Problem On iOS 27.0 beta (build 24A5430a) ATTrackingManager.requestTrackingAuthorization() completes with the status still .notDetermined and no prompt is ever presented. The ATT system prompt does not appear in any app on the Store. Environment iOS 27.0 beta 8 iPad and iPhone, both affected Country IT Question: Is this expected behavior, or is it a change in the new version of iOS? If it is a change, could you please point me to a reference that documents this? Happy to provide anything further through the Feedback report rather than here.

Title: Does identifierForVendor (IDFV) change after transferring an app to another Apple Developer account? We are planning to transfer an existing App Store app from one Apple Developer account/team to another using App Transfer. The app currently uses: UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor as one of the identifiers sent to our backend. We would like to confirm the exact behavior of identifierForVendor after the app is transferred to the recipient developer account. Our scenario is: The app is currently published under Developer Team A. Existing users already have the app installed on their devices. We transfer the app to Developer Team B through App Store Connect. Developer Team B creates new certificates/provisioning profiles and publishes a new version of the same app. Existing users update the app normally from the App Store, without uninstalling it. Questions: After an existing user updates from the last version published by Team A to the first version published by Team B, will UIDevice.current.identifierForVendor remain the same, or will it be regenerated? Is the vendor used to calculate IDFV associated with: the App Store app record, the Bundle ID, the Team ID, the App ID Prefix, the developer organization/vendor, or some other value? Does App Transfer itself cause IDFV to change, or does the value only change under specific conditions such as changing the organization name or uninstalling all apps from the same vendor? If IDFV changes after App Transfer, does Apple provide any official migration or mapping mechanism that allows the backend to associate the old IDFV with the new IDFV? For example, Sign in with Apple provides a user migration mechanism when transferring an app between developer teams. Is there any equivalent mechanism for identifierForVendor? Is there any difference between: users who update the app directly after the transfer, and users who uninstall the old version and reinstall the app after the transfer? We have reviewed the documentation for identifierForVendor and App Transfer, but we could not find an explicit statement describing the IDFV behavior specifically for an App Transfer between two different developer teams. Our main concern is maintaining backend device associations for existing users after the transfer. We would appreciate an official clarification on whether IDFV continuity is guaranteed across App Transfer, and if not, what migration strategy Apple recommends.

Hello, I'm desperately looking for a way to purge the contents of the Local Network allowlist in System Settings. Every version of a test app I've ever used gets an entry in there, and apparently so does each build of Chrome and Claude Code. Claude recommended I include the following context, and if there's a specific answer to that, great, but any way of purging this list would make me very happy. ==== Caution: slop below this line ==== macOS 27.0 (26A428), Apple silicon. The Local Network list has 471 entries, many dead: Chrome code_sign_clone paths that no longer exist, old ad-hoc builds, uninstalled apps. The pane can't remove any. Is there a supported way to remove entries or reset the list, short of Recovery? Editing /Library/Preferences/com.apple.networkextension.plist as root fails with EPERM, both rename-over and open-for-write. New files in that directory work. SIP is on, the file has no flags or xattrs, Full Disk Access didn't help, and there are no Sandbox/TCC denials in the log. What protects this file?

Environment: App: Developer ID signed, non-sandboxed macOS app Browsers affected: Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox Safari: Working fine on macOS 27 Working on: macOS 26 and earlier Broken on: macOS 27 (Golden Gate) Issue Our non-sandboxed, Developer ID signed macOS app interacts with Chrome and Firefox directories under ~/Library/Application Support/ as part of its browser extension deployment workflow. On macOS 26 and earlier, this worked without any special permissions. On macOS 27, the same operations are silently blocked — no TCC prompt is shown to the user, access is simply denied. Granting Full Disk Access to our app via System Settings > Privacy & Security > Full Disk Access resolves the issue completely on macOS 27. Safari is unaffected — our Safari extension is bundled directly inside our app and continues to work correctly on macOS 27 without any additional permissions. Question Has macOS 27 intentionally introduced TCC or MACL-based protection over Chrome and Firefox directories under ~/Library/Application Support/, blocking access from non-owner processes including non-sandboxed Developer ID apps? If this is an intentional change, is Full Disk Access the expected requirement going forward, or is there a more targeted entitlement or Apple-recommended approach for a non-sandboxed app that legitimately needs to access browser directories as part of an extension deployment workflow?

Modern versions of macOS use a file system permission model that’s far more complex than the traditional BSD rwx model, and this post is my attempt at explaining that model. If you have a question about this, post it here on DevForums. Put your thread in the App & System Services > Core OS topic area and tag it with Files and Storage. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" On File System Permissions Modern versions of macOS have five different file system permission mechanisms: Traditional BSD permissions Access control lists (ACLs) App Sandbox Mandatory access control (MAC) Endpoint Security (ES) The first two were introduced a long time ago and rarely trip folks up. The second two are newer, more complex, and specific to macOS, and thus are the source of some confusion. Finally, Endpoint Security allows third-party developers to deny file system operations based on their own criteria. This post offers explanations and advice about all of these mechanisms. Error Codes App Sandbox and the mandatory access control system are both implemented using macOS’s sandboxing infrastructure. When a file system operation fails, check the error to see whether it was blocked by this sandboxing infrastructure. If an operation was blocked by BSD permissions or ACLs, it fails with EACCES (Permission denied, 13). If it was blocked by something else, it’ll fail with EPERM (Operation not permitted, 1). If you’re using Foundation’s FileManager, these error are both reported as Foundation errors, for example, the NSFileReadNoPermissionError error. To recover the underlying error, get the NSUnderlyingErrorKey property from the info dictionary. App Sandbox File system access within the App Sandbox is controlled by two factors. The first is the entitlements on the main executable. There are three relevant groups of entitlements: The com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement enables the App Sandbox. This denies access to all file system locations except those on a built-in allowlist (things like /System) or within the app’s containers. The various “standard location” entitlements extend the sandbox to include their corresponding locations. The various “file access temporary exceptions” entitlements extend the sandbox to include the items listed in the entitlement. Collectively this is known as your static sandbox. The second factor is dynamic sandbox extensions. The system issues these extensions to your sandbox based on user behaviour. For example, if the user selects a file in the open panel, the system issues a sandbox extension to your process so that it can access that file. The type of extension is determined by the main executable’s entitlements: com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-only results in an extension that grants read-only access. com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write results in an extension that grants read/write access. Note There’s currently no way to get a dynamic sandbox extension that grants executable access. For all the gory details, see this post. These dynamic sandbox extensions are tied to your process; they go away when your process terminates. To maintain persistent access to an item, use a security-scoped bookmark. See Accessing files from the macOS App Sandbox. To pass access between processes, use an implicit security scoped bookmark, that is, a bookmark that was created without an explicit security scope (no .withSecurityScope flag) and without disabling the implicit security scope (no .withoutImplicitSecurityScope flag)). If you have access to a directory — regardless of whether that’s via an entitlement or a dynamic sandbox extension — then, in general, you have access to all items in the hierarchy rooted at that directory. This does not overrule the MAC protection discussed below. For example, if the user grants you access to ~/Library, that does not give you access to ~/Library/Mail because the latter is protected by MAC. Finally, the discussion above is focused on a new sandbox, the thing you get when you launch a sandboxed app from the Finder. If a sandboxed process starts a child process, that child process inherits its sandbox from its parent. For information on what happens in that case, see the Note box in Enabling App Sandbox Inheritance. IMPORTANT The child process inherits its parent process’s sandbox regardless of whether it has the com.apple.security.inherit entitlement. That entitlement exists primarily to act as a marker for App Review. App Review requires that all main executables have the com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement, and that entitlements starts a new sandbox by default. Thus, any helper tool inside your app needs the com.apple.security.inherit entitlement to trigger inheritance. However, if you’re not shipping on the Mac App Store you can leave off both of these entitlement and the helper process will inherit its parent’s sandbox just fine. The same applies if you run a built-in executable, like /bin/sh, as a child process. When the App Sandbox blocks something, it might generates a sandbox violation report. For information on how to view these reports, see Discovering and diagnosing App Sandbox violations. To learn more about the App Sandbox, see the various links in App Sandbox Resources. For information about how to embed a helper tool in a sandboxed app, see Embedding a Command-Line Tool in a Sandboxed App. Mandatory Access Control Mandatory access control (MAC) has been a feature of macOS for many releases, but it’s become a lot more prominent since macOS 10.14. There are many flavours of MAC but the ones you’re most likely to encounter are: Full Disk Access (macOS 10.14 and later) Files and Folders (macOS 10.15 and later) App bundle protection (macOS 13 and later) App container protection (macOS 14 and later) App group container protection (macOS 15 and later) Data Vaults (see below) and other internal techniques used by various macOS subsystems The exact list of file system locations protected by MAC is not documented and, as illustrated by the list above, can change over time. If your process runs into a MAC check the system might prompt the user to grant the process access, or it might just fail the access. If the user grants the process access, the system might only grant that access for this specific process, or it might persist that access for the program that this process is running. The exact behaviour varies based on the specific location in the file system and can also vary between different versions of macOS. Mandatory access control, as the name suggests, is mandatory; it’s not an opt-in like the App Sandbox. Rather, all processes on the system, including those running as root, as subject to MAC. Data Vaults are not a third-party developer opportunity. See this post if you’re curious. In the Full Disk Access and Files and Folders cases, users grant a program a MAC privilege using System Settings > Privacy & Security. Some MAC privileges are per user (Files and Folders) and some are system wide (Full Disk Access). If you’re not sure, run this simple test: On a Mac with two users, log in as user A and enable the MAC privilege for a program. Now log in as user B. Does the program have the privilege? If a process tries to access an item restricted by MAC, the system may prompt the user to grant it access there and then. For example, if an app tries to access the desktop, you’ll see an alert like this: “AAA” would like to access files in your Desktop folder. [Don’t Allow] [OK] To customise this message, set Files and Folders properties in your Info.plist. This system only displays this alert once. It remembers the user’s initial choice and returns the same result thereafter. This relies on your code having a stable code signing identity. If your code is unsigned, or signed ad hoc (Signed to Run Locally in Xcode parlance), the system can’t tell that version N+1 of your code is the same as version N, and thus you’ll encounter excessive prompts. Note For information about how that works, see TN3127 Inside Code Signing: Requirements. The Files and Folders prompts only show up if the process is running in a GUI login session. If not, the operation is allowed or denied based on existing information. If there’s no existing information, the operation is denied by default. For more information about app and app group container protection, see the links in Trusted Execution Resources. For more information about app groups in general, see App Groups: macOS vs iOS: Working Towards Harmony On managed systems the site admin can use the com.apple.TCC.configuration-profile-policy payload to assign MAC privileges. For testing purposes you can reset parts of TCC using the tccutil command-line tool. For general information about that tool, see its man page. For a list of TCC service names, see the posts on this thread. Note TCC stands for transparency, consent, and control. It’s the subsystem within macOS that manages most of the privileges visible in System Settings > Privacy & Security. TCC has no API surface, but you see its name in various places, including the above-mentioned configuration profile payload and command-line tool, and the name of its accompanying daemon, tccd. While tccutil is an easy way to do basic TCC testing, the most reliable way to test TCC is in a VM, restoring to a fresh snapshot between each test. If you want to try this out, crib ideas from Testing a Notarised Product. The MAC privilege mechanism is heavily dependent on the concept of responsible code. For example, if an app contains a helper tool and the helper tool triggers a MAC prompt, we want: The app’s name and usage description to appear in the alert. The user’s decision to be recorded for the whole app, not that specific helper tool. That decision to show up in System Settings under the app’s name. For this to work the system must be able to tell that the app is the responsible code for the helper tool. The system has various heuristics to determine this and it works reasonably well in most cases. However, it’s possible to break this link. I haven’t fully research this but my experience is that this most often breaks when the child process does something ‘odd’ to break the link, such as trying to daemonise itself. If you’re building a launchd daemon or agent and you find that it’s not correctly attributed to your app, add the AssociatedBundleIdentifiers property to your launchd property list. See the launchd.plist man page for the details. Scripting MAC presents some serious challenges for scripting because scripts are run by interpreters and the system can’t distinguish file system operations done by the interpreter from those done by the script. For example, if you have a script that needs to manipulate files on your desktop, you wouldn’t want to give the interpreter that privilege because then any script could do that. The easiest solution to this problem is to package your script as a standalone program that MAC can use for its tracking. This may be easy or hard depending on the specific scripting environment. For example, AppleScript makes it easy to export a script as a signed app, but that’s not true for shell scripts. TCC and Main Executables TCC expects its bundled clients — apps, app extensions, and so on — to use a native main executable. That is, it expects the CFBundleExecutable property to be the name of a Mach-O executable. If your product uses a script as its main executable, you’re likely to encounter TCC problems. To resolve these, switch to using a Mach-O executable. For an example of how you might do that, see this post. Endpoint Security Endpoint Security (ES) is a general mechanism for third-party products to enforce custom security policies on the Mac. An ES client asks ES to send it events when specific security-relevant operations occur. These events can be notifications or authorisations. In the case of authorisation events, the ES client must either allow or deny the operation. As you might imagine, the set of security-relevant operations includes file system operations. For example, when you open a file using the open system call, ES delivers the ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN event to any interested ES clients. If one of those ES client denies the operation, the open system call fails with EPERM. For more information about ES, see the Endpoint Security framework documentation. Originally ES clients operated system wide. macOS 27 introduced a new mechanism, es_new_descendants_client, that allows an ES client to operate on the process hierarchy rooted at the client itself. Revision History 2026-09-18 Extended the Endpoint Security section to discuss es_new_descendants_client. Clarified the scope of MAC. 2025-11-04 Added a discussion of Endpoint Security. Made numerous minor editorial changes. 2024-11-08 Added info about app group container protection. Clarified that Data Vaults are just one example of the techniques used internally by macOS. Made other editorial changes. 2023-06-13 Replaced two obsolete links with links to shiny new official documentation: Accessing files from the macOS App Sandbox and Discovering and diagnosing App Sandbox violations. Added a short discussion of app container protection and a link to WWDC 2023 Session 10053 What’s new in privacy. 2023-04-07 Added a link to my post about executable permissions. Fixed a broken link. 2023-02-10 In TCC and Main Executables, added a link to my native trampoline code. Introduced the concept of an implicit security scoped bookmark. Introduced AssociatedBundleIdentifiers. Made other minor editorial changes. 2022-04-26 Added an explanation of the TCC initialism. Added a link to Viewing Sandbox Violation Reports.  Added the TCC and Main Executables section. Made significant editorial changes. 2022-01-10 Added a discussion of the file system hierarchy. 2021-04-26 First posted.

We are having an issue with the Local Network permission pop-up not getting triggered for our apps that need to communicate with devices via local network interfaces/addresses. As we understand, apps using UDP should trigger this, causing macOS to prompt for access, or, if denied, fail to connect. However, we are facing issues with macOS not prompting this popup at all. Here are important and related points: Our application is packaged as a .app package and distributed independently (not on the App Store). The application controls hardware that we manufacture. In order to find the hardware on the network, we send a UDP broadcast with a message for our hardware on the local network, and the hardware responds with a message back. However, the popup (to ask for permission) never shows up. The application is not able to find the hardware device. It is interesting to note that data is still sent out to the network (without the popup) but we receive back the wrong data. The behaviour is consistent macOS Sequoia (and above) with both Apple And Intel silicon. Workarounds that have been tried: Manual Authorization: One solution suggested in various blogs was to go to "Settings → Privacy and Security-> Local network", find your application and grant access. However, the application never shows up in the list here. Firewall: No difference is seen in behaviour with firewall being ON OR OFF. Setting NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription: We have also tried setting the Info.plist adding the NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription with a meaningful string and updating the NSBonjourServices. Running Via terminal (WORKS): Running the application via terminal sees no issues. The application runs correctly and is able to send UDP and receive correct data (and find the devices on the network). But this is not an appropriate solution. How can we get this bug/issue fixed in macOS Sequoia (and above)? Are there any other solutions/workarounds that we can try on our end?

Running 'tccutil reset microphone' gives the error message 'tccutil: Failed to reset microphone'. The same command worked in the past. Deleting the TCC.db files didn't help. In the console there is an error from the tccd daemon saying handle_TCCAccessResetInternal: Invalid Service Name: kTCCServicemicrophone(Service name is invalid on this platform) Any ideas?

My app is using RemoteMediaSessionExtension to control speakers over the local network via the new Now Playing framework. Starting with Beta 6, local network calls from the extension fail with 'Path was denied by NECP policy' error. Is it a bug or an intentional change in the latest beta?

The AppTrackingTransparency documentation says: You must use the AppTrackingTransparency framework if your app collects data about end users and shares it with other companies for purposes of tracking across apps and web sites. If I create a unique customer_id value to submit to the GIPHY Actions Register endpoint to track GIFs a user has clicked or sent, does that count as "tracking across apps and web sites"?

My app used 3rd party API to provide some services, but there's a possibility that those API use some other third party service and to approve my app for App Privacy Guidelines 5.1.1(i) - Legal - Privacy - Data Collection and 5.1.2(i) - Legal - Privacy - Data Use, developers must include third party API service name.

I'm getting the following error on every submission (Build 1 through 8), even after multiple clean rebuilds and manual verification of the raw manifest content: ITMS-91064: Invalid tracking information - A PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy file contains invalid tracking information at the following path: "PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy" and also "PlugIns/[WidgetName].appex/PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy" NSPrivacyTracking must be true if NSPrivacyTrackingDomains isn't empty. What I've verified locally (via plutil -p and raw cat on both the .xcarchive and the exported .ipa): Main app PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy: NSPrivacyTracking=false, NSPrivacyTrackingDomains=[] (empty) Widget PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy: same, false + empty No duplicate keys found in either file Generated an official "Privacy Report" from Xcode Organizer - no obvious conflict at the app or widget level was shown Updated GoogleMobileAds/UserMessagingPlatform SDKs to the latest version - issue persists Bundle version increments correctly with each build (confirmed via Info.plist inside the actual uploaded archive) Is there a known caching issue on the App Store Connect validation side, or something else I might be missing? Happy to share the Privacy Report PDF and archive details if helpful.

Hello, I making VPN client app and would like to clarify Apple Guideline 5.4 article: "VPN apps may not sell, use, or disclose to third parties any data for any purpose, and must commit to this in their privacy policy", does it mean anonymous nodes/servers telemetry also can't be provided to third parties? Thank you

Our macOS app makes an URLRequest (via URLSession) to an HTTP(S) server on the local network (a device at a private IP address, e.g. 192.168.x.x). The request fails with NSURLErrorNotConnectedToInternet (-1009) whose underlying error resolves to ENETDOWN (POSIX errno 50) at the socket/connection level — i.e. the failure happens before any TLS/HTTP exchange, at connect() time. This only reproduces on macOS 27 "Golden Gate" Public Beta. The exact same build/binary works correctly on: macOS 26 "Tahoe" (shipping release) macOS 27 "Golden Gate" Developer Beta Based on our diagnosis, we believe the Local Network permission prompt itself is never firing for direct-IP (non-Bonjour) connections on this Public Beta build, leaving the app's Local Network TCC grant permanently stuck in an "undetermined" state — which then surfaces as ENETDOWN. This is consistent with the app not appearing at all in System Settings → Privacy & Security → Local Network, and with tccutil reset LocalNetwork failing both per-app and system-wide (there's no grant to reset in the first place). We'd like a sanity check / to know if others are seeing this, and whether there's a known workaround. Environment App: com.example.Client, non-sandboxed Target: https://:/api/... macOS versions tested: macOS 26 Tahoe — OK; macOS 27 Golden Gate Developer Beta — OK; macOS 27 Golden Gate Public Beta (build: 26A5388g) — fails Mac model: Mac mini Xcode version used to build: 27 beta 2 Error details URLSession completion error: Error Domain=NSURLErrorDomain Code=-1009 "..." UserInfo={ _kCFStreamErrorCodeKey=50, NSUnderlyingError=0x... { Error Domain=kCFErrorDomainCFNetwork Code=-1009 UserInfo={ _NSURLErrorNWPathKey=..., _kCFStreamErrorCodeKey=50, _kCFStreamErrorDomainKey=1 } }, ... } _kCFStreamErrorDomainKey=1 is kCFStreamErrorDomainPOSIX, and code 50 is ENETDOWN. Console log for the same request shows the failure at the connection layer, before any TLS/HTTP activity: Connection 1: received failure notification Connection 1: failed to connect 1:50, reason -1 Connection 1: encountered error(1:50) Task <...>.<1> HTTP load failed, 0/0 bytes (error code: -1009 [1:50]) What we've ruled out / tried Added NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription to Info.plist — no change in behavior. Confirmed via codesign -d --entitlements - and plutil -p Info.plist that the built/signed app bundle actually contains the key. Checked System Settings → Privacy & Security → Local Network — the app itself does not even appear in the list. Tried resetting the Local Network TCC grant: sudo tccutil reset LocalNetwork com.example.Client → tccutil: Failed to reset LocalNetwork approval status for com.example.Client Also tried a full reset for the service (no bundle id): sudo tccutil reset LocalNetwork → tccutil: Failed to reset LocalNetwork Confirmed tccutil itself is functioning normally on this machine — resetting other services succeeds, e.g.: sudo tccutil reset Camera → Successfully reset Camera So tccutil works in general, but the LocalNetwork service specifically cannot be reset, on this Public Beta build, either per-app or system-wide. Question for the forum Is there a known change/regression on the Golden Gate Public Beta where the Local Network permission prompt doesn't fire for direct-IP connections that don't go through Bonjour/NWBrowser? (The same code works fine on the Developer Beta.) Has anyone else seen tccutil reset LocalNetwork fail (while other services reset fine) specifically on the macOS 27 Golden Gate Public Beta? Any known workaround short of downgrading — e.g. restructuring the connection to use Bonjour/NWBrowser instead of a direct IP connection, or some way to explicitly trigger the permission prompt? We're also planning to file this via Feedback Assistant with a full sysdiagnose, but wanted to check here first in case this is already a known/tracked issue or someone has a workaround. Thanks in advance.

Hi, We've implemented age assurance logic in our app using the DeclaredAgeRange framework to comply with regulations in Brazil (Digital ECA, effective March 17, 2026) and Utah (App Store Accountability Act, effective May 6, 2026). Our implementation calls AgeRangeService.shared.isEligibleForAgeFeatures on app launch to determine whether the current user is subject to age assurance requirements, and proceeds to call requestAgeRange(ageGates:) accordingly. However, after monitoring in production since the Brazil enforcement date, we've consistently observed isEligibleForAgeFeatures returning false for users in regulated regions, with no age range data being returned. What we'd like to clarify: Is isEligibleForAgeFeatures currently returning true for users in Brazil in production (not sandbox)? For Utah — given that HB 498 pushed the developer compliance deadline to May 6, 2027, will isEligibleForAgeFeatures reflect the original May 6, 2026 activation date or the revised 2027 date? Is there a known rollout schedule or gradual activation plan for these regions that would explain why the flag remains false even after the legal enforcement dates have passed? We've seen similar reports from other developers on these forums, so it seems this may be a widespread issue rather than an implementation problem on our end. Any official guidance on the current status of the API in regulated regions would be greatly appreciated. Thanks.

Hi Apple Developer Community, I’m preparing an iOS app called Titech for App Review. The app is intended for clinic/business users and provides preliminary AI-generated cosmetic analysis and preview guidance based on user-submitted face photos. The app is not intended to provide medical advice, diagnosis, or treatment decisions, and users are told to consult qualified experts before acting on any recommendation. We have received multiple App Review rejections and I would appreciate guidance on whether our current approach is aligned with Apple’s expectations. Current issues raised by App Review: Guideline 2.1 - Information Needed Apple asked for more information about how the app uses face data, including: What face data is collected How it is used, stored, retained, deleted, and shared Whether it is shared with third parties Where this is explained in the privacy policy Exact privacy policy text about face data We updated the app and privacy policy to explain that: Users voluntarily upload front, left-side, and right-side face photos Photos may be sent to our backend and processed by OpenAI through the OpenAI API Face ID/fingerprint data is not collected Uploaded face photos and generated preview images are deleted after the active session ends The app does not sell face data or share it with advertisers/data brokers Guideline 2.1(b) - Information Needed Apple asked about the business model and whether users access paid content. Our app does not currently include paid digital content, subscriptions, credits, or in-app purchases. Access is controlled by a registration code for clinic/business users and App Review only. Guideline 2.3.3 - Accurate Metadata Apple said the screenshots did not show the current version of the app in use. We replaced the screenshots with updated iPhone and iPad screenshots showing: Clinic access Consent and face-data disclosure Photo capture AI-generated analysis Recommendations Side effects page Generated preview flow My questions: For apps using user-submitted face photos with a third-party AI API, is it enough to clearly disclose OpenAI processing in the consent screen and privacy policy, or should this also be repeated elsewhere in the app flow? For face photos that are deleted after the active session ends, what wording does Apple generally expect around retention and deletion? Since the app is clinic/business access only and does not sell digital content, is a registration code acceptable if we clearly explain that it is not a paid digital unlock? Are there any additional App Review notes or privacy policy sections that developers usually include for apps involving face photos and AI-generated preliminary recommendations? For metadata, should the screenshots avoid login/consent screens entirely, or is it acceptable to include them as long as most screenshots show core app functionality? Any advice from developers who have passed review with apps involving user-uploaded face photos, AI analysis, or cosmetic/health-adjacent recommendations would be very helpful. Thank you.

Let's say my app is a password or other type of secret manager, which means it can display highly sensitive data to the user. If Siri summarize whats on screen, it would then be able to "see" that sensitive data and transmit it off device in a way the user might not expect nor want. Is there a way that I can prevent this by marking specific views in an app as sensitive, or detect if Siri is analyzing the contents of the apps screen? The .privacySensitive() modifier and @Environment(\.isSceneCaptured) environment variable do not seem to apply in this case.

I am currently using macOS 27 beta 4, but this issue also existed on macOS 26.5 before I updated to macOS 27. I am not sure whether earlier system versions had the same problem, as I had never encountered a similar issue before. I am developing through the local network, including using VSCode Remote SSH to connect to a local server, and using a Swift app to establish a WebSocket connection with the local server. Recently, I have encountered multiple cases where the local server connection suddenly failed. Checking the logs showed messages such as Permission denied or similar errors. AI assistants explained that this usually means the target app does not have Local Network permission enabled in Privacy & Security settings. However, I checked the settings page and confirmed that the target apps already have Local Network permission enabled. Previously, when VSCode Remote SSH failed, I observed the following behavior: after updating VSCode, if the local server was not running, VSCode Remote SSH immediately reported that the target server could not be found. After starting the local server, it immediately reported that there was no route to the host (I do not remember the exact English error message, but it was a common network error). Checking the logs showed Permission denied. I even noticed two VSCode entries in the Local Network permission list that could be enabled or disabled independently. Just now, my Swift app failed in a similar way. I verified that the server was running and listening because websocat could successfully connect to the local server. The app uses Starscream, and client.connect() was executed but the connection could not be established. Checking log stream --predicate 'process == "name"' --level debug showed: 2026-08-08 14:48:38.620396 ... nw_endpoint_handler_path_change [C1 ... waiting parent-flow (unsatisfied (Local network prohibited), interface: bridge100, ipv4)] However, after successfully applying the workaround described below, I saw the backend server print related output, proving that the server received the app's ping frame. At the same time, the Local Network permission page did not show this app as an entry, and no permission prompt appeared asking me to authorize Local Network access. Therefore, I am no longer certain that this issue is strictly related to Local Network permission. All of the above cases involve third-party components: VSCode Remote SSH, UTM providing a server at 192.168.64.3, and Starscream instead of the WebSocket implementation provided by Foundation. I am not an expert in networking, so I cannot completely rule out issues caused by third-party software. However, I found that running the following commands in macOS Recovery Mode: #!/bin/bash cd "/Volumes/Data/Library/Preferences/" rm -f com.apple.networkextension.plist rm -f com.apple.networkextension.uuidcache.plist rm -f com.apple.networkextension.control.plist rm -f com.apple.networkextension.necp.plist and then rebooting can resolve the situation where one specific app suddenly cannot access the local network while other apps continue to work normally. Running tccutil reset All com.bundle.id did not solve the problem. This command was suggested by Claude Sonnet 5. I am not even sure whether Local Network permission is managed by TCC, but I am including this information because the five commands above appear to modify NetworkExtension-related files rather than the TCC database. This issue cannot currently be reproduced reliably. I do not know when it will happen. After it occurs, I have not found a normal-system-environment solution. The only workaround I have found is booting into Recovery Mode and clearing the local network authorization-related files.

Subject: Clarification Request – Private Relay and Silent Network Verification (SNV) Hello, Context: our app uses Silent Network Verification (SNV), the standard carrier method where the network recognizes a subscriber's connection to verify their identity without needing an SMS code. When a user has iCloud Private Relay enabled, the request path changes in a way that breaks this recognition, and the user falls back to OTP instead. We're evaluating an approach where the app would handle DNS resolution itself for this specific verification request, so the request stays on a path our network can recognize — without the user having to turn Private Relay off. Before we go further with this, we'd like clarity on two things: Would this kind of app-level DNS handling, used only for this verification step, be acceptable under the App Store Review Guidelines — or would it likely be treated as working around a user's privacy setting (for example under 2.5.1, 2.5.9, or 5.1.1)? If we added an explicit, transparent consent step in the app — telling the user we're bypassing Private Relay for this one request so they can be verified without an SMS code — would that change how this is viewed? We'd rather get this in writing from Apple than build against an assumption, and we'll need to share your response with our internal IT and compliance team, so a written reply would be genuinely helpful. Happy to provide more technical detail if useful. Thank you,

We develop a third-party endpoint security agent (DLP / device control). It needs kTCCServiceBluetoothAlways to enumerate paired Bluetooth devices and disconnect them selectively based on policy — without user interaction, since this runs unattended on managed fleets. Until recently we granted this silently via a com.apple.TCC.configuration-profile-policy (PPPC) profile pushed by MDM, or by writing directly to the TCC database — the latter no longer possible starting with macOS 27 (Golden Gate). As of macOS 27, tccd also ignores the PPPC profile approach: Override: skipping kTCCServiceBluetoothAlways ... as it is defined in deprecated PPPC profile As a result, end users now hit the standard Bluetooth access consent popup, which we have no way to suppress or pre-answer with Allow. ** Questions: ** Is there any currently supported MDM mechanism — profile-based, DDM, or otherwise — to pre-approve kTCCServiceBluetoothAlways for a specific managed app, so the popup never appears? If direct pre-approval is gone for good, is there any supported way to auto-answer the popup on the user’s behalf via policy (as exists for some other TCC services)? Is this now permanently interactive by design, or is a replacement mechanism planned for MDM-managed Bluetooth access?

in iOS26.4, after installing the app for the first time, opening the app and clicking on the UITextField input box will trigger the system to pop up the network permission application interface. This issue did not exist before iOS 26.3, only in iOS 26.4. This is a fatal bug where the network permission request box should not pop up when the developer has not called the network related API.