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Develop system extensions that enhance user security using Endpoint Security.

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es_mute_path() vs. deprecated es_mute_path_literal() - incompatibility and wrong documentation
I recently upgraded a line of code in my Endpoint-Security client, to remove a deprecation warning: for (NSString *mutePath in ignoredBinaryPaths) { //(old) res = es_mute_path_literal(self.esClient, [mutePath UTF8String]); res = es_mute_path(self.esClient, [mutePath UTF8String], ES_MUTE_PATH_TYPE_TARGET_LITERAL); if (res!=ES_RETURN_SUCCESS) os_log_error(setupLog, "Failed to white-list binary:%{public}@ error:%{errno}d", mutePath, errno); } However, after this change, I started receiving tons of ES event messages, for AUTH_OPEN and AUTH_CREATE and many others, from processes/executables I explicitly and successfully muted! Since ES is so performance sensitive - I got worried. Inspecting better the new API I found incoherent documentation and even misleading and contradicting definitions. But the ES headers say differently!!! /** * @brief Suppress all events matching a path. * * @param client The es_client_t for which the path will be muted. * @param path The path to mute. * @param type Describes the type of the `path` parameter. * * @return es_return_t A value indicating whether or not the path was successfully muted. * * @note Path-based muting applies to the real and potentially firmlinked path * of a file as seen by VFS, and as available from fcntl(2) F_GETPATH. * No special provisions are made for files with multiple ("hard") links, * or for symbolic links. * In particular, when using inverted target path muting to monitor a * particular path for writing, you will need to check if the file(s) of * interest are also reachable via additional hard links outside of the * paths you are observing. * * @see es_mute_path_events * @discussion When using the path types ES_MUTE_PATH_TYPE_TARGET_PREFIX and ES_MUTE_PATH_TYPE_TARGET_LITERAL Not all events are * supported. Furthermore the interpretation of target path is contextual. For events with more than one target path (such as * exchangedata) the behavior depends on the mute inversion state Under normal muting the event is suppressed only if ALL paths * are muted When target path muting is inverted the event is selected if ANY target path is muted For example a rename will be * suppressed if and only if both the source path and destination path are muted. Supported events are listed below. For each * event the target path is defined as: * * EXEC: The file being executed * OPEN: The file being opened * MMAP: The file being memory mapped * RENAME: Both the source and destination path. * SIGNAL: The path of the process being signalled * UNLINK: The file being unlinked * CLOSE: The file being closed * CREATE: The path to the file that will be created or replaced * GET_TASK: The path of the process for which the task port is being retrieved * LINK: Both the source and destination path * SETATTRLIST: The file for which the attributes are being set * SETEXTATTR: The file for which the extended attributes are being set * SETFLAGS: The file for which flags are being set * SETMODE: The file for which the mode is being set * SETOWNER: The file for which the owner is being set * WRITE: The file being written to * READLINK: The symbolic link being resolved * TRUNCATE: The file being truncated * CHDIR: The new working directory * GETATTRLIST: The file for which the attribute list is being retrieved * STAT: The file for which the stat is being retrieved * ACCESS: The file for which access is being tested * CHROOT: The file which will become the new root * UTIMES: The file for which times are being set * CLONE: Both the source file and target path * FCNTL: The file under file control * GETEXTATTR The file for which extended attributes are being retrieved * LISTEXTATTR The file for which extended attributes are being listed * READDIR The directory for whose contents will be read * DELETEEXTATTR The file for which extended attribues will be deleted * DUP: The file being duplicated * UIPC_BIND: The path to the unix socket that will be created * UIPC_CONNECT: The file that the unix socket being connected is bound to * EXCHANGEDATA: The path of both file1 and file2 * SETACL: The file for which ACLs are being set * PROC_CHECK: The path of the process against which access is being checked * SEARCHFS: The path of the volume which will be searched * PROC_SUSPEND_RESUME: The path of the process being suspended or resumed * GET_TASK_NAME: The path of the process for which the task name port will be retrieved * TRACE: The path of the process that will be attached to * REMOTE_THREAD_CREATE: The path of the process in which the new thread is created * GET_TASK_READ: The path of the process for which the task read port will be retrieved * GET_TASK_INSPECT: The path of the process for which the task inspect port will be retrieved * COPYFILE: The path to the source file and the path to either the new file to be created or the existing file to be overwritten */ So the behavior completely changed, you can no longer specify executables (via their binary path) from which you do NOT want any events Muting effectively became reactive, not proactive. Why this change is not documented with the deprecation? Why no alternative is suggested? why find this only because it broke my software tool behavior and performance? And last: For how long can I rely on the old, deprecated APIs, should I choose to revert my change instead of devising a whole new mechanism for muting un-interesting
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250
Aug ’25
No MDM settings to control macOS pasteboard privacy?
For context, my company develops a data loss prevention (DLP) product. Part of our functionality is the ability to detect sensitive data being pasted into a web browser or cloud-based app. The AppKit release notes for April 2025 document an upcoming “macOS pasteboard privacy” feature, which will presumably ship in macOS 26. Using the user default setting “EnablePasteboardPrivacyDeveloperPreview” documented in the release notes, I tested our agent under macOS 15.5, and encountered a modal alert reading " is trying to access the pasteboard" almost immediately, when the program reads the General pasteboard to scan its contents. Since our product is aimed at enterprise customers (and not individual Mac users), I believed Apple would implement a privacy control setting for this new feature. This would allow our customers to push a configuration profile via MDM, with the “Paste from Other Apps” setting for our application preset to “Allow”, so that they can install our product on their endpoints without manual intervention. Unfortunately, as of macOS 26 beta 4 (25A5316i), there does not seem to be any such setting documented under Device Management — for example in PrivacyPreferencesPolicyControl.Services, which lists a number of similar settings. Without such a setting available, a valuable function of our product will be effectively crippled when macOS 26 is released. Is there such a setting (that I've overlooked)? If not, allow me to urge Apple to find the resources to implement one, so that our customers can preset “Paste from Other Apps” to “Allow” for our application.
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719
Jul ’25
block microphone and speakers due to security reason
Hello, As part of developing a DLP system, the microphone and speakers should be blocked. My solution involves muting devices by changing the property kAudioDevicePropertyMute. However, this solution allows the user to unmute the device, and the app must implement a property listener to mute the device again. The problem is that muting takes some time and the device is temporarily unmuted. Admittedly, it takes less than a second, but nevertheless, it appears insecure. Is there an Apple-recommended approach to implement such blocking more securely? Maybe some solution which is based on IOKit. Thank you in advance, Pavel
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311
Aug ’25
es_event_open_t fflag showing O_SEARCH instead of FREAD/FWRITE on macOS 26 beta 4
Hello, Starting with macOS 26 beta 4, I’ve noticed that the fflag field in es_event_open_t sometimes contains O_SEARCH instead of the expected FREAD or FWRITE values. According to the documentation, fflag should represent the kernel-applied flags (e.g., FREAD, FWRITE), not the open(2) oflag values. However, in my tests, when intercepting ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN events, the value appears to match O_SEARCH in certain cases. Is this an intentional change in macOS 26, or could it be a bug in the current beta? If this is expected behavior, could you clarify under what conditions O_SEARCH or some oflag are returned? Environment: macOS 26 beta 4 Endpoint Security Framework Thanks in advance for any clarification!
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120
Aug ’25
Capturing file read events in Endpoint Security client
Hi everyone! I'd like to create an application for system monitoring using the Endpoint Security framework. I already have a working prototype and now I am trying to expand its capabilities to capture more event types. Started looking at filesystem-related events as one of the most important ones for my use case. These seem to be supported fairly well by the framework (ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN/CLOSE/CREATE/WRITE etc.) However, the "READ FILE" event seems to be absent… Am I missing something here, or Endpoint Security framework does not provide this kind of information? If it doesn't, what is the reason behind this? Capturing this type of events seems quite relevant for security-related software. Thanks & Best regards, Roman
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148
Aug ’25
How to update Endpoint Security Extension?
Hi, I’m expecting the demo from Apple, but I think I’m seeing different behavior on my end. Here are the steps I followed: Run the SampleEndpointApp example. Copy SampleEndpointApp to the /Applications folder. Run and enable the Extension and Full Disk Access → Everything works properly. I modify something in the example and start again from step #1, but nothing gets updated as shown in the demo video. The only way I can make it work is by going into Settings, manually removing the ES extension, and then running the app again. My concern is: if I deliver the application to clients, how can I properly update the extension without requiring them to manually remove it first? Thanks,
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212
Sep ’25
macOS 15 (Sequoia): Endpoint Security client runs by hand, but LaunchDaemon fails with TCC “Full Disk Access” denial on unmanaged Macs
Platforms: macOS 15.x (Sequoia), Intel-Based App type: Endpoint Security (ES) client, notarized Developer ID app + LaunchDaemon Goal: Boot-time ES client that runs on any Mac (managed or unmanaged) Summary Our ES client launches and functions when started manually (terminal), but when loaded as a LaunchDaemon it fails to initialize the ES connection with: (libEndpointSecurity.dylib) Failed to open service: 0xe00002d8: Caller lacks TCC authorization for Full Disk Access We can’t find a supported way to grant Full Disk Access (SystemPolicyAllFiles) to a system daemon on unmanaged Macs (no MDM). Local installation of a PPPC (TCC) profile is rejected as “must originate from a user-approved MDM server.” We’re seeking confirmation: Is MDM now the only supported path for a boot-time ES daemon that requires FDA? If so, what’s Apple’s recommended approach for unmanaged Macs? Environment & Artifacts Binary (path placeholder): /Library/Application Support///App/.app/Contents/MacOS/ Universal (x86_64 + arm64) Notarized, hardened runtime; Developer ID Team <TEAM_ID> Entitlements include: com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client (present) Daemon plist (simplified; placeholders used): <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"><dict> <key>Label</key> <string>com.example.esd</string> <key>Program</key> <string>/Library/Application Support/<VENDOR>/<PRODUCT>/Platform/<daemon-exec></string> <key>WorkingDirectory</key> <string>/Library/Application Support/<VENDOR>/<PRODUCT>/Platform</string> <key>RunAtLoad</key><true/> <key>KeepAlive</key><true/> </dict></plist> Designated requirement (abridged & masked): identifier "<BUNDLE_ID>" and anchor apple generic and certificate 1[...] and certificate leaf[...] and certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "<TEAM_ID>" What works Launching the ES client manually (interactive shell) succeeds; ES events flow. Signature, notarization, entitlements, Gatekeeper: all OK. What fails (daemon) launchctl print system/ shows it starts, but Console logs: (libEndpointSecurity.dylib) Failed to open service: 0xe00002d8:Caller lacks TCC authorization for Full Disk Access System TCC DB shows ES consent rows but no allow for TCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles for the daemon binary. Installing a PPPC mobileconfig locally (system scope) is blocked as “must originate from a user-approved MDM server.” Repro (minimal) Install app bundle + LaunchDaemon plist above (placeholders). Verify entitlements & notarization: codesign -dvvv --entitlements :- "" spctl --assess --type execute -vv "" Start daemon & watch logs: sudo launchctl bootstrap system "/Library/LaunchDaemons/.plist" log stream --style compact --predicate 'process == "" OR subsystem == "com.apple.TCC"' --info Observe FDA denial message only in daemon context. Attempt to add FDA via PPPC profile (system scope) → rejected unless installed by user-approved MDM. Questions for Apple On macOS 14/15, is Full Disk Access for system daemons strictly MDM-only via PPPC (i.e., not installable locally)? Under what conditions would libEndpointSecurity report a Full Disk Access denial at client initialization, given ES consent is distinct from FDA? For unmanaged Macs needing boot-time ES processing, does Apple recommend a split: root LaunchDaemon (ES subscription; no protected file I/O) + per-user LaunchAgent (user-granted FDA) via XPC for on-demand disk access? Would moving ES connection code into a System Extension change FDA requirements for unmanaged devices, or is FDA still governed by PPPC/MDM? If behavior changed across releases, can Apple confirm the intended policy so vendors can document MDM requirements vs. unmanaged install paths? What we’ve tried Verified signature, notarization, hardened runtime, ES entitlement present. Confirmed context difference: manual run OK; daemon fails. Inspected system TCC: ES consent rows present; no FDA allow for daemon. Tried installing system-scoped PPPC locally → blocked as “must originate from a user-approved MDM server.” Considered LaunchAgent-only, but ES needs root; evaluating daemon+agent split to keep ES in root and put FDA-gated work in user space. What we need A definitive statement on the supported way to grant FDA to a system daemon on macOS 14/15. If MDM PPPC is required, we’ll ship “daemon mode requires MDM” and provide a daemon+agent fallback for unmanaged devices. If a compliant non-MDM path exists for daemon FDA on unmanaged Macs, please share exact steps. Thanks! Happy to provide additional logs privately if helpful.
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1.8k
Jan ’26
UI-Less Host App for Endpoint Security Extension Installation
According to Apple's development documentation, if I want to install an Endpoint Security system extension, I need to develop a host app that must be installed in the Applications directory. Now, I want to create an ES extension to protect users from accessing certain folders. However, I don't want a custom app to pop up asking the user to allow the installation of the ES extension. (To clarify, it's fine if the system authorization request dialog pops up, but I don't want the host app's UI to appear.) Is there any way to do this?
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99
Oct ’25
Endpoint Security Extension Crashing Frequently When Handling ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN
I am facing a persistent issue with an Endpoint Security (ES) extension that is crashing only when processing the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN event. Other event types, including ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN and ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP, work without any problems. func startMonitoring() { guard !isMonitoring else { return } let result = es_new_client(&gClient) { (client, message) in guard message.pointee.action_type == ES_ACTION_TYPE_AUTH else { return } let pid = audit_token_to_pid(message.pointee.process.pointee.audit_token) if pid == gSelfPID { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) var token = message.pointee.process.pointee.audit_token es_mute_process(client, &token) return } guard message.pointee.event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN else { es_respond_auth_result(client, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_ALLOW, true) return } let pathData = message.pointee.event.open.file.pointee.path guard let pathPtr = pathData.data else { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } if shouldSkipPath(pathPtr, length: pathData.length) { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } if !hasBlockedExtension(pathPtr, length: pathData.length) { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } guard let execPathPtr = message.pointee.process.pointee.executable.pointee.path.data else { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } if isGoogleChrome(execPathPtr) { es_respond_auth_result(client, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY, true) } else { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) var token = message.pointee.process.pointee.audit_token es_mute_process(client, &token) } } guard result == ES_NEW_CLIENT_RESULT_SUCCESS, let client = gClient else { return } es_clear_cache(client) muteNoisyPaths(client: client) let events: [es_event_type_t] = [ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN] let subResult = es_subscribe(client, events, UInt32(events.count)) guard subResult == ES_RETURN_SUCCESS else { es_delete_client(client) gClient = nil return } isMonitoring = true }
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Dec ’25
DesktopServicesHelper appears to delete or unlink the source file before the ESF auth event deadline is reached, rather than waiting for the full deadline window.
On macOS Tahoe, our application using the Endpoint Security Framework (ESF) observes that during file copies through finder application, DesktopServicesHelper unlinks the source file if the ESF authorization response is delayed for ~5 seconds, even though the authorization event deadline remains 15 seconds, indicating that the process does not wait for the full ESF deadline before deleting the file. Before Tahoe, we didnt see this behaviour.
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334
Jan ’26
Bug Exists in the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK Event of System Extensions
System Version: 26.1 Device: M1 Mac Mini Steps to Reproduce: Create a UNIX socket file at /tmp/a.sock Execute the command: ln /tmp/a.sock /tmp/b.sock Execute the command: rm /tmp/b.sock Bug Description: At this point, a bug occurs in the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK event of the system extension. The value returned for message->event.unlink.target->path is /tmp/a.sock, while it is expected to be /tmp/b.sock Reproducibility: 100%
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140
Jan ’26
Endpoint Security Framework Bug: setuid Event Incorrectly Attributed to Parent Process During posix_spawn
Feedback ticket ID: FB21797397 Summary When using posix_spawn() with posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np() to spawn a child process with a different UID, the eslogger incorrectly reports a setuid event as an event originating from the parent process instead of the child process. Steps to Reproduce Create a binary that do the following: Configure posix_spawnattr_t that set the process UIDs to some other user ID (I'll use 501 in this example). Uses posix_spawn() to spawn a child process Run eslogger with the event types setuid, fork, exec Execute the binary as root process using sudo or from root owned shell Terminate the launched eslogger Observe the process field in the setuid event Expected behavior The eslogger will report events indicating a process launch and uid changes so the child process is set to 501. i.e.: fork setuid - Done by child process exec Actual behavior The process field in the setuid event is reported as the parent process (that called posix_spawn) - indicating UID change to the parent process. Attachments I'm attaching source code for a small project with a 2 binaries: I'll add the source code for the project at the end of the file + attach filtered eslogger JSONs One that runs the descirbed posix_spawn flow One that produces the exact same sequence of events by doing different operation and reaching a different process state: Parent calls fork() Parent process calls setuid(501) Child process calls exec() Why this is problematic Both binaries in my attachment do different operations, achieving different process state (1 is parent with UID=0 and child with UID=501 while the other is parent UID=501 and child UID=0), but report the same sequence of events. Code #include <cstdio> #include <spawn.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <string.h> // environ contains the current environment variables extern char **environ; extern "C" { int posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, uid_t uid); int posix_spawnattr_set_gid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, gid_t gid); } int main() { pid_t pid; int status; posix_spawnattr_t attr; // 1. Define the executable path and arguments const char *path = "/bin/sleep"; char *const argv[] = {(char *)"sleep", (char *)"1", NULL}; // 2. Initialize spawn attributes if ((status = posix_spawnattr_init(&attr)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_init: %s\n", strerror(status)); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // 3. Set the UID for the child process (e.g., UID 501) // Note: Parent must be root to change to a different user uid_t target_uid = 501; if ((status = posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(&attr, target_uid)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np: %s\n", strerror(status)); posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // 4. Spawn the process printf("Spawning /bin/sleep 1 as UID %d...\n", target_uid); status = posix_spawn(&pid, path, NULL, &attr, argv, environ); if (status == 0) { printf("Successfully spawned child with PID: %d\n", pid); // Wait for the child to finish (will take 63 seconds) if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) { printf("Child process exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else { perror("waitpid"); } } else { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawn: %s\n", strerror(status)); } // 5. Clean up posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); return (status == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE; } #include <cstdio> #include <cstdlib> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> // This program demonstrates fork + setuid + exec behavior for ES framework bug report // 1. Parent forks // 2. Parent does setuid(501) // 3. Child waits with sleep syscall // 4. Child performs exec int main() { printf("Parent PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid()); pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { // Fork failed perror("fork"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } if (pid == 0) { // Child process printf("Child PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid()); // Child waits for a bit with sleep syscall printf("Child sleeping for 2 seconds...\n"); sleep(2); // Child performs exec printf("Child executing child_exec...\n"); // Get the path to child_exec (same directory as this executable) char *const argv[] = {(char *)"/bin/sleep", (char *)"2", NULL}; // Try to exec child_exec from current directory first execv("/bin/sleep", argv); // If exec fails perror("execv"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } else { // Parent process printf("Parent forked child with PID: %d\n", pid); // Parent does setuid(501) printf("Parent calling setuid(501)...\n"); if (setuid(501) != 0) { perror("setuid"); // Continue anyway to observe behavior } printf("Parent after setuid - UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getuid(), geteuid()); // Wait for child to finish int status; if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) { if (WIFEXITED(status)) { printf("Child exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { printf("Child killed by signal %d\n", WTERMSIG(status)); } } else { perror("waitpid"); } } return EXIT_SUCCESS; } posix_spawn.json fork_exec.json
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714
Feb ’26
When is the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permission set by macOS?
[Q] When is the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient set by macOS and in which conditions? From what I'm gathering, the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient can not be set by a configuration profile and the end user can only grant full disk access. I searched for documentation on Apple's develop website (with the "kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient" search) and did not get any useful result. Using a more complete search engine, or the forum search engine, only points to the old annoying big bug in macOS Ventura. The problem I'm investigating is showing a process being listed as getting granted kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permissions in the TCC database when: it's not an Endpoint Security client. it does not have the ES Client entitlement. the bundle of the process includes another process that is an ES Client and is spawn-ed by this process but I don't see why this should have an impact. This process is supposed to have been granted kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles via end user interaction or configuration profile. AFAIK, the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permission can only be set by macOS itself. So this looks like to be either a bug in macOS, an undocumented behavior or I'm missing something. Hence the initial question. macOS 15.7.3 / Apple Silicon
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137
Feb ’26
Error 500 when requesting endpoint security entitlement
Hello, I am attempting to request the endpoint-security.client entitlement for my app using the following form: https://developer.apple.com/contact/request/system-extension/ After submitting the form, I consistently receive an HTTP 500 error from Apple’s servers. Could you please provide guidance on whether this is a known issue or if there is something I may be doing incorrectly? I appreciate your assistance.
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211
Feb ’26
My EndpointSecurity Client process is kicked by OS on Mac sleep/wake cycle
Hi, I develop an ES client applying rule-engine evaluating ES events (mostly File-system events). It is a bit non-standard not being deployed as a System-Extension, but rather as a global daemon. On some Macs, I sometimes see "crash reports" for the ES process, all sharing Termination Reason: Namespace ENDPOINTSECURITY, Code 2 EndpointSecurity client terminated because it failed to respond to a message before its deadline All of these happen not while normal Mac usage, but rather right at Mac wakeup time after sleep. My guess is, some ES_AUTH events (with deadline) arrive when Mac goes to sleep, and somehow my high-priority dispatch_queue handling them is "put to sleep" mid processing them, so when the Mac wakes up - event handling continues long after the deadline passed, and MacOS decides to kick the process. Questions: What is the recommended behavior with ES vs Sleep/Wake cycles? (we're not an antivirus, and we don't care much to clear events or go "blind" for such time) Can I specify somewhere in the info.plist of my bundle (this is built like an App) that my process should't be put to sleep, or that the OS should sleep it only when it becomes idle, or some other way tells the OS it is "ready for sleep" ? If not -- How do I observe the scenario so I can suspend my event handling IN TIME and resume on wake? Thanks!
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156
Feb ’26
Current wisdom on multiple XPC services in a System Extension?
I'm following up on a couple of forum threads from 2020 to get more clarity on the current guidance for supporting multiple XPC services in system extensions. For context, I'm trying to create a system extension that contains both an Endpoint Security client and a Network Extension filter, and I'm seeing indications that the system may not expect this and doesn't handle it smoothly. First: Previous guidance indicated that the system would automatically provide a Mach service named <TeamID>.<BundleID>.xpc to use for communicating with the system extension. However, the SystemExtension man page currently documents an Info.plist key called NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName and suggests that the default service name is deprecated; and in fact if this key is not set, I find a message in the Console: The extension from () is using the deprecated default mach service name. Please update the extension to set the NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName key in the Info.plist file. I have accordingly set this key, but I wanted to confirm that this is the current best practice. Second, and more interesting: Another user was trying to do something similar and observed that the Mach service for the endpoint security client wasn't available but the NE filter was. Quinn did some research and replied that this was intended behavior, quoting the EndpointSecurity man page: "If ES extension is combined with a Network Extension, set the NEMachServiceName key in the Info.plist" (which I have also done), and concluding from this: ... if you have a combined ES and NE system extension then the Mach service provided by the NE side takes precedence. However, the current man page does not include this quoted text and says nothing about a combined ES and NE system extension. So I'm wondering about current best practice. If I do combine the ES and NE clients in a single system extension, should they each declare the Mach service name under their respective Info.plist keys? And could there be a single XPC listener for both, using the same service name under each key, or would it be better to have separate XPC listeners? Alternatively, would it be preferable to have each component in a separate system extension? (This would entail some rearchitecting of the current design.)
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2w
es_mute_path() is returning with an error ES_RETURN_ERROR.
I am trying to disable certain paths from Endpoint Security Events using es_mute_path, but this seems to be returning with ES_RETURN_ERROR. I am currently not having 'com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client' but is disabling SIP to check the same. What is the reason for this behavior ?
Replies
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118
Activity
Jul ’25
es_mute_path() vs. deprecated es_mute_path_literal() - incompatibility and wrong documentation
I recently upgraded a line of code in my Endpoint-Security client, to remove a deprecation warning: for (NSString *mutePath in ignoredBinaryPaths) { //(old) res = es_mute_path_literal(self.esClient, [mutePath UTF8String]); res = es_mute_path(self.esClient, [mutePath UTF8String], ES_MUTE_PATH_TYPE_TARGET_LITERAL); if (res!=ES_RETURN_SUCCESS) os_log_error(setupLog, "Failed to white-list binary:%{public}@ error:%{errno}d", mutePath, errno); } However, after this change, I started receiving tons of ES event messages, for AUTH_OPEN and AUTH_CREATE and many others, from processes/executables I explicitly and successfully muted! Since ES is so performance sensitive - I got worried. Inspecting better the new API I found incoherent documentation and even misleading and contradicting definitions. But the ES headers say differently!!! /** * @brief Suppress all events matching a path. * * @param client The es_client_t for which the path will be muted. * @param path The path to mute. * @param type Describes the type of the `path` parameter. * * @return es_return_t A value indicating whether or not the path was successfully muted. * * @note Path-based muting applies to the real and potentially firmlinked path * of a file as seen by VFS, and as available from fcntl(2) F_GETPATH. * No special provisions are made for files with multiple ("hard") links, * or for symbolic links. * In particular, when using inverted target path muting to monitor a * particular path for writing, you will need to check if the file(s) of * interest are also reachable via additional hard links outside of the * paths you are observing. * * @see es_mute_path_events * @discussion When using the path types ES_MUTE_PATH_TYPE_TARGET_PREFIX and ES_MUTE_PATH_TYPE_TARGET_LITERAL Not all events are * supported. Furthermore the interpretation of target path is contextual. For events with more than one target path (such as * exchangedata) the behavior depends on the mute inversion state Under normal muting the event is suppressed only if ALL paths * are muted When target path muting is inverted the event is selected if ANY target path is muted For example a rename will be * suppressed if and only if both the source path and destination path are muted. Supported events are listed below. For each * event the target path is defined as: * * EXEC: The file being executed * OPEN: The file being opened * MMAP: The file being memory mapped * RENAME: Both the source and destination path. * SIGNAL: The path of the process being signalled * UNLINK: The file being unlinked * CLOSE: The file being closed * CREATE: The path to the file that will be created or replaced * GET_TASK: The path of the process for which the task port is being retrieved * LINK: Both the source and destination path * SETATTRLIST: The file for which the attributes are being set * SETEXTATTR: The file for which the extended attributes are being set * SETFLAGS: The file for which flags are being set * SETMODE: The file for which the mode is being set * SETOWNER: The file for which the owner is being set * WRITE: The file being written to * READLINK: The symbolic link being resolved * TRUNCATE: The file being truncated * CHDIR: The new working directory * GETATTRLIST: The file for which the attribute list is being retrieved * STAT: The file for which the stat is being retrieved * ACCESS: The file for which access is being tested * CHROOT: The file which will become the new root * UTIMES: The file for which times are being set * CLONE: Both the source file and target path * FCNTL: The file under file control * GETEXTATTR The file for which extended attributes are being retrieved * LISTEXTATTR The file for which extended attributes are being listed * READDIR The directory for whose contents will be read * DELETEEXTATTR The file for which extended attribues will be deleted * DUP: The file being duplicated * UIPC_BIND: The path to the unix socket that will be created * UIPC_CONNECT: The file that the unix socket being connected is bound to * EXCHANGEDATA: The path of both file1 and file2 * SETACL: The file for which ACLs are being set * PROC_CHECK: The path of the process against which access is being checked * SEARCHFS: The path of the volume which will be searched * PROC_SUSPEND_RESUME: The path of the process being suspended or resumed * GET_TASK_NAME: The path of the process for which the task name port will be retrieved * TRACE: The path of the process that will be attached to * REMOTE_THREAD_CREATE: The path of the process in which the new thread is created * GET_TASK_READ: The path of the process for which the task read port will be retrieved * GET_TASK_INSPECT: The path of the process for which the task inspect port will be retrieved * COPYFILE: The path to the source file and the path to either the new file to be created or the existing file to be overwritten */ So the behavior completely changed, you can no longer specify executables (via their binary path) from which you do NOT want any events Muting effectively became reactive, not proactive. Why this change is not documented with the deprecation? Why no alternative is suggested? why find this only because it broke my software tool behavior and performance? And last: For how long can I rely on the old, deprecated APIs, should I choose to revert my change instead of devising a whole new mechanism for muting un-interesting
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Activity
Aug ’25
No MDM settings to control macOS pasteboard privacy?
For context, my company develops a data loss prevention (DLP) product. Part of our functionality is the ability to detect sensitive data being pasted into a web browser or cloud-based app. The AppKit release notes for April 2025 document an upcoming “macOS pasteboard privacy” feature, which will presumably ship in macOS 26. Using the user default setting “EnablePasteboardPrivacyDeveloperPreview” documented in the release notes, I tested our agent under macOS 15.5, and encountered a modal alert reading " is trying to access the pasteboard" almost immediately, when the program reads the General pasteboard to scan its contents. Since our product is aimed at enterprise customers (and not individual Mac users), I believed Apple would implement a privacy control setting for this new feature. This would allow our customers to push a configuration profile via MDM, with the “Paste from Other Apps” setting for our application preset to “Allow”, so that they can install our product on their endpoints without manual intervention. Unfortunately, as of macOS 26 beta 4 (25A5316i), there does not seem to be any such setting documented under Device Management — for example in PrivacyPreferencesPolicyControl.Services, which lists a number of similar settings. Without such a setting available, a valuable function of our product will be effectively crippled when macOS 26 is released. Is there such a setting (that I've overlooked)? If not, allow me to urge Apple to find the resources to implement one, so that our customers can preset “Paste from Other Apps” to “Allow” for our application.
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Activity
Jul ’25
block microphone and speakers due to security reason
Hello, As part of developing a DLP system, the microphone and speakers should be blocked. My solution involves muting devices by changing the property kAudioDevicePropertyMute. However, this solution allows the user to unmute the device, and the app must implement a property listener to mute the device again. The problem is that muting takes some time and the device is temporarily unmuted. Admittedly, it takes less than a second, but nevertheless, it appears insecure. Is there an Apple-recommended approach to implement such blocking more securely? Maybe some solution which is based on IOKit. Thank you in advance, Pavel
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Activity
Aug ’25
es_event_open_t fflag showing O_SEARCH instead of FREAD/FWRITE on macOS 26 beta 4
Hello, Starting with macOS 26 beta 4, I’ve noticed that the fflag field in es_event_open_t sometimes contains O_SEARCH instead of the expected FREAD or FWRITE values. According to the documentation, fflag should represent the kernel-applied flags (e.g., FREAD, FWRITE), not the open(2) oflag values. However, in my tests, when intercepting ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN events, the value appears to match O_SEARCH in certain cases. Is this an intentional change in macOS 26, or could it be a bug in the current beta? If this is expected behavior, could you clarify under what conditions O_SEARCH or some oflag are returned? Environment: macOS 26 beta 4 Endpoint Security Framework Thanks in advance for any clarification!
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Activity
Aug ’25
Capturing file read events in Endpoint Security client
Hi everyone! I'd like to create an application for system monitoring using the Endpoint Security framework. I already have a working prototype and now I am trying to expand its capabilities to capture more event types. Started looking at filesystem-related events as one of the most important ones for my use case. These seem to be supported fairly well by the framework (ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN/CLOSE/CREATE/WRITE etc.) However, the "READ FILE" event seems to be absent… Am I missing something here, or Endpoint Security framework does not provide this kind of information? If it doesn't, what is the reason behind this? Capturing this type of events seems quite relevant for security-related software. Thanks & Best regards, Roman
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Activity
Aug ’25
How to update Endpoint Security Extension?
Hi, I’m expecting the demo from Apple, but I think I’m seeing different behavior on my end. Here are the steps I followed: Run the SampleEndpointApp example. Copy SampleEndpointApp to the /Applications folder. Run and enable the Extension and Full Disk Access → Everything works properly. I modify something in the example and start again from step #1, but nothing gets updated as shown in the demo video. The only way I can make it work is by going into Settings, manually removing the ES extension, and then running the app again. My concern is: if I deliver the application to clients, how can I properly update the extension without requiring them to manually remove it first? Thanks,
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Activity
Sep ’25
Endpoint Security Frameworks SDK - Not foudn for download
Hey team, received Entitlement for Endpoint security frameworks from Apple Developer Program for mac os application, SDK is missing from local XCODE 15.2 , trying to find out on internet but nothing works. Is we are missing something for getting download the SDK for this framework integration with our softwares.
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Activity
Oct ’25
endpoint-security client provisioning
Anyone know how long it takes to get Apple to respond to a request for provisioning for endpoint security?
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185
Activity
Oct ’25
macOS 15 (Sequoia): Endpoint Security client runs by hand, but LaunchDaemon fails with TCC “Full Disk Access” denial on unmanaged Macs
Platforms: macOS 15.x (Sequoia), Intel-Based App type: Endpoint Security (ES) client, notarized Developer ID app + LaunchDaemon Goal: Boot-time ES client that runs on any Mac (managed or unmanaged) Summary Our ES client launches and functions when started manually (terminal), but when loaded as a LaunchDaemon it fails to initialize the ES connection with: (libEndpointSecurity.dylib) Failed to open service: 0xe00002d8: Caller lacks TCC authorization for Full Disk Access We can’t find a supported way to grant Full Disk Access (SystemPolicyAllFiles) to a system daemon on unmanaged Macs (no MDM). Local installation of a PPPC (TCC) profile is rejected as “must originate from a user-approved MDM server.” We’re seeking confirmation: Is MDM now the only supported path for a boot-time ES daemon that requires FDA? If so, what’s Apple’s recommended approach for unmanaged Macs? Environment & Artifacts Binary (path placeholder): /Library/Application Support///App/.app/Contents/MacOS/ Universal (x86_64 + arm64) Notarized, hardened runtime; Developer ID Team <TEAM_ID> Entitlements include: com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client (present) Daemon plist (simplified; placeholders used): <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"><dict> <key>Label</key> <string>com.example.esd</string> <key>Program</key> <string>/Library/Application Support/<VENDOR>/<PRODUCT>/Platform/<daemon-exec></string> <key>WorkingDirectory</key> <string>/Library/Application Support/<VENDOR>/<PRODUCT>/Platform</string> <key>RunAtLoad</key><true/> <key>KeepAlive</key><true/> </dict></plist> Designated requirement (abridged & masked): identifier "<BUNDLE_ID>" and anchor apple generic and certificate 1[...] and certificate leaf[...] and certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "<TEAM_ID>" What works Launching the ES client manually (interactive shell) succeeds; ES events flow. Signature, notarization, entitlements, Gatekeeper: all OK. What fails (daemon) launchctl print system/ shows it starts, but Console logs: (libEndpointSecurity.dylib) Failed to open service: 0xe00002d8:Caller lacks TCC authorization for Full Disk Access System TCC DB shows ES consent rows but no allow for TCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles for the daemon binary. Installing a PPPC mobileconfig locally (system scope) is blocked as “must originate from a user-approved MDM server.” Repro (minimal) Install app bundle + LaunchDaemon plist above (placeholders). Verify entitlements & notarization: codesign -dvvv --entitlements :- "" spctl --assess --type execute -vv "" Start daemon & watch logs: sudo launchctl bootstrap system "/Library/LaunchDaemons/.plist" log stream --style compact --predicate 'process == "" OR subsystem == "com.apple.TCC"' --info Observe FDA denial message only in daemon context. Attempt to add FDA via PPPC profile (system scope) → rejected unless installed by user-approved MDM. Questions for Apple On macOS 14/15, is Full Disk Access for system daemons strictly MDM-only via PPPC (i.e., not installable locally)? Under what conditions would libEndpointSecurity report a Full Disk Access denial at client initialization, given ES consent is distinct from FDA? For unmanaged Macs needing boot-time ES processing, does Apple recommend a split: root LaunchDaemon (ES subscription; no protected file I/O) + per-user LaunchAgent (user-granted FDA) via XPC for on-demand disk access? Would moving ES connection code into a System Extension change FDA requirements for unmanaged devices, or is FDA still governed by PPPC/MDM? If behavior changed across releases, can Apple confirm the intended policy so vendors can document MDM requirements vs. unmanaged install paths? What we’ve tried Verified signature, notarization, hardened runtime, ES entitlement present. Confirmed context difference: manual run OK; daemon fails. Inspected system TCC: ES consent rows present; no FDA allow for daemon. Tried installing system-scoped PPPC locally → blocked as “must originate from a user-approved MDM server.” Considered LaunchAgent-only, but ES needs root; evaluating daemon+agent split to keep ES in root and put FDA-gated work in user space. What we need A definitive statement on the supported way to grant FDA to a system daemon on macOS 14/15. If MDM PPPC is required, we’ll ship “daemon mode requires MDM” and provide a daemon+agent fallback for unmanaged devices. If a compliant non-MDM path exists for daemon FDA on unmanaged Macs, please share exact steps. Thanks! Happy to provide additional logs privately if helpful.
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Activity
Jan ’26
UI-Less Host App for Endpoint Security Extension Installation
According to Apple's development documentation, if I want to install an Endpoint Security system extension, I need to develop a host app that must be installed in the Applications directory. Now, I want to create an ES extension to protect users from accessing certain folders. However, I don't want a custom app to pop up asking the user to allow the installation of the ES extension. (To clarify, it's fine if the system authorization request dialog pops up, but I don't want the host app's UI to appear.) Is there any way to do this?
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Activity
Oct ’25
Endpoint Security Extension Crashing Frequently When Handling ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN
I am facing a persistent issue with an Endpoint Security (ES) extension that is crashing only when processing the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN event. Other event types, including ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN and ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP, work without any problems. func startMonitoring() { guard !isMonitoring else { return } let result = es_new_client(&gClient) { (client, message) in guard message.pointee.action_type == ES_ACTION_TYPE_AUTH else { return } let pid = audit_token_to_pid(message.pointee.process.pointee.audit_token) if pid == gSelfPID { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) var token = message.pointee.process.pointee.audit_token es_mute_process(client, &token) return } guard message.pointee.event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN else { es_respond_auth_result(client, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_ALLOW, true) return } let pathData = message.pointee.event.open.file.pointee.path guard let pathPtr = pathData.data else { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } if shouldSkipPath(pathPtr, length: pathData.length) { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } if !hasBlockedExtension(pathPtr, length: pathData.length) { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } guard let execPathPtr = message.pointee.process.pointee.executable.pointee.path.data else { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) return } if isGoogleChrome(execPathPtr) { es_respond_auth_result(client, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY, true) } else { es_respond_flags_result(client, message, 0x7FFFFFFF, true) var token = message.pointee.process.pointee.audit_token es_mute_process(client, &token) } } guard result == ES_NEW_CLIENT_RESULT_SUCCESS, let client = gClient else { return } es_clear_cache(client) muteNoisyPaths(client: client) let events: [es_event_type_t] = [ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN] let subResult = es_subscribe(client, events, UInt32(events.count)) guard subResult == ES_RETURN_SUCCESS else { es_delete_client(client) gClient = nil return } isMonitoring = true }
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Activity
Dec ’25
DesktopServicesHelper appears to delete or unlink the source file before the ESF auth event deadline is reached, rather than waiting for the full deadline window.
On macOS Tahoe, our application using the Endpoint Security Framework (ESF) observes that during file copies through finder application, DesktopServicesHelper unlinks the source file if the ESF authorization response is delayed for ~5 seconds, even though the authorization event deadline remains 15 seconds, indicating that the process does not wait for the full ESF deadline before deleting the file. Before Tahoe, we didnt see this behaviour.
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Activity
Jan ’26
Bug Exists in the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK Event of System Extensions
System Version: 26.1 Device: M1 Mac Mini Steps to Reproduce: Create a UNIX socket file at /tmp/a.sock Execute the command: ln /tmp/a.sock /tmp/b.sock Execute the command: rm /tmp/b.sock Bug Description: At this point, a bug occurs in the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK event of the system extension. The value returned for message->event.unlink.target->path is /tmp/a.sock, while it is expected to be /tmp/b.sock Reproducibility: 100%
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Activity
Jan ’26
Endpoint Security Framework Bug: setuid Event Incorrectly Attributed to Parent Process During posix_spawn
Feedback ticket ID: FB21797397 Summary When using posix_spawn() with posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np() to spawn a child process with a different UID, the eslogger incorrectly reports a setuid event as an event originating from the parent process instead of the child process. Steps to Reproduce Create a binary that do the following: Configure posix_spawnattr_t that set the process UIDs to some other user ID (I'll use 501 in this example). Uses posix_spawn() to spawn a child process Run eslogger with the event types setuid, fork, exec Execute the binary as root process using sudo or from root owned shell Terminate the launched eslogger Observe the process field in the setuid event Expected behavior The eslogger will report events indicating a process launch and uid changes so the child process is set to 501. i.e.: fork setuid - Done by child process exec Actual behavior The process field in the setuid event is reported as the parent process (that called posix_spawn) - indicating UID change to the parent process. Attachments I'm attaching source code for a small project with a 2 binaries: I'll add the source code for the project at the end of the file + attach filtered eslogger JSONs One that runs the descirbed posix_spawn flow One that produces the exact same sequence of events by doing different operation and reaching a different process state: Parent calls fork() Parent process calls setuid(501) Child process calls exec() Why this is problematic Both binaries in my attachment do different operations, achieving different process state (1 is parent with UID=0 and child with UID=501 while the other is parent UID=501 and child UID=0), but report the same sequence of events. Code #include <cstdio> #include <spawn.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <string.h> // environ contains the current environment variables extern char **environ; extern "C" { int posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, uid_t uid); int posix_spawnattr_set_gid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, gid_t gid); } int main() { pid_t pid; int status; posix_spawnattr_t attr; // 1. Define the executable path and arguments const char *path = "/bin/sleep"; char *const argv[] = {(char *)"sleep", (char *)"1", NULL}; // 2. Initialize spawn attributes if ((status = posix_spawnattr_init(&attr)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_init: %s\n", strerror(status)); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // 3. Set the UID for the child process (e.g., UID 501) // Note: Parent must be root to change to a different user uid_t target_uid = 501; if ((status = posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(&attr, target_uid)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np: %s\n", strerror(status)); posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // 4. Spawn the process printf("Spawning /bin/sleep 1 as UID %d...\n", target_uid); status = posix_spawn(&pid, path, NULL, &attr, argv, environ); if (status == 0) { printf("Successfully spawned child with PID: %d\n", pid); // Wait for the child to finish (will take 63 seconds) if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) { printf("Child process exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else { perror("waitpid"); } } else { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawn: %s\n", strerror(status)); } // 5. Clean up posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); return (status == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE; } #include <cstdio> #include <cstdlib> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> // This program demonstrates fork + setuid + exec behavior for ES framework bug report // 1. Parent forks // 2. Parent does setuid(501) // 3. Child waits with sleep syscall // 4. Child performs exec int main() { printf("Parent PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid()); pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { // Fork failed perror("fork"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } if (pid == 0) { // Child process printf("Child PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid()); // Child waits for a bit with sleep syscall printf("Child sleeping for 2 seconds...\n"); sleep(2); // Child performs exec printf("Child executing child_exec...\n"); // Get the path to child_exec (same directory as this executable) char *const argv[] = {(char *)"/bin/sleep", (char *)"2", NULL}; // Try to exec child_exec from current directory first execv("/bin/sleep", argv); // If exec fails perror("execv"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } else { // Parent process printf("Parent forked child with PID: %d\n", pid); // Parent does setuid(501) printf("Parent calling setuid(501)...\n"); if (setuid(501) != 0) { perror("setuid"); // Continue anyway to observe behavior } printf("Parent after setuid - UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getuid(), geteuid()); // Wait for child to finish int status; if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) { if (WIFEXITED(status)) { printf("Child exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { printf("Child killed by signal %d\n", WTERMSIG(status)); } } else { perror("waitpid"); } } return EXIT_SUCCESS; } posix_spawn.json fork_exec.json
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Activity
Feb ’26
When is the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permission set by macOS?
[Q] When is the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient set by macOS and in which conditions? From what I'm gathering, the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient can not be set by a configuration profile and the end user can only grant full disk access. I searched for documentation on Apple's develop website (with the "kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient" search) and did not get any useful result. Using a more complete search engine, or the forum search engine, only points to the old annoying big bug in macOS Ventura. The problem I'm investigating is showing a process being listed as getting granted kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permissions in the TCC database when: it's not an Endpoint Security client. it does not have the ES Client entitlement. the bundle of the process includes another process that is an ES Client and is spawn-ed by this process but I don't see why this should have an impact. This process is supposed to have been granted kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles via end user interaction or configuration profile. AFAIK, the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permission can only be set by macOS itself. So this looks like to be either a bug in macOS, an undocumented behavior or I'm missing something. Hence the initial question. macOS 15.7.3 / Apple Silicon
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Activity
Feb ’26
Error code 500 when requesting a System Extension or DriverKit Entitlement
Hello all, I am trying to submit a request for endpoint security entitlement. I keep getting this error for weeks: This page isn’t working developer.apple.com is currently unable to handle this request. HTTP ERROR 500
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Activity
Mar ’26
Error 500 when requesting endpoint security entitlement
Hello, I am attempting to request the endpoint-security.client entitlement for my app using the following form: https://developer.apple.com/contact/request/system-extension/ After submitting the form, I consistently receive an HTTP 500 error from Apple’s servers. Could you please provide guidance on whether this is a known issue or if there is something I may be doing incorrectly? I appreciate your assistance.
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Activity
Feb ’26
My EndpointSecurity Client process is kicked by OS on Mac sleep/wake cycle
Hi, I develop an ES client applying rule-engine evaluating ES events (mostly File-system events). It is a bit non-standard not being deployed as a System-Extension, but rather as a global daemon. On some Macs, I sometimes see "crash reports" for the ES process, all sharing Termination Reason: Namespace ENDPOINTSECURITY, Code 2 EndpointSecurity client terminated because it failed to respond to a message before its deadline All of these happen not while normal Mac usage, but rather right at Mac wakeup time after sleep. My guess is, some ES_AUTH events (with deadline) arrive when Mac goes to sleep, and somehow my high-priority dispatch_queue handling them is "put to sleep" mid processing them, so when the Mac wakes up - event handling continues long after the deadline passed, and MacOS decides to kick the process. Questions: What is the recommended behavior with ES vs Sleep/Wake cycles? (we're not an antivirus, and we don't care much to clear events or go "blind" for such time) Can I specify somewhere in the info.plist of my bundle (this is built like an App) that my process should't be put to sleep, or that the OS should sleep it only when it becomes idle, or some other way tells the OS it is "ready for sleep" ? If not -- How do I observe the scenario so I can suspend my event handling IN TIME and resume on wake? Thanks!
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Activity
Feb ’26
Current wisdom on multiple XPC services in a System Extension?
I'm following up on a couple of forum threads from 2020 to get more clarity on the current guidance for supporting multiple XPC services in system extensions. For context, I'm trying to create a system extension that contains both an Endpoint Security client and a Network Extension filter, and I'm seeing indications that the system may not expect this and doesn't handle it smoothly. First: Previous guidance indicated that the system would automatically provide a Mach service named <TeamID>.<BundleID>.xpc to use for communicating with the system extension. However, the SystemExtension man page currently documents an Info.plist key called NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName and suggests that the default service name is deprecated; and in fact if this key is not set, I find a message in the Console: The extension from () is using the deprecated default mach service name. Please update the extension to set the NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName key in the Info.plist file. I have accordingly set this key, but I wanted to confirm that this is the current best practice. Second, and more interesting: Another user was trying to do something similar and observed that the Mach service for the endpoint security client wasn't available but the NE filter was. Quinn did some research and replied that this was intended behavior, quoting the EndpointSecurity man page: "If ES extension is combined with a Network Extension, set the NEMachServiceName key in the Info.plist" (which I have also done), and concluding from this: ... if you have a combined ES and NE system extension then the Mach service provided by the NE side takes precedence. However, the current man page does not include this quoted text and says nothing about a combined ES and NE system extension. So I'm wondering about current best practice. If I do combine the ES and NE clients in a single system extension, should they each declare the Mach service name under their respective Info.plist keys? And could there be a single XPC listener for both, using the same service name under each key, or would it be better to have separate XPC listeners? Alternatively, would it be preferable to have each component in a separate system extension? (This would entail some rearchitecting of the current design.)
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