version of iOS? If it is a change, could you please point me to a reference that documents this? Happy to provide anything further through the Feedback report rather than here.
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Sep ’26
Does identifierForVendor (IDFV) change after transferring an app to another Apple Developer account?
Title: Does identifierForVendor (IDFV) change after transferring an app to another Apple Developer account? We are planning to transfer an existing App Store app from one Apple Developer account/team to another using App Transfer. The app currently uses: UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor as one of the identifiers sent to our backend. We would like to confirm the exact behavior of identifierForVendor after the app is transferred to the recipient developer account. Our scenario is: The app is currently published under Developer Team A. Existing users already have the app installed on their devices. We transfer the app to Developer Team B through App Store Connect. Developer Team B creates new certificates/provisioning profiles and publishes a new version of the same app. Existing users update the app normally from the App Store, without uninstalling it. Questions: After an existing user updates from the last version published by Team A to the first version published by Team B, will UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor remain the same, or will it be regenerated? Is the vendor used to calculate IDFV associated with: the App Store app record, the Bundle ID, the Team ID, the App ID Prefix, the developer organization/vendor, or some other value? Does App Transfer itself cause IDFV to change, or does the value only change under specific conditions such as changing the organization name or uninstalling all apps from the same vendor? If IDFV changes after App Transfer, does Apple provide any official migration or mapping mechanism that allows the backend to associate the old IDFV with the new IDFV? For example, Sign in with Apple provides a user migration mechanism when transferring an app between developer teams. Is there any equivalent mechanism for identifierForVendor? Is there any difference between: users who update the app directly after the transfer, and users who uninstall the old version and reinstall the app after the transfer? We have reviewed the documentation for identifierForVendor and App Transfer, but we could not find an explicit statement describing the IDFV behavior specifically for an App Transfer between two different developer teams. Our main concern is maintaining backend device associations for existing users after the transfer. We would appreciate an official clarification on whether IDFV continuity is guaranteed across App Transfer, and if not, what migration strategy Apple recommends.
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527
Sep ’26
File Keychain ACL: is there a supported way to read back the complete stored authorization condition?
I have a follow-up question about file-based Keychain ACLs, this time specifically about inspecting the authorization state after it has been configured. I’ve been looking through the public SecAccess / SecACL / SecTrustedApplication APIs. I can enumerate ACL entries and their authorizations, and SecACLCopyContents gives me the trusted applications associated with an ACL. What I haven’t been able to establish is whether the complete stored caller-matching condition can be read back through a supported API. In particular, SecTrustedApplicationCopyData returns opaque application-identifying data. Is that data intended to be a complete representation of the condition that the Keychain will use to recognize that trusted application? Or can the stored trusted-application condition contain additional code-signing requirements or other matching constraints that are not represented by SecTrustedApplicationCopyData? My higher-level requirement is to verify, after configuring a private key, that its effective authorization scope is no broader than an independently reviewed policy. Ideally I would like to compare: the authorized private-key operations; all trusted-application subjects and their complete matching conditions; prompt-related state; and partition-list constraints. Is there a public and supported API, or an Apple-provided tool with a supported machine-readable contract, that can enumerate the complete effective authorization state of a private key in a file-based Keychain? I’m deliberately not trying to infer this from the current executable’s path, designated requirement, hash, security dump-keychain output, or representative negative tests unless Apple considers one of those to be the supported way to establish the stored authorization state. I realise from the existing guidance, including TN3137 and the discussion around file-based Keychains, that this is legacy technology. If complete supported introspection simply isn’t available for this model, knowing that limitation would also answer my question. Thanks.
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Sep ’26
Direct Keychain access in app-specific iOS ExtensionFoundation extensions
This is a pre-implementation question about supported direct Keychain service access, based on documentation and SDK-declaration review. No device/Simulator result, runtime failure, compiled sample or verified signing configuration is being reported. Assumed configurations An embedded, app-specific, non-UI ExtensionFoundation extension, restricted to its containing app's extension point. No unrestricted or third-party extension scope is assumed. A: the extension point requires EnhancedSecurity(true). B: the point definition omits EnhancedSecurity. This is not a claim that B is unsandboxed or equivalent to every configuration explicitly declaring EnhancedSecurity(false). Generic-password items, with valid signed membership in the destination Keychain access group assumed for the question only. If that assumption cannot hold for A or B, please identify the unsupported prerequisite. No real identifiers or profiles are supplied. Version scope The API question concerns iOS 26.0 and later only where the relevant symbols/configurations are supported. In the installed iPhoneOS 27.0 SDK declarations inspected, AppExtensionPoint, EnhancedSecurity and UserInterface have iOS 26.0 availability; some binding conveniences have iOS 26.2 availability. Those are declaration observations, not evidence of Keychain authorization or behavior on any OS release. No runtime comparison or final deployment target is selected. Please specify any finer minimum OS/SDK requirement or version-dependent difference; do not infer older-iOS support from the framework name alone. Question For A and B separately, is each of SecItemCopyMatching, SecItemAdd, SecItemUpdate and SecItemDelete supported directly from the extension process for those items, without forwarding the operation to the containing app? Please distinguish the four operations and, for any supported or conditional case, identify: The public sandbox/service rule and required entitlements, separately from access-group membership. Applicable OS/SDK versions and any device-versus-Simulator or development-versus-distribution limits. Lock state, item accessibility, user-interaction or other prerequisites that change the answer. If a case is unsupported or unspecified, stating that and citing the applicable public documentation would resolve that part of the question. API availability or absence of the EnhancedSecurity requirement alone is not being treated as permission to access the service. This asks for the direct API/service boundary only. Relevant public references https://developer.apple.com/documentation/extensionfoundation/adding-support-for-app-extensions-to-your-app https://developer.apple.com/documentation/extensionfoundation/appextensionpoint/enhancedsecurity https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/sharing-access-to-keychain-items-among-a-collection-of-apps
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Oct ’26
Authorization plugin problems on macOS 27: is there a supported alternative?
We develop an authorization plugin that replaces password entry at the login window and at screen unlock with a phone-based sign-in. The user scans a QR code with their phone, or the Mac reaches the phone over Bluetooth. Either way the plugin ends up with the user's password, which it hands to the authorization engine as if it had been typed. All networking runs in a LaunchDaemon that the plugin calls over XPC. Setup system.login.console: loginwindow:login → OurPlugin:login system.login.screensaver: rule use-login-window-ui → authenticate-session-owner-or-admin, with screenUnlockMode set to 2 authenticate: builtin:authenticate → OurPlugin:authenticate The UI is an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass. On success we set username and password in the context (plus home at login) and call SetResult with kAuthorizationResultAllow. What we see on macOS 27 Since moving to macOS 27 on a MacBook Pro (M3 Pro), we hit these more often: Touch ID unlocks the Mac but leaves our view on screen. Open the lid and unlock with Touch ID. The desktop becomes usable, but our plugin view stays on top, and shortly after the screen locks again. Same symptom as thread 819454, where it was filed as FB22289735. Saved passwords disappear from apps after an unlock through our plugin. They come back only after the user logs out and in again. This looks like FB13128730 (thread 796487). The lock screen stays on the desktop after sign-in. The clock, the user picture and our view, with its filled-in password field, stay on screen while the menu bar and Dock are drawn on top of them. Similar to FB12074874. We also saw this once: the password field in our view would not take keyboard input at the lock screen. Every key press just played the system alert sound, and nothing was typed. Questions Is there any workaround for these on macOS 27? Or a supported way to stop macOS offering Touch ID while our plugin handles unlock? Is an SFAuthorizationPluginView plugin still a supported way to replace the login and unlock UI? If not, what should we move to? Is Platform SSO with the new web-based authentication in macOS 27 (login window, Lock Screen and FileVault unlock) the path you would recommend? If so, is there a supported option for offline sign-in, which we do over Bluetooth today?
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455
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Oct ’26
YubiKey Bio does not return a PRF result after fingerprint verification on iOS
I'm testing PRF evaluation with a YubiKey Bio through AuthenticationServices on iOS. Registration succeeds, but during later authentication with the enrolled fingerprint, I don't receive a PRF result. Using the key’s FIDO2 PIN works. Environment iPhone 12 iOS 27.0.1 YubiKey Bio connected through USB Firmware: 5.7.0 Steps to reproduce Configure a FIDO2 PIN and enroll a fingerprint on the YubiKey Bio. Connect the key to the iPhone. Register a credential using ASAuthorizationSecurityKeyPublicKeyCredentialProvider with PRF support requested. Request authentication for the registered credential with PRF input and userVerificationPreference = .required. Authenticate using the enrolled fingerprint. Check the returned PRF result. Compare this with authentication using the FIDO2 PIN. Expected result Successful authentication with PRF evaluation returns a 32-byte PRF output. Actual result No PRF result is returned when using fingerprint verification. The PIN flow works. Related report I found WebKit bug #314934, which reports missing PRF results with a YubiKey C Bio in Safari. The reporter observed successful authentication but a null PRF output. Could AuthenticationServices be affected by a similar issue? Is there a known limitation or workaround for PRF evaluation with YubiKey Bio fingerprint verification?
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Oct ’26
iOS 26/27 Passwords App: Keychain Accessibility Classes and Locked-AFU Protection
I’m looking for technical clarification on how the standalone Apple Passwords app protects credentials on iOS 26 and iOS 27, specifically when a device is locked after its first unlock since boot (AFU). Apple’s Platform Security documentation identifies Safari website passwords as using the When Unlocked Keychain protection class: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secb0694df1a/web However, it is unclear whether this documentation also describes the implementation of the newer standalone Passwords app. Keychain accessibility classes Does the Passwords app continue to store website and application passwords using kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked or an equivalent, more restrictive class? Do passkeys, TOTP verification-code secrets, and any intermediate keys necessary to decrypt stored credentials receive the same protection? Locked-AFU protection When an iPhone has been unlocked once since boot and subsequently locked again, are the cryptographic keys required to retrieve saved website passwords inaccessible until the user unlocks the device again? Specifically, does the When Unlocked class enforce this restriction cryptographically, or could a process with elevated operating-system privileges retrieve the protected material while the device remains locked? Full-filesystem and Keychain extraction Assuming an authorized forensic examiner obtains a full-filesystem extraction or privileged operating-system execution on a device that remains locked in AFU, but does not know the device passcode: Does filesystem access alone expose usable plaintext credentials stored in Apple Passwords? Are additional cryptographic keys or authentication steps required? What security guarantees remain for When Unlocked Keychain items under these conditions? I’m not requesting information about undisclosed vulnerabilities or specific forensic-tool exploits. I’m interested in the documented behavior and security boundaries of Apple’s Keychain architecture. Independent verification Are there any published technical assessments, research papers, forensic experiments, or Apple security documents that verify the actual accessibility classes used by the Passwords app on iOS 26/27? For context, a 2026 independent security assessment of Proton Pass identified its use of kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for sensitive Keychain material as a defense-in-depth weakness and recommended kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. I’m trying to understand whether Apple’s native Passwords app provides a stronger cryptographic boundary against locked-AFU extraction, rather than merely a different user-interface authentication requirement. Any clarification from an Apple engineer or references to authoritative technical documentation would be greatly appreciated.
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357
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Oct ’26
Supported NSDataAccessSecurityPolicy schema and exact-owner allowlist on macOS
For macOS 26.7.1 (25G241), Xcode 27.0 (27A266a), and macOS SDK 27.0, we request the supported, exact Info.plist schema for NSDataAccessSecurityPolicy: its value type, literal key names and nesting, item types, and identity-selector grammar. Can the policy allow only the owning process signed with a specific Team ID and signing identifier, without allowing all applications signed by that Team? Are cdhash or designated-requirement selectors supported, and how do process and installer/package identities differ? Please clarify the relationship to user consent and Full Disk Access exceptions, and confirm whether this configuration is supported for the macOS build listed above. Please provide primary documentation or an authoritative schema, rather than a schema inferred from NSUpdateSecurityPolicy.
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Oct ’26
macOS 26.3.1: creating and verifying a disabled local service account without a password credential
I’m designing a dedicated local PostgreSQL service account on macOS 26.3.1. No account has been created. Design requirements: no usable human password credential, no ordinary interactive login, shell /usr/bin/false, home /var/empty, no SSH credential, and no admin/wheel membership or Secure Token/FileVault volume-owner role. Any eventual service execution would be separately controlled. These are desired properties, not claims about established macOS behavior. I’m seeking a supported provisioning and verification procedure. Direct disabled creation: What supported Apple API/tool and attribute representation can create a local service account directly in a DisabledUser state? Can this be established during initial creation, without an externally available enabled password-authenticating intermediate state? Credential absence: Can creation occur without ever assigning or storing a usable human password credential or equivalent authentication secret? Please distinguish no password, an empty password, an unknown/generated password, disabled password authentication, and a disabled account. An empty password is unacceptable for this design. DisabledUser scope: What authentication paths does it prevent on macOS 26.3.1—password authentication, GUI/console login, SSH password authentication, and other Open Directory-backed authentication? How does this differ from system-controlled process execution under the UID, including launchd execution using UserName/GroupName? Nonauthenticating verification: What supported read-only attributes, policies, or APIs establish that the account is disabled and lacks a usable password credential, without attempting authentication or exposing hashes/secrets? Does inspecting the disabled marker establish only account state, or also credential absence? Secondary clarification: Is pwpolicy disableuser still recommended for local accounts? Is DisabledTags;SecureToken relevant only to token issuance, and can a controlled daemon run under a disabled UID without enabling human authentication? Source basis APPLE_DOCUMENTED: AuthenticationAuthority documentation identifies DisabledUser as indicating a disabled account. APPLE_DOCUMENTED: ODNode documentation provides record creation with attributes; the reviewed material does not establish the requested creation-time guarantee. LOCAL_MANUAL_DOCUMENTED: The installed pwpolicy(8) describes disableuser; its complete current authentication-path scope remains unresolved. APPLE_DOCUMENTED: Secure/bootstrap-token guidance discusses token issuance separately from account authentication. APPLE_DOCUMENTED, ARCHIVED: Daemon guidance describes selecting service identities through launch configuration. Not yet established: a safe credential-free creation sequence, the state of every intermediate step, the complete disabling scope, and sufficient nonauthenticating verification. A create-then-disable sequence would not meet the requirements unless every intermediate authentication state is characterized.
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615
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Oct ’26
iOS 27 regression: ASWebAuthenticationSession no longer holds a form submission while the "Save Password?" modal is shown (worked on iOS 26)
Our app signs users up through ASWebAuthenticationSession (not ephemeral). The sign-up page is a normal HTML form that posts to our server. When sign-up succeeds, the server redirects to our custom-scheme redirect_uri, which closes the session, as expected. When the user types a password and submits, iOS shows the "Save Password?" modal inside the session. From there, iOS 26 and iOS 27 behave differently: iOS 26.5: iOS waits. The form isn't sent until the user answers the modal. Then the request goes out, the redirect closes the session, and the password has been saved. iOS 27.0 and 27.2 beta 2: iOS doesn't wait. The form is sent right away, the redirect closes the session in under a second, and the modal disappears with it. The user never gets to tap Save. Things we checked: Same server, same page, same device, same app build. Only the iOS version changes the result. prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession is off. Safari itself never waited on neither versions. The waiting only happened inside ASWebAuthenticationSession. Saving passwords still works on the device otherwise, and every test used a new account and password. Questions: Is the iOS 27 behaviour intended? If so, is there any supported way to let the user answer the sheet before the redirect closes the session? If it's a bug, is it tracked somewhere? The only fix we've found is to show an extra page after sign-up and only redirect from there, which adds a step for every user. We'd rather not ship that if the iOS 26 behaviour is coming back.
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510
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Oct ’26
Crashing in sandbox-exec (FB16964888)
Why are we doing this nonsense? We want to be able to run builds in a sandbox such that they can only see the paths they are intended to depend on, to improve reproducibility. With builds with a very large number of dependencies, there's a very large number of paths added to the sandbox, and it breaks things inside libsandbox. Either it hits some sandbox length limit (sandbox-exec: pattern serialization length 66460 exceeds maximum (65535), Nix issue #4119, worked around: Nix PR 12570), or it hits an assert (this report; also Nix issue #2311). The other options for sandboxing on macOS are not viable; we acknowledge sandbox-exec and sandbox_init_with_parameters are deprecated; App Sandbox is inapplicable because we aren't an app. Our use case is closer to a browser, and all the browsers use libsandbox internally. We could possibly use SystemExtension or a particularly diabolical use of Virtualization.framework, but the former API requires notarization which is close to a no-go for our use case as open source software: it is nearly impossible to develop the software on one's own computer, and it would require us to ship a binary blob (and have the build processes to produce one in infrastructure completely dissimilar to what we use today); it also requires a bunch of engineering time. Today, we can pretend that code signing/notarization doesn't exist and that we are writing an old-school Unix daemon, because we are one. The latter is absolutely diabolical and hard to implement. See this saga about the bug we are facing: Nix issue #4119, Nix issue #2311, etc. What is going wrong I can't attach the file fail.sb as it is too large (you can view the failing test case at Lix's gerrit, CL 2870) and run this: $ sandbox-exec -D _GLOBAL_TMP_DIR=/tmp -f fail.sb /bin/sh Assertion failed: (diff &lt;= INSTR_JUMP_NE_MAX_LENGTH), function push_jne_instr, file serialize.c, line 240. zsh: abort sandbox-exec -D _GLOBAL_TMP_DIR=/tmp -f fail.sb /bin/sh Or a stacktrace: stacktrace.txt Credits Full credits to Jade Lovelace (Lix) for writing the above text and filing a bug. This is submitted under FB16964888
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Oct ’26
iOS 27: “Malicious link blocked” for legitimate call forwarding codes
Hello! I develop a voicemail app service and I use MMI codes to let users enable/disable call forwarding to their voicemail number. For example, the app opens the Phone app with a code such as: **21*<phone number># This is expected behavior and is required for the service to work. However on iOS 27, those links are now blocked with a “Malicious link blocked” warning, saying that the link may forward incoming calls/messages. Is there any supported way for apps with a legitimate use case like this to request an exemption, or otherwise avoid this warning?
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Oct ’26
Supported validation of a returned iOS Keychain access-control policy
For an existing iOS generic-password Keychain item, what documented public API or query contract can establish that its returned SecAccessControl has no additional authentication, application-password, or operation-specific constraints? The item must remain WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, in an exact access group and identity, and non-synchronizing. An unknown or unverified item must be refused without modifying, deleting, or replacing it. An attribute-only creation with no explicit access-control object can return a SecAccessControl when data and attributes are read. We observed this on an iOS 26.5 Simulator. The returned object compared different from a freshly created zero-flags object. We are not treating either that comparison or a successful no-UI read as proof of its complete constraints. The public interface we reviewed exposes creation and type identification; constraint inspection and serialization appear in private headers. Evaluating one operation also does not describe the item's complete policy. Is there a supported discriminator we have missed? If not, is there a documented creation-provenance and persistent-item-identity contract that establishes this property across relaunch, and what limitations apply to existing or recreated items? Please clarify the supported contract rather than private implementation details. We need to preserve refusal of unverified existing items while using the public Keychain APIs correctly.
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Oct ’26
Not all items form Keychain Access are under the Passwords App
In the process of updating several Apple devices to OS 27.0.1, I accidentally updated my main workstation from Sequoia to Golden Gate. I had intended to do this, but not this soon. Now I find that the Keychain Access App no longer takes my login password to unlock items. Unfortunately, the Passwords App does not allow me to see a number of things that are stored in the Keychain Access App: e.g. Secure Notes. But in this case the problem is an application password for an IRC client. I have no way of recovering my IRC account unless I can supply the password to Keychain Access.
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1.6k
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Oct ’26
Crazy Unknown App Groups in my account.
I opened Apple Connect and was setting up a new app and when I go into App Groups, I see this! AltStore?? Cydia?? I didn't put those there, and Im the only one on my team. AltStore group com rileytestut AltStore group.com.rileytestut.AltStore.44K72272WR CY- group com cydia Extender group.CY-931DA672-818E-11E8-AED3-DB7934DE71C9.com.cydia.Extender CY- group lolwtf group.CY-36A1A27E-C8FB-11E6-AC51-975482641AE2.lolwtf
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507
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Oct ’26
SecItemAdd returns OSStatus 100001 from JXA launched by a sandboxed development tool
On macOS 26.6.2 (build 25G83), arm64, I am using the Security framework through JXA, executed by a static /usr/bin/osascript helper launched from the Codex desktop application's local command environment. A dummy-only test attempts to add one generic-password item to the local file-based login keychain. SecItemAdd returns OSStatus 100001. The system's "security error 100001" command describes this as "UNIX[Operation not permitted]". The helper explicitly opens the login keychain and selects it using kSecUseKeychain for the add operation. Synchronizable and Data Protection Keychain options are false. It supplies an access object created by SecAccessCreate with an empty trusted-application array. What I have confirmed: Keychain open/status calls succeed and report unlocked, readable, and writable. I understand these flags do not establish permission for this individual operation. Attribute-only exact lookups report the dummy item as not found before and after each failed add. Granting narrowly scoped filesystem write permission for the login keychain file through the launching tool did not resolve the failure. I have not performed a comparison outside that restricted execution environment. I have not established whether the cause is the environment, API/ACL configuration, or an OS issue. Is this JXA/Security usage supported for a file-based keychain? Which documented diagnostics can distinguish process/sandbox restrictions from item ACL or authentication requirements? Are there relevant constraints on this query/access-object construction? I am seeking a supported implementation, not a way to disable or bypass security protections. I can provide a dummy-only reproducer without credentials or personal paths.
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Sep ’26
ScreenCaptureKit authorization fails after tccd exhausts file descriptors (FB24757092)
I’m seeking DTS guidance on supported ScreenCaptureKit usage and diagnostics for an intermittent authorization failure, filed as FB24757092. Captured evidence (my incident) On macOS 26.6.2 (25G83), Apple silicon, an already-authorized custom Apple Development-signed AltTabDebug build encountered renewed Screen Recording prompts. Unified logs show root tccd exhausting file descriptors during authorization. Three failing tccd processes each reported 255 total descriptors, with 250 unique descriptors referring to the same app executable. SecStaticCodeCreateWithPath failed with error 100024 (UNIX[Too many open files]); tccd could not match the existing kTCCServiceScreenCapture code requirement, and replayd reported TCC Disallow / user denied for captureScreenshot. Later checks allowed the same running app again. This confirms resource exhaustion and authorization failures. It does not establish why descriptors accumulated, a persistent leak mechanism, a per-capture leak rate, or a deterministic reproducer. The reported load spike and roughly one-second display freeze have an uncertain causal relationship to these failures. I have not established reproduction on macOS 27 or descriptor exhaustion in an unmodified release build. No incident-time sysdiagnose was collected. Separate upstream observations The AltTab maintainer reported testing the signed release in /Applications on the same OS build: 446 screenshots produced 1,350 ScreenCapture authorization requests, with repeated code-signature validation; approximately 23 ms of root-tccd CPU per thumbnail was reported. These are the maintainer’s measurements, not independently repeated by me, and do not measure descriptor growth per capture. https://github.com/lwouis/alt-tab-macos/issues/6025 https://github.com/lwouis/alt-tab-macos/issues/6025#issuecomment-5640382131 Questions Is there a supported ScreenCaptureKit capture pattern, request concurrency/rate guidance, or recovery strategy to reduce repeated authorization work and avoid renewed prompts when code validation fails from transient resource exhaustion? How should an app distinguish a genuine permission denial from an unavailable/failed authorization service, without repeatedly requesting permission? Which logging profile, trace, or incident-time diagnostics should we collect to correlate capture submissions/completions with tccd descriptor lifetime and isolate the accumulation mechanism? FB24757092 contains the focused timeline, descriptor dumps, prompt screenshot, and separately attributed maintainer findings. Raw diagnostics and private system/account information are intentionally omitted here. I built a standalone Swift/AppKit probe that uses one retained SCContentFilter per batch, logs submissions and actual callbacks, bounds outstanding requests, stops new submissions on the first error, and discards images. On macOS 27.0 (26A428), its ad-hoc-signed build captured its own window successfully in 446-request captureScreenshot batches at concurrency 1 and 4. This validates the harness, not reproduction of the original failure. The code-level form requests a focused project demonstrating the issue; this probe does not yet reproduce exhaustion. Could DTS advise the next isolation step and whether a private support case is appropriate for the existing evidence?
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782
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Sep ’26
How can we test an update from a specific pre-transfer app version to the first post-transfer release?
We recently completed an app transfer between two Apple Developer Program teams. Before releasing the first post-transfer version, we need to verify the update behavior from several specific historical versions signed by the previous team. Our main question is not limited to TestFlight: we would like to know Apple's recommended and supported method for reproducing this update path. Could you clarify the following? What is Apple's recommended and supported method for testing an update from a specific pre-transfer version to the first post-transfer release? Can an archived Ad Hoc IPA signed by the previous team be used as the starting version for this test? Can that IPA be updated by a post-transfer TestFlight, Development, or Ad Hoc build signed by the recipient team? Which of these methods most accurately reproduces an App Store update after an app transfer? For a manual Development or Ad Hoc update, is the previous-application-identifiers entitlement required? If it is required, how should the recipient team request a provisioning profile that authorizes this entitlement? Thank you.
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Sep ’26
requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:additionalInformationAction:completionHandler: Bug
I'm using the code below. It functions correctly on iOS 27.2 Beta 1 but crashes on iOS 27.2 Beta 2. API implemented here Xcode version - Version 27.2 beta (27B5019j) iOS Version - iOS 27.2 Beta 1 and Beta 2 behavior App Store region - Germany if (@available(iOS 27.2, *)) { [ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:YES additionalInformationAction:^{ NSLog(@"[ATT] Additional Information Clicked"); } completionHandler:^(ATTrackingManagerAuthorizationStatus status) { NSLog(@"[ATT] completion status: %ld", (long)status); }]; Resulted in a crash at runtime. No error at compile time. *** Terminating app due to uncaught exception 'NSInvalidArgumentException', reason: '+[ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:additionalInformationAction:completionHandler:]: unrecognized selector sent to class 0x28f3d0f80' *** First throw call stack: (0x1998ee8e0 0x19966c380 0x1999ee444 0x1998aa774 0x1998aaa30 0x1020a3a60 0x102fc8558 0x102fe1df0 0x103003dd8 0x102fd8340 0x102fd8280 0x1998a0614 0x19989187c 0x1998927e4 0x24643df24 0x19da6db54 0x1020a5264 0x1996e35b8) libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type NSException *** Terminating app due to uncaught exception 'NSInvalidArgumentException', reason: '+[ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationUsingExpandedInterface:additionalInformationAction:completionHandler:]: unrecognized selector sent to class 0x28f3d0f80' *** First throw call stack: (0x1998ee8e0 0x19966c380 0x1999ee444 0x1998aa774 0x1998aaa30 0x1020a3a60 0x102fc8558 0x102fe1df0 0x103003dd8 0x102fd8340 0x102fd8280 0x1998a0614 0x19989187c 0x1998927e4 0x24643df24 0x19da6db54 0x1020a5264 0x1996e35b8) terminating due to uncaught exception of type NSException
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253
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Sep ’26
ATT - requestTrackingAuthorization returns notDetermined without presenting the prompt on iOS 27.0 beta
Problem On iOS 27.0 beta (build 24A5430a) ATTrackingManager.requestTrackingAuthorization() completes with the status still .notDetermined and no prompt is ever presented. The ATT system prompt does not appear in any app on the Store. Environment iOS 27.0 beta 8 iPad and iPhone, both affected Country IT Question: Is this expected behavior, or is it a change in the new version of iOS? If it is a change, could you please point me to a reference that documents this? Happy to provide anything further through the Feedback report rather than here.
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Sep ’26
Does identifierForVendor (IDFV) change after transferring an app to another Apple Developer account?
Title: Does identifierForVendor (IDFV) change after transferring an app to another Apple Developer account? We are planning to transfer an existing App Store app from one Apple Developer account/team to another using App Transfer. The app currently uses: UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor as one of the identifiers sent to our backend. We would like to confirm the exact behavior of identifierForVendor after the app is transferred to the recipient developer account. Our scenario is: The app is currently published under Developer Team A. Existing users already have the app installed on their devices. We transfer the app to Developer Team B through App Store Connect. Developer Team B creates new certificates/provisioning profiles and publishes a new version of the same app. Existing users update the app normally from the App Store, without uninstalling it. Questions: After an existing user updates from the last version published by Team A to the first version published by Team B, will UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor remain the same, or will it be regenerated? Is the vendor used to calculate IDFV associated with: the App Store app record, the Bundle ID, the Team ID, the App ID Prefix, the developer organization/vendor, or some other value? Does App Transfer itself cause IDFV to change, or does the value only change under specific conditions such as changing the organization name or uninstalling all apps from the same vendor? If IDFV changes after App Transfer, does Apple provide any official migration or mapping mechanism that allows the backend to associate the old IDFV with the new IDFV? For example, Sign in with Apple provides a user migration mechanism when transferring an app between developer teams. Is there any equivalent mechanism for identifierForVendor? Is there any difference between: users who update the app directly after the transfer, and users who uninstall the old version and reinstall the app after the transfer? We have reviewed the documentation for identifierForVendor and App Transfer, but we could not find an explicit statement describing the IDFV behavior specifically for an App Transfer between two different developer teams. Our main concern is maintaining backend device associations for existing users after the transfer. We would appreciate an official clarification on whether IDFV continuity is guaranteed across App Transfer, and if not, what migration strategy Apple recommends.
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527
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Sep ’26
File Keychain ACL: is there a supported way to read back the complete stored authorization condition?
I have a follow-up question about file-based Keychain ACLs, this time specifically about inspecting the authorization state after it has been configured. I’ve been looking through the public SecAccess / SecACL / SecTrustedApplication APIs. I can enumerate ACL entries and their authorizations, and SecACLCopyContents gives me the trusted applications associated with an ACL. What I haven’t been able to establish is whether the complete stored caller-matching condition can be read back through a supported API. In particular, SecTrustedApplicationCopyData returns opaque application-identifying data. Is that data intended to be a complete representation of the condition that the Keychain will use to recognize that trusted application? Or can the stored trusted-application condition contain additional code-signing requirements or other matching constraints that are not represented by SecTrustedApplicationCopyData? My higher-level requirement is to verify, after configuring a private key, that its effective authorization scope is no broader than an independently reviewed policy. Ideally I would like to compare: the authorized private-key operations; all trusted-application subjects and their complete matching conditions; prompt-related state; and partition-list constraints. Is there a public and supported API, or an Apple-provided tool with a supported machine-readable contract, that can enumerate the complete effective authorization state of a private key in a file-based Keychain? I’m deliberately not trying to infer this from the current executable’s path, designated requirement, hash, security dump-keychain output, or representative negative tests unless Apple considers one of those to be the supported way to establish the stored authorization state. I realise from the existing guidance, including TN3137 and the discussion around file-based Keychains, that this is legacy technology. If complete supported introspection simply isn’t available for this model, knowing that limitation would also answer my question. Thanks.
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Sep ’26