How do I delete or edit codes in the iOS Beta Passwords app?

I have an application which is based on a video streaming service. A critical thing about this app is that these videos must be secured all the way and can't be pirated. The current problem I have is that anyone can use voice recorder to capture my videos audio which isn't suitable this app purpose. My question is Is there anyway that I can disable using any voice recording apps (or the microphone) and detect if someone tried to while streaming videos from my app? Thanks in advance

Hi, We are developing react native app, and we are having issue with ATS policy in production build distributed to TestFlight internal testing, requests to https are being killed. The preview build ad-hoc distribution is working fine. (I am testing the app on physical device) I will described what I've tried and supply you with logs from different tools. I tried to disable ATS - requests are working enable ATS (no change to default config) - requests are failing with following error Task <55618987-64A8-4C04-9B00-2EFF074D796C>.<1> finished with error [-1022] Error Domain=NSURLErrorDomain Code=-1022 "The resource could not be loaded because the App Transport Security policy requires the use of a secure connection." UserInfo={NSLocalizedDescription=The resource could not be loaded because the App Transport Security policy requires the use of a secure connection., NSErrorFailingURLStringKey=<private>, NSErrorFailingURLKey=<private>, _NSURLErrorRelatedURLSessionTaskErrorKey=<private>, _NSURLErrorFailingURLSessionTaskErrorKey=<private>, NSUnderlyingError=0x30127bb10 {Error Domain=kCFErrorDomainCFNetwork Code=-1022}} I tried to check server if it had met ATS requirements and ran ats-diagnostic ./TLSTool s_client -connect api.rankacy.com:443 * input stream did open * output stream did open * output stream has space * protocol: TLS 1.2 * cipher: ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 * trust result: unspecified * certificate info: * 0 + ecPublicKey 256 ecdsa-with-SHA384 'api.rankacy.com' * 1 + ecPublicKey 384 sha256-with-rsa-signature 'E6' * 2 + rsaEncryption 4096 sha256-with-rsa-signature 'ISRG Root X1' nscurl https://api.rankacy.com/ --verbose --ats-diagnostics Starting ATS Diagnostics Configuring ATS Info.plist keys and displaying the result of HTTPS loads to https://api.rankacy.com/. A test will "PASS" if URLSession:task:didCompleteWithError: returns a nil error. ================================================================================ Default ATS Secure Connection --- ATS Default Connection ATS Dictionary: { } Result : PASS --- ================================================================================ Allowing Arbitrary Loads --- Allow All Loads ATS Dictionary: { NSAllowsArbitraryLoads = true; } Result : PASS --- ================================================================================ Configuring TLS exceptions for api.rankacy.com --- TLSv1.3 ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.3"; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.2 ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.2"; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.1 ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.1"; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.0 ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.0"; }; }; } Result : PASS --- ================================================================================ Configuring PFS exceptions for api.rankacy.com --- Disabling Perfect Forward Secrecy ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- ================================================================================ Configuring PFS exceptions and allowing insecure HTTP for api.rankacy.com --- Disabling Perfect Forward Secrecy and Allowing Insecure HTTP ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads = true; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- ================================================================================ Configuring TLS exceptions with PFS disabled for api.rankacy.com --- TLSv1.3 with PFS disabled ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.3"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.2 with PFS disabled ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.2"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.1 with PFS disabled ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.1"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.0 with PFS disabled ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.0"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- ================================================================================ Configuring TLS exceptions with PFS disabled and insecure HTTP allowed for api.rankacy.com --- TLSv1.3 with PFS disabled and insecure HTTP allowed ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads = true; NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.3"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.2 with PFS disabled and insecure HTTP allowed ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads = true; NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.2"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.1 with PFS disabled and insecure HTTP allowed ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads = true; NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.1"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- --- TLSv1.0 with PFS disabled and insecure HTTP allowed ATS Dictionary: { NSExceptionDomains = { "api.rankacy.com" = { NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads = true; NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion = "TLSv1.0"; NSExceptionRequiresForwardSecrecy = false; }; }; } Result : PASS --- I am running out of ideas. Also it's hard to test because the preview ad-hoc build is working fine. So only after submitting the app to TestFlight I am having this issue Looking for your response Martin

We develop an SDK that requires sharing a device-specific identifier with our web API, in order to guarantee that certain artifacts are only used on the correct device. For the device-specific identifier, we use UIDevice.currentDevice.identifierForVendor which should not be restricted under ATT. In production, many developers are getting back to us with complaints of web requests being blocked: nw_endpoint_handler_path_change [C1 [our url]:443 waiting parent-flow (satisfied (Path is satisfied), interface: en0[802.11], ipv4, dns, uses wifi)] blocked tracker Connection 1: received failure notification Connection 1: failed to connect 1:50, reason -1 Connection 1: encountered error(1:50) Task <FA03088C-DDFC-437E-A06F-E05CC930E3E0>.<1> HTTP load failed, 0/0 bytes (error code: -1009 [1:50]) Task <FA03088C-DDFC-437E-A06F-E05CC930E3E0>.<1> finished with error [-1009] Error Domain=NSURLErrorDomain Code=-1009 "The Internet connection appears to be offline." UserInfo={_kCFStreamErrorCodeKey=50, NSUnderlyingError=0x3031118f0 {Error Domain=kCFErrorDomainCFNetwork Code=-1009 "(null)" UserInfo={_NSURLErrorBlockedTrackerFailureKey=true, _kCFStreamErrorDomainKey=1, _kCFStreamErrorCodeKey=50, _NSURLErrorNWPathKey=satisfied (Path is satisfied), interface: en0[802.11], ipv4, dns, uses wifi}}, _NSURLErrorFailingURLSessionTaskErrorKey=LocalDataTask <FA03088C-DDFC-437E-A06F-E05CC930E3E0>.<1>, _NSURLErrorRelatedURLSessionTaskErrorKey=( "LocalDataTask <FA03088C-DDFC-437E-A06F-E05CC930E3E0>.<1>" ), NSLocalizedDescription=The Internet connection appears to be offline., NSErrorFailingURLStringKey=..., NSErrorFailingURLKey=..., _kCFStreamErrorDomainKey=1} Interestingly, I've made a few observations: The blacklist seems to be persistent, across devices. The blacklist stays in place regardless of whether we send no identifiable data in the web request (in fact, an empty ping request to our URL still gets blocked) The only way to get past the block is to use ATT, and request from the user that we track them across websites. This is false, because we don't track any user data whatsoever; and iOS disables ATT by default (in the settings app, users have to opt-in). Our iOS SDK already has an xcprivacy manifest mentioning the fact that we use a device-specific identifier, and that we send it to our web API URL. Still, we get blocked. How can we fix this? We can standup a proxy URL but I'd imagine it's only a matter of time before that also gets blocked. Apple has not provided any guidance on the specifics of how domains get blocked, and how they can be unblocked.

We are implementing just-in-time account creation using Platform Single Sign-on. After creating the account, we are registering the user with PSSO and we want to ensure that the IDP account used for account creation matches the IDP account used in the user registration flow. An easy way to do this appears to be using loginUsername on the ASAuthorizationProviderExtensionLoginManager object. loginUsername gets set during account creation and then we can check what the user is entering during registration. The documentation, however, marks this attribute as deprecated. There is no indication of what could be used instead. Is there some other value we could look at? Does Apple have a plan to introduce a preferred API option? Thanks!

Hello, The man page for xpcservices.plist states that: Services embedded in an application bundle will only be visible to the containing application (...) What exactly "visible" means? Doest that mean that there is a mechanism to prevent other programs than the embedding application to access the XPCService's mach port or it just means that the XPCService is not listed (e.g. launchctl list) and if attacker can guess the mach port they can access it? I'm asking to understand if there is a security gain using the -[NSXPCConnection setCodeSigningRequirement:] for embedded XPCServices.

Is the method used to unlock an iOS device available to an app? We would like to require a step-up to MFA (in our app) if passcode was used and allow for single factor if Face ID was used.

Hi, It may be a stupid question, but we really wonder if there is a way for MDM to push a unique mTLS cert to our iOS application or if it can populate a client certificate in the iOS where our application can access it. Like browser app, how do browser mTLS certs get pushed? Thanks, Ying

Hi, I just watched session "10203" on "Meet AccessorySetupKit". In 09:13, it was mentioned that there is special UI for entering PIN codes / passphrases. How exactly is this UI triggered? And is there any UI for setting a pin during initial setup? I couldn't find any further information about any of this in the documentation. Best, Klemens

I'm a new developer who is looking to make my first app easier to manage on my end by staying in the Apple ecosystem. My ideal backend is just pure and simple CloudKit. This should help me cut down on costs and increase my security, or so I thought. The more I looked into the issue of mobile app security --more specifically, preventing fraudulent access to backend APIs-- the more it seems like CloudKit is a disaster waiting to happen. While data in transit is encrypted and there's even end-to-end encryption for private DBs, securing an app's public DB in the presence of modified apps is a daunting, if not impossible task. My assumption is that a modified app cannot be trusted to make honest assertions about itself, the device, or its iCloud account, and can potentially lie its way into restricted areas of the DB. If an app is compromised, CloudKit queries from that app can be used to make malicious queries or even changes to the databases. I'm hoping App Attest, even with its potentially circular logic, can at least make life harder for fraudsters, competitors, and vandals (when combined with other security measures like jailbreak, debugging, hooking, and tampering detections), but I have not found a single mention on how App Attest might be used to protect CloudKit. There doesn't even seem to be a verified way for me to build a third party server that can handle App Attest and then tell CloudKit to allow a user through (with all the security hazards a new developer faces when configuring an authentication server). The message seems to be: App Attest is important, but you can't use it with CloudKit, so build your own server. Questions Is my assumption that a compromised app can make malicious queries or changes to an app's CloudKit DB correct? Can App Attest be made to protect a CloudKit public DB, with or without the involvement of a third-party server to handle attestations?

I'm a new app developer and I've read through most relevant posts on this topic here and elsewhere. Many of the forum posts here are specific to Objective-C, or old enough to be considered outdated in the fast-moving world of computing. Many of the posts elsewhere are about protecting authentication secrets, which doesn't apply in my case, and a lot are by someone with a product to sell, which I've ignored. My app is 99.9% Swift and I'm not going to store any authentication secrets in the IPA. What I'd like to protect is the core mechanism of my product, which has to be included in the binary and is small (&lt; 10k lines). I want to make it so it's harder to steal the source code than it is to recreate my functionality from scratch, which is difficult even with the app in front of them. From what I gathered, Swift code compiled by Xcode is protected from reverse engineering / decompilation by the following: Symbolization of the app Native builds from Xcode destroys names of variable, functions, etc. Swift code is compiled in such a way that makes stealing harder than Objective-C This should make me feel better, but the threat-level is increasing with the availability of free, commercial-grade decompilers (e.g. Ghidra) and machine learning. The fact that iOS 18 supports a checkm8 (i.e. jailbreakable) device means that decrypting the IPA from memory is still trivial. Questions People talk about stealing authentication secrets via reverse-engineering, but is the same true for mechanisms (i.e. code)? How common is the issue of source-code stealing in iOS apps? Can machine learning be leveraged to make decompilation/reverse engineering easier? Will I get rejected by App Review for obfuscating a small portion of my code?

Private Access Tokens (PATs) are headlined as something that can eliminate CAPTCHAs, but also includes app-to-server communications in its use cases. Because of this, they seem to perform a very similar function to DeviceCheck, since both aim to attest to the health of the device in question. I don't really understand the difference between the two and find this confusing. Since PATs are newer and more general, I'm more inclined to adopt them, but where does this leave DeviceCheck? Is it redundant? How does App Attest fit into all of this? If my goal is to minimize if not eliminiate fraudulent/malicious use of my app's APIs, should I use Private Access Tokens, DeviceCheck, and App Attest simultaneously to maximize my protection? If not, what is accepted to be the best practice? I admire Apple's dedication to privacy and security, but as a new developer I feel Apple could make it easier for their app developers to find out and implement the latest best practices.

A call to the API SecKeyGeneratePair in SecureEnclave for iOS18 returns an OSStatus 0 but the SecKeyRef is not present. Understand that this API is currently deprecated and there are plans to move to the new APIs, but I believe this API should still work in iOS18 as expected for now. The API works as expected on iPadOS 18. // Create SE key let sacRef = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(kCFAllocatorDefault, kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock, .privateKeyUsage, nil)! let privKeyAttr = [ kSecAttrAccessControl: sacRef, kSecAttrIsPermanent: true, ] as NSDictionary os_log("Priv key params: %{public}@", log: osLogger, privKeyAttr) let keygenAttr = [ kSecAttrApplicationLabel: attrApplicationLabelSeKey, kSecAttrTokenID: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, kSecPrivateKeyAttrs: privKeyAttr, kSecAttrKeyType: kSecAttrKeyTypeEC, kSecAttrKeySizeInBits: 256 ] as NSDictionary var error: Unmanaged<CFError>? os_log("keygen params: %{public}@", log: osLogger, keygenAttr) var keyRef: SecKey? let status = SecKeyGeneratePair(keygenAttr, &keyRef, nil) os_log("SecKeyGeneratePair osStatus: %{public}d, keyRef: %{public}@", log: osLogger, status, keyRef == nil ? "null" : "ref present")

I have a unique need here and hope there is someone out there that might be of help. There is a backend server that will send an x509 certificate and private key (as strings) after the mobile apps on-boarding process. Additionally, the app includes an AWS SDK that is used to talk to their IoT system. This SDK requires PKCS12 certificate format to pass authentication. (I believe the common method is to have bundled the cert into the app which is not an option for me here sadly) I suspect it may be possible to use some openSSL iOS framework to do this conversion at runtime but have not personally tried it yet as my go-to is usually trying things first with Apples APIs. So my question becomes is there a way to meet this requirement using any of the security APIs or other APIs that apple has like swift-nio-ssl? Thank you very much for your time. Best, Michael

The release notes state the following: To protect users’ privacy, app group containers (in ~/Library/Group Containers) are now protected by System Integrity Protection. This is similar to the protection added to app data containers in macOS Sonoma. An app that’s properly entitled for an app group continues to have access to the app group container. Specifically, the app must use FileManager to get the app group container path and meet one of the following requirements: the app is deployed through Mac App Store; the app group identifier is prefixed with the app’s Team ID; or the app group identifier is authorised by a provisioning profile embedded within the app. If the app doesn’t meet these requirements, the system might present the user a prompt to authorize the app’s use of the app group container. If granted, that consent applies only for the duration of that app instance. This restriction also applies to app extensions, although in that case the system won’t prompt the user for consent but will instead just deny the access. (114586798) We have a helper app which is not sandboxed (due to it requiring Accessibility access/permissions) that accesses our group container. I've tested our helper app with the current beta of macOS Sequoia 15 (24A5264n) and it still works correctly, however I'm not clear if these restrictions are actually enforced in the current beta. I've tried testing for this by accessing the group container via Terminal (with Full Disk Access disabled for Terminal), but did not get any alert mentioned in the notes (or been otherwise restricted). Are these restrictions currently enforced?

Hi, My application ships a copy of following cryptographic libraries: libp11-kit.0.dylib libnettle.8.dylib libgnutls.30.dylib It's purpose is to connect by secured HTTP to an optional server, that might be turned on to allow to receive HTTP requests. I think this is standard encryption, but do I need to mention this explicitely with App Uses Non-Exempt Encryption? The application doesn't encrypt content it is just for secured HTTP connections. regards, Joël

By calling the deactivationRequest from the main app bundle, we see Privacy & Security prompts for TouchID to deactivate the System Extension. We want to know if there's way to avoid that prompt. And also need know why the prompt pops up to deactivate our own app's System Extension component. We even tried to call the deactivate request from Daemon which contain the root access. We still see the prompt. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/systemextensions/ossystemextensionrequest/deactivationrequest(forextensionwithidentifier:queue:)

I'm using a file descriptor to write into a file. I've encountered a problem where if the underlying file is removed or recreated, the file descriptor becomes unstable. I have no reliable way to confirm if it's writing on the expected file. let url = URL(fileURLWithPath: "/path/") try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) FileManager.default.createFile(atPath: url.path, contents: .empty) let filePath = FilePath(url.path) var fileDescriptor = try FileDescriptor.open(filePath, .readWrite) // The file is recreated - may be done from a different process. try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) // L9 FileManager.default.createFile(atPath: url.path, contents: .empty) // L10 let dataToWrite = Data([1,1,1,1]) try fileDescriptor.writeAll(dataToWrite) // L13 let dataWritten = try Data(contentsOf: url) print(dataToWrite == dataWritten) // false I would expect L13 to result in an error. Given it doesn't: Is there a way to determine where fileDescriptor is writing? Is there a way to ensure that fileDescriptor is writing the content in the expected filePath?

我们正在创建一个新的 macOS 应用程序，该应用程序需要访问沙盒之外的文件。它需要以静默状态停靠并使用 Electron Builder 应用程序进行打包。我已将相关权限配置为 com.apple.security.memory-exception.files.absolute path.read-only ， 它可以在 mas dev 的本地版本中正常访问。配置参数如下： com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-only /Volumes/NO NAME/ /Volumes/NO NAME 1/ <字符串>/卷/无名称 2/</字符串> </阵列> 但在应用商店审查期间，有人说它不是法律价值。以下为声明原文： 您的应用未正确实现沙盒，或者它包含一个或多个具有无效值的权利。在重新提交新的二进制文件之前，请查看包含的权利和沙盒文档并解决此问题。 com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-only True 如果存在 com.apple.security.memory-exception.files.absolute path.read-only 授权，应用商店会接受它吗？我需要做些什么才能访问它？

I have the following situation: My SwiftUI App for macOS is using App Sandbox and is currently configured for read/write access for all the locations selectable in XCode I have added a file selector using a button and NSOpenPanel() to let the user select a folder containing a database file, to which I successfully get permissions using URL.bookmarkData() and URL.startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() I then try to read file paths from the database file and open those but I instantly get a permission error without a permission dialog/prompt appearing In my test I am using paths to files in my iCloud Drive folder I added all file/folder related usage string entries to the Info.plist for testing I think this is weird, since I can paste one of those file:// URLs from the database into a (non-Safari) browser and it shows the native permission dialog/prompt before downloading the file as expected. Is there any usage string that's not shown in the Info.plist Dropdown in XCode that I need to add to my app in order for this to work?